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This dissertation explores the potential of legal competences as independent factors 
explaining the coordination of EU and Member State actors in sustainable development 
policies. Three case studies are selected: policy formulation on alternative fuel policies, 
‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC climate change negotiations and EU and Member State 
implementation of the United Nations Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The ‘legal competences’ are operationalised in a broad manner, including Treaty 
articles, the Court’s case law, the external legal multilateral context as well as regulations 
and directives. This approach proves to be useful as what ‘legal competence’ was deemed 
influential differed per case study. Overall, the legal competences can be said to have  at 
least a moderate effect. The findings in this dissertation nuance and qualify some of the 
theories and concepts in which the role of the EU Treaties is often neglected. Moreover, 
while the literature often focuses on ‘creeping’ competences of the Commission, the case 
studies reveal that the Member State actors  were especially protective of their fixed legal 
competences e.g. taxation, the energy-mix or land-use policies. As such, the aim of 
discretionary autonomy of Member States might be more powerful than the ‘competence 
creep’ by the European Commission, hindering coordination processes in sustainable 
development policies. 
Notwithstanding these findings, the legal competences are also routinely not used and the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is notably absent in the evaluation of coordination of these 
specific sustainable development policies. This finding is interesting as every case study 
provides clear examples of ‘contrary to the Treaty-logic’. Examples include the peculiar 
negotiation mandate based on unanimity for UNFCCC negotiations, the lack of EU 
coordination on SDG implementation and the absence of CJEU cases on traditional 
combustion engines. Moreover, the category of ‘shared’ competences in particular proved to 
be a wide-ranging category in need of specific examination per policy area. Therefore, 
coordination of multi-faceted mixed competence arrangements, analysed in this dissertation, 
is becoming  increasingly difficult and often based on ad-hoc decisions. As such, the 
interaction with intervening political-theoretical variables has provided some additional 
understanding. The case studies show that there is significant interaction between political 
and legal variables in practice for example between preference heterogeneity, supranational-
intergovernmental dominance and the catalogue of competences and Treaty provisions. In 
that sense, the Treaty provisions itself are the result of a political trade-off in the Treaty 
negotiations in the 2000s, thus making it implausible to mark the legal competences as 
‘independent’ from political processes. These findings can be valued as minimal plausibility 
probes, seeing the small N and peculiarities of the cases. The dissertation nevertheless 
contributes to theory-building and to new methodological approaches analysing the EU’s and 
Member State’s coordination on sustainable development issues, both internally as well as in 
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There is an increasing amount of attention on EU and Member State contributions to 
worldwide sustainable development and this is expected to continue with the implementation 
of two landmark agreements: the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN Agenda 2030 with its 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, absent from the literature is an 
analysis of the political effect of legal competences on coordination between EU and Member 
State actors. By using different case studies focusing on alternative fuel policies, ‘Team EU’ 
in climate negotiations and SDG implementation, this dissertation attempts  to explore the 
potential of including legal competences as independent variables explaining coordination of 
EU and Member State actors. Each case study relies on the same sources: legal documents 
(Treaty provisions, cases before the Court of Justice of the EU, regulations and directives), 
additional (policy) documents, literature and (in total) forty-seven semi-structured interviews. 
By means of a step-by-step approach the effect of the legal competences on coordination 
(and socialisation) processes are tested autonomously and in interaction with intervening 
variables consisting of issues provided by the theoretical literature: ‘supranational or 
intergovernmental dominance’, ‘the EU’s position in the international constellation of power’ 
and ‘preference heterogeneity’. The integrative politico-legal research design provides for a 
triangulation of findings.  
The expectation beforehand was that legal competences, especially those derived from EU 
Treaties, would have a considerable effect on coordination of EU and Member State actors in 
all stages (policy formulation, negotiation and implementation). Furthermore, it was expected 
that there would be a considerable interaction with the issues stemming from political 
theories, but that legal competences would be more dominant. Regarding the ‘management’ 
of the coordination process by EU and Member State actors, it seemed likely that the legal 
competences would further empower the European Commission, while  often restraining 
Member State actors from having  a ‘managing’ role in coordination.  
The findings nuance some of the theories and concepts in which the role of EU Treaties is 
often neglected. The legal competences by the Treaties and UN documents have at least a 
moderate effect. The ‘legal competences’ were operationalised in a broad manner, to include 
Treaty articles, the Court’s case-law, the external legal multilateral context as well as 
regulations and directives. This approach proved to be useful as it differed per case study 
which ‘legally defined power’ was important. The legal competences often mark the policy 
areas in which coordination is supposed to be more complicated, and sketch the common 
path of coordination in negotiation and (to a lesser extent) policy formulation and 
implementation for these specific case studies. While the literature often focuses on 
‘competence creep’ of the Commission, the case studies reveal that the Member State actors 
especially are protective of their fixed legal competences on e.g. taxation, energy-mix or 
land-use policies. Additionally, the external (UN) legal context to a certain extent amplifies 
the necessity of coordination, as is shown in the (UNFCCC) climate change multilateral 
context. In the absence of a multilateral forum, such as for alternative fuels, it proves more 
difficult to keep the coordination process of EU and Member State actors active. 
The dissertation also shows, however, that the legal competences are sometimes not used 
habitually and that there is an overall silence of the Court of Justice in these specific 
sustainable development policies. The Commission in particular seems to be hesitant to start 
legal procedures, thereby not pushing its legal competences to the limit. This finding is all the 
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more fascinating as every case study provides for some clear examples of behaviours 
‘contrary to the Treaty-logic’ or ‘contrary to sustainable development objectives’. Examples 
include, inter alia,  the peculiar negotiation mandate (unanimity) for UNFCCC negotiations, 
the lack of EU coordination on SDG implementation and the absence of steering policies and 
the absence of legal questions to the Court of Justice on traditional combustion engines in 
the alternative fuels case study. Moreover, the category of ‘shared’ competences proved to 
be a wide-ranging category in need of specific examination per policy area. This makes the 
coordination of multi-faceted mixed competence arrangements, analysed in this dissertation, 
increasingly difficult and often based on ad hoc decisions. The interaction with intervening 
variables provides some additional understanding. The case studies, however, show that 
there is a lot of interaction between these intervening variables and legal competences in 
practice. These findings can be valued as minimal plausibility probes, given the small 
number and peculiarities of the cases. Nevertheless, this study contributes to develop a new 
methodological approach to analyse the EU’s and Member State’s coordination on 
sustainable development issues, both within the EU as well as in a multilateral context. 
The chapters of this dissertation are organised as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the research 
question, concepts, variables, expectations and methods, taking into account the boundaries 
and limitations of this dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the existing bodies of literature with 
reference to the EU’s and Member State’s coordination (in sustainable development policies) 
and selects some of the main elements from both legal and political perspectives. It then 
explains how this dissertation constructs a theoretical framework that contributes to both 
these fields by focusing on competences, i.e. legal competences and the interaction with 
variables derived from the theories of neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism, social 
constructivism and institutionalism and concepts such as actorness, cohesiveness and 
effectiveness. Chapter 3 outlines the research design of a comparative case study, the 
method of data collection and analysis as well as its methodological limitations. It also 
presents the process tracing a routine applied throughout all the case studies. Chapter 4, 5 
and 6 then cover the case studies on policy formulation on alternative fuels for passenger 
cars, ‘Team EU’ in climate change negotiations, and the implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 in the EU and Member States. The two final chapters contain an overall analysis. More 
specifically, chapter 7 provides a descriptive and analytical overview of the findings in all the 
three cases while summarising the findings. Moreover, other specific explanations raised in 
the case studies are reviewed. The chapter assesses and visualises the interactions 
between legal and political variables and refers back to the methodological challenges, while 
nevertheless showing its value for future research and theory building. Finally, chapter 8 then 
builds on the results reached in chapter 7. It answers the central research question and 
provides reflections on the theoretical, methodological and conceptual aspects by focusing 
on advantages and limitations of the research design and methods. Following the main 
findings and reflections, some avenues for future research are suggested and the policy 




Samenvatting Proefschrift (Dutch executive summary) 
Volgens de Spelregels? Coördinatie van Europees Duurzaam Ontwikkelingsbeleid 
en het Belang van de Politiek-Juridische Context 
 
De bijdrage van de Europese Unie en haar lidstaten aan wereldwijde duurzame ontwikkeling 
krijgt toenemende aandacht in de literatuur. De verwachting is dat deze aandacht toeneemt 
met twee belangrijke internationale akkoorden: het Klimaatakkoord van Parijs en de Agenda 
2030 van de Verenigde Naties met haar zeventien Duurzame Ontwikkelingsdoelen (SDGs). 
In de literatuur ontbreekt nog aandacht voor het politieke effect van juridische bevoegdheden 
op coördinatie van EU en lidstaten in gezamenlijk duurzaam ontwikkelingsbeleid. In dit 
proefschrift worden verschillende casestudies gebruikt: 1) alternatieve brandstoffen, 2) 
‘Team EU’ in klimaatonderhandelingen en 3) implementatie van de VN Agenda 2030 en de 
SDGs. Het proefschrift verkent het potentieel van juridische bevoegdheden als 
onafhankelijke variabele en verklarende factor van de afhankelijke variabele: coördinatie van 
EU en lidstaat actoren in (besluitvorming, onderhandelingen en implementatie van) 
duurzaam ontwikkelingsbeleid. Bij elke casestudie wordt gebruik gemaakt van dezelfde soort 
bronnen: de Verdragen van de EU, juridische documenten, arresten voor het Europese Hof 
van Justitie, (overige) officiële beleidsdocumenten, literatuur en zevenenveertig 
semigestructureerde interviews. Met behulp van een systematische benadering wordt het 
effect van juridische bevoegdheden getest, zowel autonoom als in interactie met 
‘interveniërende variabelen’ geoperationaliseerd vanuit de theoretische literatuur: 
‘supranationale of intergouvernementele dominantie’, de positie van de EU in het 
internationale krachtenveld, en heterogeniteit in voorkeuren tussen de lidstaten. Het 
integratieve politiek-juridische onderzoeksdesign zorgt voor triangulatie van bevindingen. 
 
Vooraf werd verwacht dat de juridische bevoegdheden, vooral op basis van de EU-
verdragen, een aanzienlijk effect hadden op coördinatie van EU en lidstaat-actoren in alle 
stadia van de besluitvorming. Bovendien was de verwachting dat er veel interactie was met 
de verklaringen vanuit de politiek-theoretische literatuur, maar dat de juridische 
bevoegdheden dominanter waren. In het krachtenveld van de actoren werd verwacht dat de 
juridische bevoegdheden vooral de Europese Commissie in staat zou stellen om te 
coördineren en de lidstaat-actoren juist zou belemmeren. 
 
De bevindingen nuanceren en kwalificeren sommige van de theorieën en concepten, waarin 
de rol van EU-Verdragen vaak absent is. De juridische bevoegdheden binnen de EU en in de 
context van de Verenigde Naties hebben tenminste matig effect. De juridische 
bevoegdheden zijn in deze dissertatie breed geoperationaliseerd en omvatten 
Verdragsartikelen, arresten van het Hof van Justitie van de EU, de externe multilaterale 
juridische context en richtlijnen en verordeningen. Deze benadering was nuttig omdat het per 
casestudie verschilde welke juridische bevoegdheid dominant was. De juridische 
bevoegdheden gaven in het algemeen aan in welke beleidsvelden coördinatie moeilijker 
werd geacht, maar gaven ook juist het gezamenlijke pad van coördinatie aan in (vooral) 
onderhandelingen en (in mindere mate) besluitvorming en implementatie. In de literatuur is 
vooral aandacht voor de ‘sluipende’ overdracht van bevoegdheden naar de EU. Toch maken 
de casestudies juist duidelijk dat vooral de lidstaten gebruik maken van hun bevoegdheden, 
vooral wanneer zij hun belastingen, energie mix of landgebruik-beleid willen beschermen.  
De externe (VN) context geeft ook in zekere mate de grenzen van interne coördinatie aan, al 
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geldt dit vooral voor klimaatonderhandelingen. Wanneer er eigenlijk geen multilateraal forum 
is, zoals in het geval van alternatieve brandstoffen, is het erg moeilijk om EU en lidstaat-
actoren op één lijn te krijgen. 
 
Het proefschrift laat echter ook zien dat de juridische bevoegdheden soms gewoonweg niet 
worden gevolgd. Bovendien lijkt het Hof van Justitie absent in de evaluatie van coördinatie 
van duurzaam ontwikkelingsbeleid. Vooral de Europese Commissie lijkt aarzelend in het 
starten van juridische procedures, waarmee het haar formele juridische bevoegdheden niet 
volledig tot wasdom laat komen. Deze bevinding is des te opmerkelijker omdat elke 
casestudie duidelijke voorbeelden laat zien van gedrag dat contrair is aan het EU-Verdrag 
en/of de bindende doelstelling van duurzame ontwikkeling. Voorbeelden zijn bijvoorbeeld het 
eigenaardige onderhandelingsmandaat van ‘Team EU’ in de klimaatonderhandelingen, dat 
ten onrechte is gebaseerd op unanimiteit. Bovendien is het Voorzitterschap veel dominanter 
dan dit volgens het Verdrag had moeten zijn. Andere voorbeelden zijn de geringe EU-
coördinatie van SDG-implementatie en het niet-starten van juridische procedures tegen de 
kartelvorming rond dieselbrandstoffen. Naast deze voorbeelden blijkt dat de categorie van 
‘gedeelde’ bevoegdheden wel erg breed is en dat per beleidsgebied moet worden bezien 
hoe dit in de praktijk werkt. Dit maakt coördinatie van ‘mixed competence arrangements’ met 
vele facetten, zoals geanalyseerd in dit proefschrift, uitermate lastig en vaak gebaseerd op 
ad-hoc beslissingen.  In dat verband blijkt de interactie met de ‘interveniërende variabelen’ 
duidelijk te zorgen voor extra begrip. De casestudies maken echter vooral ook duidelijk dat er 
veel interactie is tussen politieke en juridische variabelen in de praktijk en dat het nuttiger is 
om deze variabelen in gezamenlijkheid en ongewogen mee te nemen. De bevindingen in dit 
proefschrift kunnen worden gekenschetst als ‘plausibility probes’. Additioneel onderzoek is 
nodig om de bevindingen te bevestigen, gezien het klein aantal cases met enkele 
eigenaardigheden. Desondanks draagt deze dissertatie bij aan de theorievorming en nieuwe 
methodologische benaderingen in het analyseren van EU en lidstaat coördinatie van 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research puzzle 
“Sustainable development lies at the core of European values and constitutes an 
overarching objective of the European Union as set out in the Treaties” (Council of the 
European Union, 2017)1 
The contribution of the European Union (EU) and its Member States to worldwide 
sustainable development is a topic that has received considerable scholarly attention. This 
attention is on the rise after two landmark international agreements were reached in 2015: 
the Paris Climate Agreement2 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)3. The European Union and 
its Member States have been keen to commit themselves to the concept of sustainable 
development already in the past 30 years. The concept of sustainable development means to 
‘ensure that development meets the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. This concept has its origins in the 
report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, chaired by the then – 
Prime Minister of Norway, Go Harlem Brundtland, and its report Our Common Future 
(1987).4 The EU has been actively involved in international sustainable development within 
the United Nations system since the famous Brundtland Report and especially since the Rio 
Conference (1992). This commitment to sustainable development is firmly anchored in the 
EU Treaties.5 
An expanding body of literature focuses on the EU sustainable development policies, both 
within the EU and in international negotiations. Most of the authors who deal with the topic of 
EU sustainable development tend to focus on environmental policies, climate policies and 
negotiations and/or development cooperation. The EU has been described as a leader in 
environmental policy6, a ‘normative power’7 , progressive8 and a ‘forerunner’ in. climate 
negotiations9. Other authors are more critical and criticise  the EU for its lack of policy 
                                                     
1 Council of the European Union (2017), A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development - Council conclusions, 10370/17, 20 June 2017, para 1. 
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015) Paris Agreement, 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf, Accessed 13 December 2016. 
3 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017. 
4 United Nations (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, A/42/427.  
5 See a.o. Article 3(5) Treaty on the European Union: In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to (..)the sustainable development of the 
Earth (…) free and fair trade, eradication of poverty (..) as well as to the strict observance and the development of international 
law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. See also Art 21(2) and Art 21(3) TEU. Interestingly, 
sustainable development is not one of the ‘foundational values’ of the Union, cf Art 2 TEU. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty 
on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ 2012 C 83 and C 326/47). 
6 Kelemen, R. D. (2010) ‘Globalizing European union environmental policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3, p. 
335. More general on political leadership in the EU, cf Tömmel, I., & Verdun, A. (2017) ‘Political leadership in the European 
Union: an introduction’. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 103-112 who evaluate the literature on leadership in 
the EU as follows: “there is also reflection and theorizing about political leadership in international contexts, mostly referring to 
leaders in intergovernmental bargains. Yet the Union is much more than just an international organisation, so that these theories 
also do not easily fit. These difficulties may explain why there is so little research into political leadership in the EU”, p. 104. 
7 Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 
No. 2, pp. 235-258. 
8 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 32, pp. 114-123. 
9 Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2017) ‘Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris Agreement 
on climate change’. Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 1-20 (published online). 
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coherence for development10 and for its ‘inconsistent’ environmental policies11 that are 
‘merely symbolic’12.   
From the perspective of legal theory, as well as in political discussions, the issue of legal 
competences and (increasing/decreasing) powers is one of the most imperative discussions. 
In an ‘ever closer union’13 the EU and Member States share competences in nearly every 
issue of European political life, ranging from a secondary role of the Union in education and 
tax policy to exclusive competence of the Union in core areas including external trade 
policy.14 The issue of the division of competences between EU and Member States is a 
delicate question, often narrowed to a choice of either diminishing of the ‘creeping’15 
competences of the EU or instead supporting a ‘single voice’ of an exclusive competent 
Union as more efficient and powerful. The first category is often visible in more ‘sovereignty-
oriented’ Member States, resulting in, for example, a ‘Review on the Balance of 
Competences’ between the United Kingdom and the EU.16 The latter approach is often 
encouraged by proponents of a larger role of the EU at an international stage, from academia 
or from within the European Commission17.  
The issue of (the lack of) coordination between EU and Member State actors is subject to 
increasing commentary. When the issue of coordination is studied from a power perspective, 
it is mostly viewed from the traditional lenses of political science theories. There are scholars 
who argue then that the European Commission is best placed to coordinate policies and 
negotiations, while others see it more as a (large) Member State-driven process. This 
‘traditional dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism’ has dominated 
analyses of European integration for at least five decades.18 Increasingly, scholars see the 
coordination more as a ‘socialisation’ process in which preferences of EU and Member State 
actors converge through social interaction processes. In particular, the EU and Member 
State actors active in climate change negotiations have been described in this way.19 The 
focus on (the absence of) aligning interests, especially between Member States, which are 
then in a rational or institutional fashion assembled by the ‘agent’ (European Commission) is 
another method used to examine coordination.20 Moreover, especially from an external 
                                                     
10 Carbone, M. (2008) ‘Mission impossible: The European Union and policy coherence for development’. European 
integration, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 323-342. 
11 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 32, p. 116. 
12 Baker, S. (2007) ‘Sustainable development as symbolic commitment: Declaratory politics and the seductive appeal of 
ecological modernisation in the European Union’. Environmental Politics, Vol.16, No. 2, pp. 297-317. 
13Article 1 TEU  
14 Pollack, M. A. (2000) ‘The end of creeping competence? EU policymaking since Maastricht’. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 519-538. 
15 Ibid 
16 Government of the United Kingdom (2015) Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, available at <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/140/140.pdf>, Accessed 12 June 
2017. 
17 As Casolari sees it, a “judicial trend in which the position of the Member States completely depends on that of the EU 
institutions”, Cf Casolari, F. (2012) ‘The principle of loyal co-operation: a ‘Master Key’ for EU external representation’, in 
Blockmans, S. and Wessel, R. A. (2012) ‘Principles and Practices of EU External Representation’. CLEER Working Paper 
Series, 2012, Vol. 5. 
18 Billiet, S. (2009) ‘Principal–agent analysis and the study of the EU: What about the EC’s external relations?’. Comparative   
European Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 437. 
19 Groenleer, M. L., & Van Schaik, L. G. (2007). United we stand? The European Union's international actorness in the cases of 
the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,, Vol. 45, No. 5, p. 975. 
20 Jupille, J. and Caporaso, J. A. (1999) ‘Institutionalism and the European Union: Beyond international relations and 
comparative politics’. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 429-444. 
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perspective, there is more and more attention being placed on EU’s role in the world and in 
multilateral negotiations and its actorness, effectiveness and coherence.21  
Cross-disciplinary research on competences and powers is proposed in both legal22 and 
political science23 contributions on the EU in international organisations. Absent  from the 
literature, however, are combinations of these legal and political approaches analysing EU 
and Member State coordination on sustainable development policies and negotiations 
whereby these ‘legal competences’24 are analysed in conjunction with the aforementioned  
political approaches. It has been said that, ‘law and politics are hardly confronted’ and there 
is a tendency to ‘discount the contributions of each discipline’.25  As a result, little is known 
about the political effects of these mixed competences and the relationship between legal 
competences and EU and Member State action on sustainable development is under-
theorised in both political science and law. This is problematic, because to solve the 
sustainable development ‘global challenges’ it is necessary  to co-create knowledge and 
work together across disciplines in order to transform.26 Therefore, especially when analysing 
sustainable development policies combining approaches and knowledge is vital. It is 
therefore important to ensure that the coordination between EU and Member States is 
analysed both from political as well as legal perspectives, as the EU and Member States 
have a ‘shared responsibility’ for sustainable development.27 
This dissertation will assess the influence of legal competences on EU and Member State 
actors and coordination, specifically for ‘sustainable development’ policies, in policy 
formulation, negotiation and implementation. As such, this research comprises of case study 
research on the EU’s sustainable development policies using a step-by-step approach in a 
politico-legal fashion. This first chapter provides an introduction to the analysis. Section 1.2 
introduces the research question, concepts, variables, expectations and methods, taking into 
account the boundaries and limitations of this dissertation. Section 1.3 presents the 
objectives of the analysis and explain their relevance: what are the contributions of the 
analysis to current scholarly research, the empirical reality and EU policy making. Section 1.4 
                                                     
21 Oberthür, S., Jørgensen, K.E. and Shahin, J. (eds) (2013) The Performance of the EU in International institutions, (Abingdon: 
Routledge). Jørgensen, K.E. (2009) The European Union and International Organizations, (London : Taylor & Francis)., Koops, 
J.A. and Macaj, G. (2014) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).  Drieskens, E. and 
Van Schaik, L.G. (2014) The EU and Effective Multilateralism: internal and external reform practices (Routledge). Gehring, T., 
Oberthür, S. and Mühleck, M. (2013) ‘European Union Actorness in International Institutions: Why the EU is Recognized as an 
Actor in Some International Institutions, but Not in Others’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 51, No. 5, pp. 849-
865 and da Conceição-Heldt, E., and Meunier, S. (2014) ‘Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external 
effectiveness of the EU in global governance’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 961. 
22 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 261-286. 
23 Groen, L. and Niemann, A. (2013) ‘The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A case of contested EU 
actorness and effectiveness’. International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 320: “future research should, among other things, 
analyse the extent to which the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty will have actually impacted the EU’s actorness and effectiveness 
in external climate change policy-making” 
24 Cf Benz, A. (2010) ‘The EU’s competences: The ‘vertical’ perspective on the multilevel system’. Living Reviews in European 
Governance – LERG, p. 5 in which he states that ‘The division of competences (i.e. legally defined powers)’ between the EU 
and its member states has been one of the most important issues in the discussion on the institutional reform and in the 
processes of Treaty amendment’. The broadening to ‘legal competences’ (comparable to Benz’s legally defined powers) give 
more leeway for operationalisation, see section 2.4 and section 3.3. 
25 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 285 and Alter, K. J., Dehousse, R. and Vanberg, G. (2002) ‘Law, Political Science and EU Legal 
Studies: An Interdisciplinary Project?’. European Union Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 113-136. 
26 Mauser, W., Klepper, G., Rice, M., Schmalzbauer, B. S., Hackmann, H., Leemans, R. and Moore, H. (2013) ‘Transdisciplinary 
global change research: the co-creation of knowledge for sustainability’. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, pp. 420-431. 
27 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM(2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016, p. 16. 
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offers relevant introductory information about the case studies that were selected: policy 
formulation on alternative fuels, ‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC climate negotiations and 
implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and the SDGs in EU and Member States. Finally, 
section 1.5 presents the outline of the dissertation. 
1.2 Research question, concepts, variables and methods 
1.2.1 Research question 
The main question of this study is as follows: How do the legal competences, affect EU and 
Member State coordination in formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable 
development policies?  
Taking into account the objective to contribute to the integrative academic debate there is 
another sub-question for this dissertation, which is formulated as follows: how do the legal 
competences, as an explanation for EU and Member State coordination on sustainable 
development policies, interact with other issues, more specifically the supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
and preference heterogeneity?  
The main question is concretised in the three case studies in three additional sub-questions, 
namely:  
1. How do the legal competences, affect EU and Member State coordination in policy 
formulation on alternative fuels for passenger cars? 
2. How do the legal competences, affect EU and Member State coordination in 
negotiations at the UNFCCC? 
3. How do the legal competences, affect EU and Member State coordination in 
implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and the SDGs?  
 
Within these case studies (see chapter 4-6) also the sub-question about interaction with 
‘other explanations’ is included in the analysis. Answering this main question and the four 
sub-questions allows an exploration the construction of an integrative theoretical framework 
applicable across sustainable development cases, which in itself provides a significant 
contribution to the scholarly literature.  
1.2.2 Research concepts 
It is necessary to first clarify some key concepts in order to answer the research question. 
Legal competences 
- As a legal principle the EU only has the competences conferred upon it by the 
Treaties.28  The Lisbon Treaty (2009)  introduced a more precise catalogue of EU 
competences (Art. 2 TFEU): exclusive competences, where  only the EU has 
legislative power ;29 
                                                     
28 Art 5 TEU. 
29 Art 3 TFEU, e.g. common commercial policy, monetary policy for Eurozone Member states, customs union. 
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- shared competences, in which both the Union and Member States have legislative 
power;30 and 
- supportive competences, where the Union can support, coordinate or supplement the 
actions of Member States, but cannot supersede the competence of Member States 
in that policy area.31 
Alongside these three main categories ‘parallel competences’ (as a specific type of shared 
competences)32, CFSP competences33 and ‘coordination competences’34 are recognised in 
the Treaties (see chapter 2 for an overview).  
 
To operationalise  the concept of ‘legal competences’ this dissertation takes a broader 
approach than only reviewing the catalogue of legal competences in art 2-6 TFEU, by also 
conducting a parallel review of the legal bases in other parts of the Treaties. In addition to the 
‘fixed’ competences in the Treaty, the EU and Member States’ competences can evolve 
indirectly through  the judicial interpretation of the Court of Justice.35 Moreover, regulations 
and directives could be viewed as legally defining powers with internal and external effects. 
To provide comprehensive analysis, the status of the EU in an international organisation as 
well as the UN legal context (Statutes and documents) is used as a legally defined power. 36 
 
Coordination (in policy formulation, negotiation and implementation) 
With regards to the operationalisation of the dependent variable coordination, a deliberate 
choice was made not to search for the presence or absence of coordination. Due to the  the 
urgency of the topics, as well as the history of cooperation in these policy areas, it is 
inevitable that the EU and Member State actors coordinate policies with each other on these 
topics. Therefore, the question is not whether EU and Member State actors coordinate (the 
existence of coordination), but rather how the legal competences, among other factors, affect 
this coordination process. It is even more interesting to analyse how coordination occurs  
throughout  the decision-making process, thus leading to a focus on (policy) formulation, 
negotiation and implementation. 
To ensure sufficient flexibility when analysing the effect of the independent and intervening 
variables on the dependent variable ‘coordination’, this latter concept should be applied 
loosely. Nevertheless, it is necessary to clarify which ‘dimension(s)’ of coordination are 
analysed in this dissertation and to go beyond the simple definition of ‘meetings’.37 The focus 
of this research is on the coordination ‘management’ of the European Commission in policy 
areas of shared competence. Therefore, the definition of coordination is as follows: 
coordination is the process of contacts between diplomats and officials from EU institutions 
(especially the European Commission) and Member States with the purpose of discussing an 
                                                     
30 Art 4 TFEU, e.g. internal market, environment, transport, energy, consumer protection. 
31 Art. 6 TFEU, e.g. industry, culture, civil protection, tourism. 
32 Art. 4(3) & 4(4) TFEU: e.g. research, space, development cooperation, humanitarian aid. 
33 Art. 24 TEU: Common Foreign and Security Policy. No competence of Court of Justice of the EU in this field. 
34 Art. 5 TFEU: employment, social policies and economic policies. 
35 Delreux, T. (2006) ‘The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective on the internal 
decision-making process’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 235. 
36 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 261-286. 
37 Cf Kissack, R. (2007) ‘European Union Member State coordination in the United Nations system: towards a methodology for 
analysis’. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2007, Vol. 1, p. 3 states: Coordination is the meeting of diplomats and 
officials from the governments of the European Union Member States (most likely with staff from the Council Secretariat and/or 
Commission present but this is not essential) in any location (national capitals, Brussels, New York or Geneva) with the purpose 
of discussing an issue on a UN agenda. 
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issue of common interest and working towards a common position. These coordination 
processes can be internal (within the EU) or external (international) and include the 
discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination. 
With this definition (and operationalisation) the dissertation hopes to add to the rich literature 
on coordination in the EU, but nevertheless keeps its operationalisation flexible enough to 
provide an essential contribution to the literature with a ‘politico-legal’ analysis by taking into 
account the effect of independent (legal) and intervening (political) variables. By including the 
‘management’ of the coordination (by the European Commission) the dissertation adheres to 
the view that coordination is a ‘political process’ and that it is useful to look at coordination 
‘capacities’ of EU and Member State actors.38 However, in light of the objective of this 
dissertation, there is no attempt to suggest a new measure of coordination or re-evaluation of 
coordination ‘capacities’, but rather this research looks at the politico-legal drivers of the 
coordination (management) and enabling and restraining influences on EU and Member 
State actors in sustainable development policies. In addition, the ‘effectiveness’ of the 
coordination process as well as the ‘coherence’ of the output of the coordination process are 
not specifically analysed  in this dissertation.39  
The analysis of coordination includes instead what some call ‘socialisation’, namely the idea 
that Member States’ representatives involved in deciding the EU position (e.g. in international 
institutions) first and foremost adopt a European orientation.40 For the purposes of this 
research, one could see this socialisation more as a ‘result’ of coordination (or the absence 
thereof) influenced by political and legal variables, rather than a political-theoretical 
intervening variable affecting coordination on its own, although this latter approach has been 
chosen by other authors.41 
EU and Member State actors 
From a legal perspective, the distinctive profile of EU institutions and Member States is clear 
whereas, from a political perspective, this distinction is often not used. The EU is viewed as 
an international institution42 or a political system sui generis 43. Sometimes the EU and its 
Member States are viewed as a collective actor44 in external relations, but this is often as a 
result of its normative45 role in the world rather than its negotiating power in international 
organisations. However, there is growing literature on effectiveness where the EU is seen as 
a collective actor. Nevertheless, and especially in climate change negotiations, the EU and 
its Member States are often seen as an ‘ensemble’ that includes the Council of the EU, the 
                                                     
38 Schout, A., & Jordan, A. (2005). ‘Coordinated European Governance: SelfOrganizing or Centrally Steered?’. Public 
Administration, Vol. 83. No. 1, p.211 and Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring 
the capacities of networked governance (Oxford University Press), p. 3-30. 
39 Cf section 2.2.5 for a literature review on effectiveness of coordination.   
40 Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases 
of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 969-
998. EU socialisation means that EU Member States’ representatives involved in deciding on and negotiating the EU position in 
international institutions first and foremost adopt a European orientation, see Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and 
Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 75. 
41 Cf section 2.2.1 for a literature review section on coordination and socialisation. 
42 Gavas, M., Maxwell, S. and Johnson, D. (2010) ‘Consolidation or cooperation: The future of EU development cooperation’. 
German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) Discussion Paper, No. 6. 
43 Lavenex, S., and Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European 
politics’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 6, p. 791. 
44 Kleistra, Y. and van Willigen, N. (2014). ‘Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges.’ In Koops, J.A. and 
Macaj, G. (eds) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 62. 
45 Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 
No. 2, pp. 235-258. 
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European Commission, , the Presidency of the Council of the EU, the European External 
Action Service and the Member States.46  
While this ‘collective actor’ approach in climate change negotiations is understandable (see 
chapter 5), it does not stem from a legally defined distinction. In the operationalisation of this 
dissertation the EU and Member State actors are dissected to analyse the coordination of 
these actors in greater detail. EU actors are therefore operationalised  from the document 
‘EU statements in multilateral organisations – general arrangements’ as follows: those actors 
competent to represent the Union as provided in the Treaties, i.e. the President of the 
European Council, the Commission, the High Representative & EU Delegations.47 Member 
State actors are the representatives of Member States themselves, for instance in the 
Council of the EU, when the High Representative does not represent them. In practice, and 
as operationalised during the case studies, this means that the EU actor is often the 
European Commission representative, also when he or she is ‘seconded’ from the Member 
State.48 Instead, an official who works for the Council is identified in this research as a 
‘Member State actor’ alongside the easily definable officials working in the ministries in the 
national capitals.  
Sustainable development 
The concept of sustainable development means to ‘ensure that development meets the 
needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’.49 The concept is broad and embraced by all kinds of actors including 
governments, multinational corporations, social reformers and environmental activists 
because of its inspirational value. Different actors however, have their own interpretation of 
what sustainable development means.50 Academically, the concept is contested, inter alia, by 
social ecology, (eco)feminism, (anti-)capitalist, (anti) North-South divide and many other 
approaches.51 This dissertation adheres to the belief that the ambiguity and over the ‘true’ 
meaning of sustainable development is ‘inevitable’52 and does not contribute to the debate on 
the concept itself. Moreover, it takes into account the European Commission’s view that it is 
now especially about governance and implementation.53 For the operationalisation of 
sustainable development, the dissertation makes use of the practical elaboration of this 
concept proposed in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals.54 This conceptualisation and operationalisation implies that 
sustainable development’ not only encompasses the ‘three dimensions’ (environmental, 
social and economic) but also those of security and human rights in the case study on SDG 
                                                     
46 Cf Groen L. (2016) The Importance of Fitting Activities to Context: The EU in Multilateral Climate and Biodiversity 
Negotiations. PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, p. 31. 
47 Council of the European Union (2011) General Arrangements for EU Statements in Multilateral Organizations, 16901/11, 24 
October 2011. Available at << http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015901%202011%20INIT>>. Accessed 
19 November 2015,, p.2.  
48 The reference to ‘EU official’ in the case studies hence refers also  to EU actors. 
49 United Nations (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, A/42/427.  
50 Giddings, B., Hopwood, B., and O'Brien, G. (2002) ‘Environment, economy and society: fitting them together into sustainable 
development’. Sustainable Development, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.187-189. 
51 Cf Hopwood, B., Mellor, M., and O'Brien, G. (2005) ‘Sustainable development: mapping different approaches’. Sustainable 
development, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 38-52. 
52 Connelly, S. (2007) ‘Mapping sustainable development as a contested concept’. Local Environment, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 260. 
53 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM(2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016. p. 14-15, 18. 
54 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017. 
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implementation. However, the concept still has a three-dimensional image in practice, which 
means that the two other case studies are primarily derived from these three dimensions.55  
Political-theoretical issues and concepts 
The idea of this study is to contribute to the political science debate. The following concepts 
are of crucial importance to  this dissertation and related to the debates within the discipline: 
the supranational vs intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position within  the international 
constellation of power and preference heterogeneity. The concept of ‘supranational-
intergovernmental dominance’ stems from the main debate in the literature on European 
integration according to which  integration is driven either by supranational institutions or by 
national governments.56 This concept is operationalised to see whether there are ‘institutional 
turf battles’ between the Council and the Commission in the specific case studies on the 
direction of policies. . The EU’s position within the international constellation of power is 
operationalised through in-case variables such as CO2 emissions in the climate change case 
study and the amount of biofuels in the alternative fuels case study.  
Preference heterogeneity means the absence of aligning substantive interests. Within the 
context of this dissertation, this variable is looking at homogeneity or heterogeneity in the 
preferences of Member States.  Whether there is substantive convergence or divergence, i.e. 
preference homogeneity or heterogeneity is the way in which this concept is operationalised. 
In this sense, the ‘supranational-intergovernmental’ dominance variable is focused on 
institutional arguments, while the preference heterogeneity variable is mostly oriented on 
substantive arguments.  The three concepts will be analysed in interaction with the legal 
competences, so as to contribute to the scholarly debate. Moreover, for all case studies other 
explanations that were often raised in the semi-structured interviews are shared. Chapter 2 
will elaborate on the political and legal concepts in further detail. 
1.2.3 Variables and expectations 
This dissertation assesses the influence of legal competences on EU and Member State 
actors and coordination, with a specific focus on ‘sustainable development’ policies. The 
research conducted for this dissertation was exploratory and aimed to test the potential of 
‘legal competences’ as an explanation for enabling or restraining coordination between EU 
and Member State actors with regards to sustainable development policies. The existing 
literature often attributes a more dominant role to political-theoretical issues in affecting the 
coordination process between EU and Member State actors. This dissertation tests whether 
‘legal competences’ can have an independent effect. As the influence of different forms of 
mixed competences on EU and Member State action, let alone with regards to sustainable 
development policies, is a relatively new field, it would be overly ambitious to aim for pure 
causality. Therefore, this dissertation is sympathetic to methodological reflections which 
consider causal mechanisms as ‘theoretical formulations, (..) that adduces properties of the 
relationships among phenomena with the potential to recur, which helps explain why x 
causes y’.57 This research will aim to provide sufficient empirical and legal evidence to 
contribute to a nuanced picture of the interaction between political and legal variables and 
causal mechanisms in the coordination of sustainable development policies.   
                                                     
55 There are also legal reasons not to include common foreign and security policies in the analysis, see section 1.2.5. 
56 Branch, A. P., and Ohrgaard, J. C. (1999) ‘Trapped in the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy: a response to Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 123-143. 




Despite taking a critical stance towards direct causality (see chapter 3 and above), this 
dissertation, for reasons of methodological straightforwardness, uses independent, 
intervening and dependent variables. As the value this dissertation adds to the literature is 
the fact that it tests the effect of mixed competences, ‘legal competences’ are considered as 
independent variables. The above-mentioned ‘political-theoretical issues’ will function as 
‘intervening’ variables and he coordination between EU and Member State actors in 
sustainable development policies is the dependent variable. Besides legal competences and  
intervening variables, other case-specific explanations can affect the coordination between 
EU and Member State actors in regards to sustainable development policies. Each case 
study will take these ‘other explanations’ into account to create a more complete picture. All 
variables are visualised in Figure 1.1.  
 
Figure 1. 1 Variables and expectations of relations 
The initial hypothesis is that the broad legal powers define EU and Member State 
coordination on sustainable development policies. It is expected that EU actors are enabled 
more than they are restrained in their activities due to their legal Treaties-based orientation 
and with the European Court of Justice acting as the EU-friendly arbitrator on principles such 
as the duty of sincere cooperation. With regards to Member State actors, it is expected that 
they will make less use of these legal competences and see these competences as 
restrictive of cooperation. Chapter 7 (synthesis) and Chapter 8 (conclusion and discussion) 
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1.2.4 Research methods 
The research question will be assessed by means of a comparative case study design, 
incorporating three different cases. As the aim of this dissertation is to compare different 
‘mixed competence’ sustainable development policies, internal and external dimensions of 
EU action and different stages of the policy cycle, three case-studies are analysed in depth 
(see 1.4). This in-depth study employs legal as well as qualitative methods and a step-by-
step process tracing. The sources for each case study are EU Treaties, the Court’s case law, 
regulations, directives, strategies, other official documents, statutes and the legal context of 
the international organisations, and an academic literature review. Moreover, the qualitative 
part of this study heavily relies on a total of forty-seven semi-structured interviews with EU 
and Member State officials, (former) ministers, Members of (European/national) Parliament, 
private sector representatives, Civil Society Organisations and experts. The literature review 
and even more sothe semi-structured interviews58 serve the exploratory purpose of the case 
studies, while they complement the legal basis of the analysis, by indicating the practical 
effect of mixed competences, i.e. legal competences, and by addressing (more) political 
informal mechanisms. Therefore, this dissertation adheres to the appeal and 
complementarity of mixed-method research.59 Combining methods has indeed the advantage 
of increasing the reliability of findings as well as of ‘providing a glimpse into the causal 
mechanisms behind correlations of variables’.60 While mixed-method research is often 
understood as combining quantitative and qualitative research, this design is based on the 
combination of legal and qualitative/empirical research. These approaches have the potential 
to be complementary.61 
 
This dissertation makes use of process tracing for each case study (see 3.3.1). The three 
cases will be researched in-depth to identify the (intervening or causal) mechanisms between 
legal competences and the enabling/restraining influence on EU and Member State actor 
coordination. Process tracing is mostly used for theory testing and theory development.62 
This dissertation is primarily focused on theory development, as it does not simply research 
the causal mechanism of legal competences, but it also considers these legal competences 
as one of the explaining factors for coordination between EU and Member State actors on 
sustainable development policies, alongside the intervening (political-theoretical) variables 
and also considers other explanations. Process tracing was chosen as a method as it allows 
for thorough investigation in a situation where the character of the relations between the 
‘variables/conditions’ is unclear .63  
 
The three cases in this book do not form a uniform set of cases. Nonetheless, their combined 
reading provides for a unique and rich set of cases covering both internal and external 
dimensions of EU sustainable development policies and encompassing (external) 
negotiation, policy formulation, as well as policy implementation. This enables a process-
                                                     
58 See annex 1. Five of these forty-seven interviews could be considered as more ‘explorative’.  
59 Lieberman, E. S. (2005) ‘Nested analysis as a mixed-method strategy for comparative research’. American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 99, No. 3, pp. 435-452. 
60 Toshkov, D. D. (2009) Between politics and administration: Compliance with EU law in Central and Eastern Europe. PhD 
Thesis Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Leiden University. 
61 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 285. 
62 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press), p. 224. 




based’ politico-legal analysis of the potential of legal competences. No other study has so far 
assessed the effect of legal competences on EU and Member State actors in the conduct of 
EU sustainable development policies, let alone oriented on both the internal and external 
dimension of EU policies. Chapter 3 will offer a more detailed elaboration concerning the 
research design, methodological considerations, data collection and data analysis. 
1.2.5 Research focus and limitations 
This study focuses on aspects of EU and Member State coordination  with regards to 
sustainable development policies; more specifically it analyses these policies’ formulation, 
negotiation and implementation,both in their internal and external dimensions. It identifies the 
legal competences and examines their relation and interaction with (or autonomy from) 
intervening variables derived from the political science theories. The operationalisation of 
these variables (see chapter 2) results in the exclusion of some nuanced aspects of EU law 
and in the the simplification of political theories. The analysis of the three stages of the 
decision-making process makes the dissertation extensive and broad in its orientation on the 
coordination process. Nevertheless, this study cannot compare the details of l different 
coordination processes in the same stage of the decision-making process. Despite this 
shortcoming, the dissertation still manages to contribute to the existing literature by testing 
empirically whether claims such as ‘policy-planning has never been one of the Commission’s 
strengths’ are indeed substantiated in practice.64  
 
The dissertation focuses on mixed competence arrangements with a ‘centre of gravity’ in 
policy areas of shared competence. It is expected that coordination aspects are more 
important in these shared and mixed competence arrangements. As a result, this dissertation 
focuses less on sustainable development policies where the ‘centre of gravity’ is more lenient 
towards exclusive EU competences (e.g. trade), or Member States’ sovereign policies (e.g. 
defence). As this dissertation centres on complex mixed competence arrangements, more 
straightforward sustainable development negotiations, such as the ones related to ‘a globally 
binding instrument on mercury65’, are not part of this study.  
 
Moreover, the dissertation is focused on ‘sustainable development policies’, a broad 
category, as the UN Agenda 2030 includes therein even security aspects, besides the 
original three social, environmental and economic dimensions. There are, however, some 
limitations with the operationalisation in this dissertation. The CFSP ‘shared competence’ 
sub-category is for instance deliberately excluded from this study, due to a couple of 
reasons. First, the Court of Justice has no legal competence on CFSP policies, which would 
greatly affect the legal component of this study. Secondly, as Van Schaik (2013: 18) states, 
the institutional framework of CFSP differs substantially from that of other Union’s (external) 
policies, which makes it difficult to compare the role of key actors and the division of 
competences and legal competences in the case studies.66  
 
                                                     
64 Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance 
(Oxford University Press), p. 100. 
65 De Baere, G. (2012) ‘Mercury Rising: The European Union and the International Negotiations for a Globally Binding 
Instrument on Mercury’. European Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 640-655. 
66 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More than the Sum of its Parts (Palgrave 
Macmillan), p. 18. 
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Furthermore, the primary focus of the analysis is on ‘EU and Member State actors’, thus 
excluding parliaments and other societal actors such as CSOs, regional authorities and the 
private sector. As a result, one of the most influential theories of the last decades, namely the 
one of multi-level governance67, is not operationalised in an intervening variable and is 
therefore not part of this dissertation. However, there is of course some room in the answers 
to the semi-structured interview questions to indicate the presence and importance of other 
actors and the answers and ‘external’ analysis of these ‘other societal actors’ is taken as a 
valuable external perspective.  
 
1.3 Research objectives and relevance 
The aim of this dissertation is to gain more insight into how the division of competences, i.e. 
legal competences, influences the coordination between EU and Member State actors in 
relation to sustainable development policies. Further, it attempts to examine how these legal 
competences interact with some selected concepts through which coordination is often 
analysed in political science contributions. The study contributes both to the academic and 
EU policy debate and the content itself provides societal relevance in the quest for tackling 
global challenges from the European continent.  
1.3.1 Academic relevance and objectives 
In relation to current research this dissertation has the objective to provide an original 
contribution to the literature in at least three ways. Firstly, the way in which mixed EU 
competences is operationalised in a politico-legal fashion and as a defining, independent 
factor explaining EU and Member State coordination on sustainable development policies 
alongside or even preceding political theoretical issues. Secondly, in the combination of 
analysing policy formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainability policies. The 
implementation of sustainable development agreements is often under-researched, yet it is in 
the implementation that political and legal arguments on the division of competences take 
centre stage. Thirdly, the originality of this academic contribution is in the combination of 
analysing internal and external dimensions of EU sustainable development policies together 
in light of the UN Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals. In this way, the 
dissertation tries to combine findings from seemingly unrelated academic fields, namely EU 
external relations and EU internal implementation of sustainable development issues. 
 
By bringing the legal competences into political science limelight, this dissertation aims to 
cross disciplines and explore analyses in a politico-legal fashion.  The empirical studies that 
analyse the internal coordination structures of the EU and Member State actors review some 
specific political-theoretical issues in particular. Examples include the balance of power 
between (large) Member States in the Council and the Commission68 , ‘socialisation’ of 
representatives from Member States69 , the EU position in the international constellation of 
                                                     
67 Cf Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Multi-level governance and European integration (Rowman & Littlefield). 
68 Laatikainen, K. and Smith, K. (eds) (2006) The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). Cf Dykstra, H. (2009) ‘Commission versus Council Secretariat: an analysis of bureaucratic rivalry in 
European foreign policy.’ European Foreign Affairs. Review Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 431-450. 
69 Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the Cases 
of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 969-
998. EU socialisation means that EU Member States’ representatives involved in deciding on and negotiating the EU position in 
international institutions first and foremost adopt a European orientation, see Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and 
Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 75. 
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power and preference heterogeneity in the sense of (the absence of) aligning interests.70 By 
bringing in the competences, i.e. legal competences, empirical studies would align more with 
legal theories. This makes the contribution of this empirical study more aligned with practice 
in which legal and political considerations are often taken together. Moreover, this integrative 
study contributes to more academic cooperation between the disciplines, which is even more 
necessary in relation to analysis of sustainable development policies.71 This integrative 
objective serves academic purposes as influences come not only from within the discipline 
but from other areas of academic interests.72 To make it concrete, political scientists must 
become more aware of the legal framework, which to a certain extent defines the political 
options.73 However, as political contributions in this field have shown, legal competences are 
only part of the authority of actors. There are other important sources of authority, including 
substantive expertise, or making the link with other policy dossiers.74  
 
The academic relevance of this dissertation goes beyond integrative purposes and 
contributes to comparative case studies on sustainable development with a focus on the EU 
and Member States. Over the past decade, as Groen (2016: 25) has stated, studies on the 
EU in international affairs and on the EU’s performance in global environmental governance 
have “slowly moved from individual case studies towards broader assessments and 
comparisons”.75 Despite that, a case study analysis on sustainable development issues in 
which the EU and Member State coordination is compared on internal and external 
coordination, while focusing on multiple policy areas and multiple ‘chains’  in the decision-
making process, has not been carried out before. It therefore makes sense to analyse 
internal and external policies, especially since the ‘universal’ UN Agenda 2030 on 
Sustainable Development.76 As such, the original academic contribution of analysing the 
legal provisions and EU competences that (could) define the implementation of the SDGs 
(see 6.2) bridges EU external relations with internal division of competences. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is not to provide a full explanation of legal and political variables 
in the selected cases. Only three intervening variables derived from the literature are chosen 
and their interaction with the legal competences is analysed, which helps to characterise EU 
and Member State coordination so that it contributes to the current scholarship on the topic. 
The main focus is whether and how legal competences affect EU and Member State 
coordination, thus leading to an exploration into whether the legal competences could indeed 
contribute to theory formulation on EU and Member State coordination of sustainable 
                                                     
70 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). Groen, L. and Niemann, A. (2013) ‘The European Union at the Copenhagen climate 
negotiations: A case of contested EU actorness and effectiveness’. International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 308-324.  
71 Delreux, T. (2006) ‘The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective on the internal 
decision-making process’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 231-248. 
Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 261-286. Kamphof, R., and Wessel, R.A. (2018) ‘Analysing shared competences in EU 
external action: the case for a politico-legal framework’. Europe and the World: A law review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 38-64. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2018.02.  
72 Della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (2008) Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective 
(Cambridge University Press), p. 36. 
73 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 285. 
74 Vanhoonacker, S. and Pomorska, K. (2013) ‘The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign 
policy’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 9, p. 1322. 
75 Groen L. (2016) The Importance of Fitting Activities to Context: The EU in Multilateral Climate and Biodiversity Negotiations. 
PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, p. 25. 
76 See chapter 6. 
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development policies, both internally and externally. These new findings may stimulate 
others to engage in the exercise of explaining and analysing the coordination of EU and 
Member State actors in their contribution to worldwide sustainable development. The 
exploration is innovative because of its focus on legal competences as well as the interaction 
with the three political-theoretical variables that it includes. The analysis contributes to the 
increasing demand for comparative research in order to advance more general knowledge in 
this area.  Chapter 2 and 3 provide more information on the theoretical framework, 
operationalisation and methods. 
1.3.2 Relevance to the EU policy debate and societal relevance 
The dissertation not only serves academic integrative purposes. With regard to the EU policy 
debate, sustainable development, as emphasised by the Lisbon Treaty (Art 3(5) TEU), is an 
important objective for the EU and is increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ into EU policies and 
legislation.77 By concretising this concept in the case studies on ‘Team EU’ in international 
climate change negotiations, alternative fuel policies and implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, this research contributes to the EU policy 
debate and the debate in EU Member States on the issue of competences78.  
 
Citizens in EU Member States make increasing use of legal rules and Treaty obligations in 
their quest to ensure that their governments pursue more sustainable policies. As an 
example, the Dutch ‘Urgenda’ case demonstrate that Courts can be responsive to the 
argument that Member States’ policies are insufficient and even ‘unlawful’ to avoid 
dangerous climate change.79 Legal uncertainty appears to have negative consequences for 
citizens and businesses. Recent Eurobarometer surveys illustrate that citizens value 
sustainable development issues like environmental protection and development cooperation 
highly.80 However, within these policies, sustainable development is often the ‘ball’ in the 
political power game in which legal and political considerations take centre stage. 
 
Moreover, this dissertation serves societal purposes, as the legal competences will become 
increasingly important both for the ‘transitional’ and transformative sustainability policies, as 
well as for the debate on the ‘Future of Europe’ after Brexit. The EU and Member States 
need to keep track of their climate pledges to make their ‘emission pathways consistent with 
holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre 
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre 
industrial levels’, as stipulated in the recent Paris Agreement.81 Without proper European 
                                                     
77 As examples of mainstream policies, the European Commission DG Environment refers to e.g. the EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy, the EU 2020 Strategy and the EU’s Better Regulation Agenda as well as sectoral programmes such as 
the 7th Environmental Action Programme. <<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/index_en.htm>>, 
accessed 11 October 2017. 
78 Cf Government of the United Kingdom (2015) Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, available at <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/140/140.pdf>, Accessed 12 June 
2017. 
79 Urgenda v The Netherlands, The Hague District Court (24 June 2015) ECLI:NL: RBDHA:2015:7196 (original language: 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145). For a legal analysis cf de Graaf, K. J. and Jans, J. H. (2015) ‘The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands 
Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change’. Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp 517-527. 
80 European Commission Special Eurobarometer (2014) ‘Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment’, Special 
Eurobarometer 416, September 2014 and European Commission Special Barometer (2017) ‘EU Citizen’s views on 
development, cooperation and aid’, Special Eurobarometer 455, April 2017. Cf Falkner, R. (2007) ‘The political economy of 
‘normative power’ Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 510.  
81 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015) Paris Agreement, 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf, Accessed 13 December 2016. 
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regional cooperation and implementation in strategic fields such as energy, transport and 
development cooperation policies, many European households could be adversely affected 
by climate change, and universal climate agreements may be trampled on by the EU and 
Member States.82 Whether reaching these goals would entail institutional reform needs to be 
studied, showing the importance of this research study. 
 
1.4 Introducing the cases and case selection 
In order to maximise the analytical leverage of the case studies, they have to be carefully 
selected.83 This study made a selection on the basis of expertise, to lay the foundation for a 
more thorough politico-legal analysis framework.84 Due to the explorative objective of this 
dissertation, the case studies were purposely differentiated in the covered policy areas, the 
dimension of EU sustainable development policies (internal/external) and the place in the 
policy cycle (negotiation, formulation and implementation)), with the aim to achieve a 
maximum of variance alongside these dimensions. The case studies thus differ considerably 
and do not form a uniform set of cases.85  Nevertheless, the amalgamation of these cases 
provides for a unique and relevant process-based analysis of the effects of legal 
competences and of the interaction with other variables often coined in the literature.  
As will be explained later, there are some limitations in the (loose) case selection criteria 
applied in this study.86 Nevertheless, three ‘general’ - but not mutually exclusive - selection 
criteria can be identified. The first criterion is  the fact that a given policy arrangement is 
identified as a ‘mixed competence’ arrangement based on multiple policy areas according to 
the catalogue of competences (Art 2-6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union). Secondly, the ‘main’ (original) policy area of the broad policy arrangement, or the 
‘centre of gravity’ of the mixed competence arrangement, is a ‘shared competence’ so that 
EU and Member States have to cooperate. Thirdly, each process has clear coordination 
between EU and Member State actors and defined outcomes, so that the results (or absence 
thereof) from the dependent variable can be ascribed to the independent and intervening 
variables at least to some extent.  
The cases differ in their place in the policy chain (policy formulation, negotiation and 
implementation), as well as in the dimension of sustainable development policies 
(internal/external), so as  to cover a broad spectrum of sustainable development policies. It is 
necessary to include the three stages of decision-making, as one could identify differences in 
the actual effect of the division of competences in practice and see whether the coordination 
‘management’ is for instance more difficult during the implementation phase rather than 
during policy-making or negotiation. The existing literature on the topic of coordination tends 
                                                     
82 Kamphof, R., Bonenkamp, T., Selleslaghs, J.M.H.M.R. and Hosli, M.O. (2017) ‘External competences in energy and climate 
change’ in Leal-Arcas, R. and Wouters, J. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing), 
p. 30. 
83 The question of case selection in comparative politics originates in the work of e.g. Lijphart (1971) in the 1970s: Lijphart, A. 
(1971) ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’. American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, pp. 682-693. As 
indicated by Seawright  and Gerring (2008: 295) many scholars ‘continue to lean primarily on pragmatic considerations such as 
time, money, expertise and access’ or the ‘theoretical prominence of a given case’. However, this does not provide a 
methodological justification for the case selection. On selection of case studies, see also Seawright, J. and Gerring, J. (2008) 
‘Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options’. Political Research Quarterly, 
Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 294-308. 
84 Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: Toward 
a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, p. 1320. 
85 See section 3.1.3 on ‘generalisability’ of the findings.  
86 Cf section 3.1.3 on how to generalize the findings and section 7.4.4 on methodological limitations: criticizing the three cases.  
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to  generally be more critical towards EU and Member State coordination in ‘implementation’ 
than for example negotiation in international institutions.87 Moreover, the research on the 
internal and external functioning of the Union and the research on different stages of the 
policy process are not well connected.  Therefore, it proves helpful to compare the findings in 
different policy cycles and dimensions; this also makes the research more aligned to what is 
often defined as  policy objectives, e.g. to make policies more ‘integrated’ and ‘coherent’ so 
as to achieve the transformative nature of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement.88   
The three cases will be researched in-depth by means of process tracing, in order to identify 
the intervening and/or causal mechanisms between mixed (external) competences and the 
enabling/restraining influence on EU and Member State actors in their coordination process. 
Process tracing is used because the character of the relations between these ‘variables’ (or 
conditions) is unclear and the method allows for thorough investigation.89 More information 
on the research design and the method of data collection is to be found in chapter 3. 
Figure 1.2 gives an overview of the cases and the similarities and differences in the selection 
of the cases. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical and methodological justification for these three 
cases. What follows is a short overview of the three cases.  
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87 Cf Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked 
governance (Oxford University Press), p. 100: “policy planning has never been one of the Commission’s strengts” when 
compared to e.g. literature on the EU and Member States in climate change negotiations. See for example Oberthür, S. and 
Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’. The International 
Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 35-50. 
88 European Commission (2018) ‘From commitment to action: Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals through the 
next Multi-Annual Financial Framework of the European Union’. Advisory report to the European Commission by the Multi-
Stakeholder Platform on the Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU, March 2018. Accessed << 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/adopted-position-paper-on-the-mff_en.pdf>> 18 August 2018, p. 6. 




Table 1. 1 Selection of case studies  
 
Case study 1 - EU and Member States: formulating policies on alternative fuels for private 
vehicles 
The issue of ‘alternative’ transportation fuels, such as electricity, hydrogen and biofuels, 
receives much attention in the European Union. This is not surprising, as traditional 
combustion engines, are under scrutiny due to recent emission scandals such as 
‘Dieselgate’.90 Moreover, transport is nowadays almost totally dependent on oil products, 90 
percent of which is imported.91 In contrast with the other case studies, the ‘multilateral’ 
context on these alternative fuels is largely absent and this inquiry is primarily focused on 
‘internal’ coordination aspects between the EU and Member State actors. While the 
alternative fuels have as a primary focus the shared competence ‘energy’ and ‘transport’ 
policy areas, these alternative fuels are a typical ‘mixed competence’ issue, related to 
aspects like taxation, agriculture, climate action and trade. There is a single market for road 
fuel and fuel production facilities are widely distributed throughout the EU. Therefore, this 
case study focuses on Treaty provisions and on the single market directives concerning 
these alternative fuel policies. Besides addressing these legal competences, literature, and 
policy review, the qualitative part of this study relies on eleven semi-structured interviews 
with EU and Member State officials and stakeholders from the private sector and CSOs.92 
The analysis focuses on the process from the 2009 Fuel Quality Directive93  and Renewable 
Energy Directive94, almost coinciding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, until July 
2017. This case study has primarily an internal dimension and is used to analyse the 
decision-making process and formulation of sustainable development policies. 
Case study 2 - EU and Member States in UNFCCC (climate change) negotiations 
As Dee (2013: 76) puts it, the EU and Member State action in the climate change negotiation 
framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  is 
‘perhaps the most widely cited case study employed in evaluating EU behaviour in 
multilateral negotiations’.95 The European Union and its Member States have been leading 
                                                     
90 Teffer, P. (2016) ‘Switching off emissions filters 'within the law' says car lobby’, EU Observer, 1 July 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/dieselgate/134138. 
91 European Commission (2015) ‘Ten priorities for Europe: A new start for Europe: an EU agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and 
democratic change’ 
92 These interviews have been conducted from July 2016 to March 2017; eight of these interviews have been conducted 
together with Thijs Bonenkamp, MSc graduate in International Relations & Diplomacy at Leiden 
University and research assistant at Leiden University.  Three of these interviews have been conducted by the author alone and 
notes have been shared with Thijs Bonenkamp and colleagues from Delft University (Dr Reinoud Wolffenbuttel and Delft 
University graduate Luke Middelburg. The interview questions have been sent to the interviewees beforehand. The interviews 
have not been taped. Please see  chapter 3 (research design) and the annex for more information on the interviews. The 
interviews from July 2016-September 2016 have been conducted for the Ford Poling Challenge, which comprises of a non-
technical study conducted by Thijs Bonenkamp and the author, and a technical study conducted by the researchers from Delft 
University of Technology, presented at a biofuel workshop in The Hague in October 2016: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/events/2016/10/renewable-energy. Delft University measures the gasoline/ethanol/water 
composition of biofuels as part of the overarching technical study. 
93 Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament of the Council on the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and 
introducing a mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the specification of fuel used by inland 
waterway vessels, 23 April 2009, OJ. L. 140/88. 
94 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources, 23 April 2009, OJ L. 140/16. 
95 Dee, M.J. (2013) Challenging Expectations: A study of European Union performance in multilateral negotiations, PhD 
dissertation, University of Glasgow, p. 76. 
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actors in constructing the international climate policy framework since the early 1990s.96 The 
topic of climate change has even been identified as a ‘saviour issue’ for the success of the 
EU integration project. 97 All Member States are a party to the UNFCCC and so is the EU 
itself as an autonomous actor.98 Despite that, the EU and Member States are essentially 
cooperating as ‘Team EU’ in the climate change negotiations. The annual Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs) have been described by the interviewees as massive events. Interestingly, 
the issue of climate change, in spite of itshigh political significance, does not get much 
attention from the Treaties. As a matter of fact, searching for the periphrases ‘climate 
change’ or ‘climate action’ in the text of the Treaties only leads to one result under the 
‘environment’ chapter. In that sense, climate change could be viewed as a ‘shared 
competence’ along the reasoning of environment policy (Art 4 TFEU, Art 191 TFEU), but the 
UNFCCC COP negotiations are so broad that one could speak of a mixed competence.  
Besides analysing legal provisions and documents and conducting a literature review, this 
case study relies on nineteen semi-structured interviews. This analysis focuses on the 
process from the Copenhagen climate conference (2009) coinciding with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, until July 2017, thereby including the historic UNFCCC COP21 held in 
Paris (2015). The main emphasis is on these large conferences, but day-to-day climate 
diplomacy is also part of the analysis and the questions in the interviews. This case study 
has primarily an external dimension and is thus symptomatic for the negotiation of 
sustainable development policies by the EU and Member State actors.  
Case study 3 - EU and Member States: implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and the 
Sustainable Development Goals 
In September 2015, the United Nations ‘Agenda 2030’ for Sustainable Development was 
adopted99, in the presence of  many Heads of State from the Member States and the First 
Vice President of the Commission. A coordinated effort by the Member States of the 
European Union has lead to the  negotiation of  the 17 ‘SDGs’ and targets from 2012 to 
2015. The European Commission (DG Development and DG Environment) has been active 
in this negotiatiative  phase and had brought together  the ambitions on policy areas of 
environment and development cooperation. In contrast with the earlier Millennium 
Development Goals (2000-2015), the EU and Member States are now asked to evaluate 
both their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions, instead of transferring (financial) means of 
implementation from the ‘Northern’ to the ‘Southern’ part of the world. Implementing this 
broad agenda is a ‘shared responsibility’100, although the UN system preserves the ‘primary 
responsibility’ for follow-up and review at a national government level.101 The first document 
that could function as an implementation strategy at the  EU level followed only fourteen 
                                                     
96 'Jürgen Lefevere, Artur Runge-Metzger and Jake Werksman, 'The EU and international climate change policy' in Jos Delbeke, 
Peter Vis (eds), EU Climate Policy Explained (Routledge, 2015), pp. 109'. 
97 Van Schaik, L. and Schunz, S. (2012) ‘Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Normor 
InterestDriven Actor?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 169. 
98 UNFCCC website (2017) Parties to the Convention and Observer States’ http://unfccc.int/parties_ 
and_observers/parties/items/2352.php. 
99 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017. 
100 European Commission (2015) ‘A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015’, 
COM(2015) 44 final, Brussels, 5.2.2015. 
101 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017, para. 47. 
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months after the adoption of the agenda.102 In the meantime, the implementation of the 
Agenda in the Member States has been a mixed picture with some forerunners and some 
Member States waiting for guidance from the Commission. The primary focus of Agenda 
2030 has been since the very beginning the ‘development cooperation’ which is a shared 
‘parallel’ competence (Art 4(3) TFEU and Art 208 TFEU). However, the 17 SDGs encompass 
many policy areas and are therefore a typical example of a ‘mixed competence’ 
implementation necessity. This case study focuses on the implementation period - from 
September 2015 until July 2017, but the EU and Member State process of negotiating the 
agenda (2012-2015) is also covered. Besides analysing the official (legal) documents and 
legal provisions, this case study relies on fifteen semi-structured interviews with EU and 
Member State officials and a couple of ‘other societal stakeholders’. The implementation has 
both internal and external dimensions.   
1.5 Outline of the study 
After this introductory chapter, the dissertation proceeds in the following way to come to an 
answer on the research question. Chapter 2 reviews the existing bodies of literature with 
reference to the EU’s and Member State coordination (in sustainable development policies) 
and extracts some of the main elements both from legal and political perspectives. It then 
explains how this dissertation builds a theoretical framework that contributes to both fields by 
focusing on competences, i.e. legal competences and interaction with variables derived from 
the theories neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, social constructivism and 
institutionalism and concepts such as actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness. Chapter 3 
outlines the research design of a comparative case study, the method of data collection and 
analysis, as well as its methodological limitations. Chapter 4, 5 and 6 then cover the case 
studies formulating policies on alternative fuels for passenger cars, ‘Team EU’ in climate 
change negotiations, and the implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 in the EU and Member 
States. The two final chapters contain an overall analysis. Chapter 7 compares and 
synthesises the three case studies, focusing on similarities, differences, and general 
reflections across the cases on coordination processes and the use of legal competences. 
Moreover, the interactions with these other variables are analysed and the cases are 
critically evaluated for future use. The concluding chapter 8 then builds on the results of 
chapter 7. It paves the way for a larger politico-legal analysis of the EU and Member States 
shared action on sustainable development by reflecting on the difficulties in this exploration. 
The findings qualify and nuance some existing literature by providing new insights and 
highlighting the policy relevance of such an integrative analysis. Moreover, this chapter 
presents avenues for future research and institutional innovation.  
 
SUMMARY CHAPTER 1 
The policies and the coordination of the EU and Member States on sustainable development 
policies are extensively studied from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. However, 
the issue of the legal competences does not feature prominently in this analysis, while being 
critical to many legal contributions and political discussions. This dissertation focuses on the 
following question: how do the legal competences affect EU and Member State coordination 
in formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable development policies? By using 
                                                     
102 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM(2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016. 
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different case studies, focusing on alternative fuel policies, ‘Team EU’ in climate negotiations 
and SDG implementation, the dissertation tries to explore the potential of including the broad 
notion of the legal competences as an independent variable explaining coordination between 
the  EU and Member State actors. As such, interaction is analysed with intervening variables, 
explanations currently provided by theories such as neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, 
social constructivism and institutionalism. The integrative politico-legal research design 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
“Only when legal and political insights are combined, will we be able to know what to 
do to attain one of the main EU objectives in accordance with Article 3(5) TEU: In its 
relations with the wider world, the Union shall (..) contribute to the sustainable 
development of the Earth(..)”(Jørgensen and Wessel, 2011: 286)103 
 
The Lisbon Treaty provides a set of legal provisions outlining the different types of EU 
competences in Article 2-6 TFEU. These competences mark are exclusive, shared or 
supporting competences, whilst linking it to specific policy areas and identifying the 
consequences for coordination between EU and Member States. This ‘catalogue of 
competences’ has been spelled out ‘for the first time ever’  in the Lisbon Treaty.104 Table 2.1 
provides an overview of EU competences. As is shown, many of the sustainable 
development-related policy areas fall under the notion of ‘shared competence’ (e.g. 
environment, energy, social policy and development cooperation), but there are likewise 
some that are included in the lists of  supporting competences or exclusive competences. 
Besides these Treaty provisions, there are also specific Treaty chapters, provisions and legal 
principles that should be used. The Court’s case law and internal market regulation outline 











Monetary policy (Eurozone), fisheries, 
commercial policy, competition rules internal 
market, 
Shared competence Article 4 
TFEU 
Internal market, social policy, cohesion policy, 
agriculture, environment, consumer protection, 





Industry, culture, civil protection, tourism, 
education, youth, sport, civil protection, 
administrative cooperation 
   









Research, technological development, space, 
development cooperation, humanitarian aid 
                                                     
103 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 286. 
104 Govaere, I. (2015) ‘“Setting the international scene”: EU external competence and procedures post-Lisbon revisited in the 
light of ECJ Opinion 1/13’. Common Market Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 5, p. 1278. Cf The European Convention (2002), Final 
Report of Working Group V “Complementary Competencies”, CONV 275/1/02 REV 1, 4 November 2002, for an overview of the 
reasons why a catalogue of competences was needed according to the negotiators of the Convention. An example of this 
reasoning can be found at p. 2: “To meet the requirements of transparency and clarity a future Treaty should contain a short, 








Common Foreign and Security Policy (no 
competence Court of Justice of the EU to give 
judgment). 
Coordination EU Article 5 
TFEU 
Employment, social policies, economic policies 
Table 2. 1 Typology of competences in EU Treaties105 
This chapter reviews the existing literature theorising EU and Member State coordination is 
theorised and links it with the legal perspectives on EU legal competences. While this 
dissertation applauds the wide diversity of theoretical approaches on EU and Member State 
coordination, it cannot but highlight the paucity of a more pragmatic connection with the legal 
competences as outlined above. Relatively few empirical studies directly address the mixed 
EU competences in work on sustainable development.106 Empirical studies that are built on a 
systematic analysis of the effect of competences on EU and Member State coordination are 
even rarer and the operationalisation is unconvincing. For example, Da Conceição-Heldt and 
Meunier chose to use the formal rules of decision-making to operationalise the concept of 
internal cohesiveness, however implying that internal cohesiveness is highest in the case of 
‘exclusive competences’ and ‘medium’ in the case of shared competences, without 
questioning this line of reasoning.107 The real effect of competences on EU and Member 
State coordination is therefore not operationalised yet. To fill this gap, this chapter comes to 
a theoretical framework in which the interaction between the legal competences and 
variables from the ‘grand theories’ can be tested in the case studies on sustainable 
development policies.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 highlights the different theories and 
concepts on EU and Member State coordination and their (often scant) attention for the use 
of legal competences. After starting with some general remarks on the literature on 
coordination and socialisation in the EU (2.2.1) and then the traditional neofunctionalism-
intergovernmentalism dichotomy (2.2.2) the section continues with social constructivism 
(2.2.3) and institutionalist approaches (2.2.4). Thereafter, the concepts of actorness, 
effectiveness and cohesiveness, as used in empirical (sustainability) studies are covered in 
2.2.5. In section 2.3 the legal perspective on competences is outlined with specific attention 
for the Treaty, legal principles and the Court’s case law. Subsequently, section 2.4 builds on 
the earlier section by proposing a theoretical framework and operationalisation of the 
theories and concepts to analyse and assess the interactions between these issues (2.4.1-
2.4.3). This section likewise raises some of the limitations of this integrative approach (2.4.4).  
2.2 Theories on EU and Member State cooperation (and legal competences) 
Many political theories and concepts deal with the sharing of powers and relationships 
between the EU institutional actors and the Member State actors. These theories often fail to 
fully consider the legal competences and ponder other variables to have more and 
                                                     
105 The table only summarises the competences as  prescribed in the Treaties (Art. 2-6 TFEU) and does  not include 
e.g.exclusive Member State competences such as direct taxation. 
106 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) uses EU competence in the theoretical framework.  
107 da Conceição-Heldt, E. and Meunier, S. (2014) ‘Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external 
effectiveness of the EU in global governance’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p.  969. 
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independent effect on EU and Member State coordination. This dissertation has chosen to 
operationalise these grand theories of neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, social 
constructivism and institutionalism and concepts such as actorness, cohesiveness and 
effectiveness into functional but basic ‘intervening variables’ in the case studies. This section 
extracts some of the main elements of these theories and concepts without aiming to provide 
a full overview.108 As demonstrated later n the paper, the legal competences derived from the 
Treaties often only indirectly play a role and the theories seem ‘inadequate to account for the 
differential impact of Europe on the Member States’.109 Part of the literature could be 
nuanced or qualified based on insights derived from this dissertation.  
2.2.1 Coordination and socialisation in the EU (general) 
There has been significant amounts of literature written on coordination in the EU, although 
this is often not linked with the legal division of competences, but instead focused on multi-
actor networks and multi-level governance. The seminal work of Jordan and Schout (2006)110 
can be seen as a child of its time when coordination capacities, networks and governance of 
the EU were in the limelight of the academic discussions following the ‘European 
Governance’ White Paper of the European Commission (2001)111. Networked 
governance,link between the literature on ‘’multi-level governance’112 and the ‘open method 
of co-ordination’113 werea major driver of academic discussions on EU coordination in the 
late 1990s and 2000s.  This academic debate shifted the attention from the interdependence 
between the European Commission and the Member States to the coordination capacities, 
networks and multiple actors.114 It also included a focus on the more ‘softer’ measures of 
coordination.  
 
The concept of coordination in the EU is ‘ill-defined’ and ‘essentially contested’, but it 
essentially comes down to the idea ‘to bring different parts together to create an interrelated 
whole’.115 Although inclusion of the legally binding Treaty provisions is seen as ‘hugely 
important’ in the literature because it ‘completes the legal codification’ of concepts like 
sustainable development, these works fail to include references to the division of 
competences and its effects on EU-Member State coordination.116 Notwithstanding the 
positive connotation and definition of the concept, coordination is often identified as a 
problem. European Commission in particular seems from the outset disproportionately 
negatively evaluated in terms of coordination capacities, although this is not always backed 
                                                     
108 Please see many of the quoted references for a more extensive overview of the specific theories and concepts. 
109 Börzel, T. (2003) ‘How the European Union interacts with its member states’. Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien (Ed.) 
URN: http:// nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-246018, p. 3.  
110 Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance 
(Oxford University Press). 
111 European Commission (2001) ‘European Governance: a White Paper’, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001.  
112 Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001) Multi-level governance and European integration (Rowman & Littlefield). 
113 Borrás, S., & Jacobsson, K. (2004). ‘The open method of co-ordination and new governance patterns in the EU’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, vol. 11. No. 2, pp. 185-208. 
114 Although Radaelli (2003: 11) acknowledges that “a Constitutional article may help in demarcating the territory of the OMC. It 
should (then..) respect the flexible and experimental nature of the relation between open 
coordination and legislative competence”. Cf Radaelli, C. M. (2003) The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance 
architecture for the European Union? (Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies). 
115 Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance 
(Oxford University Press), p. 40. 
116 Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance 
(Oxford University Press), p. 69, specifically on ‘Environmental Policy Integration’ (EPI). 
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by strong empirical evidence.117 Definitions that are more neutral choose to apply the 
concept in a way to refer only very loosely to ‘meetings’.118 
 
There is also a strand of the ‘coordination’ literature that is more positive on EU coordination. 
This is then often referred to as ‘socialisation’ instead of ‘coordination’ where the domestic 
actors are ‘Europeanized’.119 Preferences of Member State and EU actors, instead of being 
fixed, can converge over time through social interaction processes.120 In that way Member 
States’ representatives involved in deciding on or negotiating an EU position adapt a 
European orientation attributed to the ‘socialisation’ in EU practices. 121 With regard to 
sustainable development policies, literature on climate change negotiations takes this 
‘socialisation’ as a given, as a phenomenon affecting EU and Member State coordination in 
UNFCCC settings.122 However, as has been stated earlier, the socialisation is more a ‘result’ 
of specific coordination processes rather than a variable affecting coordination. In that sense, 
socialisation will not be operationalised as an intervening variable in this research, but more 
as a process that could be part of the dependent variable in this dissertation whenever it is 
visible.  As in the related coordination literature there is minimal attention for legal 
competences, often replaced by a focus on ‘social’ norms that would drive the coordination 
between EU and Member State actors.  
2.2.2 Dichotomy neofunctionalism – intergovernmentalism 
The tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental characteristics are visible in 
the two most prominent political theories on EU and Member State cooperation. According to 
the neofunctionalist theory, EU institutions acquire more powers over time within and even 
across (spillover) policy areas, leading to more supranational policy-making.123 Conversely, 
according to the theory of intergovernmentalism, the progress in European integration follows 
the convergence of important domestic groups and governments in European Member 
States. 124 The two competing paradigms leave ample room for groups of scholars who reject 
this ‘zero-sum’ game conception of the coordination between EU and Member State 
actors.125 The approach to see whether one of the two is ‘dominant’ is e.g. visible in the 
                                                     
117 Ibid, p. 209 where the section on EU coordination capacities starts with the sentence ‘The Commission has a poor reputation 
for internal and external management’ without mentioning any further reference.   
118 Cf Kissack, R. (2007) ‘European Union Member State coordination in the United Nations system: towards a methodology for 
analysis’. European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper 2007, Vol. 1, p. 3 states: Coordination is the meeting of diplomats and 
officials from the governments of the European Union Member States (most likely with staff from the Council Secretariat and/or 
Commission present but this is not essential) in any location (national capitals, Brussels, New York or Geneva) with the purpose 
of discussing an issue on a UN agenda. 
119 Cf 2.2.3 social constructivism and sociological institutionalism.  
120 Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, p. 
975. 
121 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 75. 
122 E.g. Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, 
pp. 969-998, although this study was conducted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
123 Haas, E. B. (1958) The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces, 1950-1957 (No. 42). (Stanford University 
Press). Lindberg, L.N. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
124 Moravcsik, A. (1998) The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press), chapter 1. Cf Taylor, P. (1982) ‘Intergovernmentalism in the European Communities in the 1970s: Patterns 
and Perspectives’. International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 741-766. 
125 Börzel, T. (2003) ‘How the European Union interacts with its member states’. Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien (Ed.) 
URN: http:// nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-246018, p. 3. 
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literature on EU-Member State implementation in which non-implementation of directives is 
framed as either ‘inability of states to comply’ or ‘state reluctance to conform’.126  
 
Indeed, already the adapted theory of liberal intergovernmentalism provides for a ‘two-stage’ 
process of preference formation and intergovernmental bargaining in which the first stage is 
more a domestic process wherestate executives are influenced by the preferences from 
society interest groups. In the second stage the state executive, who negotiates on the 
differences in an international (EU) arena, aggregates these preferences.127  
 
This dissertation adheres to the conclusion as held earlier by a.o. Billiet (2009: 435) and 
Pollack (1997) who state that it is neither the strictly intergovernmental, nor the strictly 
supranational position that holds the truth, and that instead the autonomy of the Commission 
varies over time and from one function to another, depending on the mix of ‘control 
mechanisms’.128 However, as this study shows later, this does not mean that the 
institutionalist principal-agent model fully covers the legal competence lacunae in the 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism literature.  
2.2.3 Social constructivism and sociological (neo-)institutionalism 
The theory of social constructivism and the development of common norms is an equally 
popular theory, although the International Relations literature ‘finds it hard to focus on the 
relationship as key unit of analysis’129. Originated in the broader category of international 
relations constructivism as a heterogeneous category, it sees international relations as 
dominated by cultural and ideological forces but mostly social interaction by actors.130 In EU-
Member State relations, it is especially common to use ‘social’ constructivism. Groenleer and 
Van Schaik (2007) for example find with regard to negotiations on climate change that 
Member State representatives appear to have been ‘socialised’ by the interaction during the 
frequent meetings taking place in Brussels and the EU coordination meetings of international 
conferences.131In comparison to some other theories the interesting contribution of these 
‘social’ theories is that actors are not only viewed as rational/instrumental but psychological 
and even bound by group processes132 and the logic of ‘social’ appropriateness.133 These 
social norms, however, are mostly unrelated to the legal competences while these 
competences appear to influence the cooperation, especially in a situation of mixed or 
shared competences. In that sense the theories which combine sociological and institutional 
aspects by arguing that the institutions in Europe have a socialising role could align better 
                                                     
126 Mbaye, H. A. (2001) ‘Why national states comply with supranational law: Explaining implementation infringements in the 
European Union, 1972-1993’. European Union Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 259. 
127 Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach’. JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No.4, pp. 473-524. Cf Caporaso, J. (1998) ‘Regional integration theory: 
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128 Billiet, S. (2009) ‘Principal–agent analysis and the study of the EU: What about the EC’s external relations?’. Comparative   
European Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 439. Cf Pollack, M. A. (1997) ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European 
Community’. International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 99-134. 
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International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 855-885. 
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132 Hix, S. and Høyland, B. (2011) The political system of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan). 
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with the concept of legal competences than the ‘pure’ social constructivists.134 Nevertheless, 
these theories seem still of the opinion that the domestic actors are in the end ‘socialised’ 
into European norms and rules of appropriateness.135  
2.2.4 Institutionalism 
The attention given to institutions and institutionalisation in theory-building on international 
relations has increased at such pace that one could speak of a ‘institutionalist turn’ in IR, as 
states are not only viewed as ‘units with largely static preferences’, but the origin, evaluation 
and variation in state preferences is also explored.136 Institutionalism is a common way of 
reflecting on European integration and takes many forms. A more historical analysis of 
European integration is offered by historical institutionalists.137 This kind of historical 
institutional analysis sees reform in the EU as ‘incremental’ rather than the result of 
‘fundamental transformations’.138 In the theory of ‘rational institutionalism’, the EU is viewed 
as a constraint on the behaviour of (Member State) actors with given identities and 
preferences. In this way, the EU is largely a ‘political opportunity structure’, which offers 
some actors political (and legal) resources to exert influence, while, it constrains the ability of 
others to pursue the goals.139 Primarily, this is concretised in a ‘principal-agent’ relationship in 
which a group of principals (Member States) delegates power to the supranational agent (the 
European Commission).140 Traditionally, principal-agent theory accentuates the control 
behaviour and mechanisms.141 The ‘sociological institutionalism’ is explicated above.  
 
The institutionalists could form a bridge between legal and political studies. The notion that 
‘institutions matter’ is fundamental to this approach, as it is in many legal approaches.142 An 
interesting example is offered by the institutionalist explanation of EU external powers, which 
is built upon the idea that the “modes and effects of external governance are shaped by 
internal EU modes of governance”. 143 This resonates with the legal perspective (see section 
2.3) in which EU external relations law is largely the result of the division of competences 
within the EU. However, institutionalists also tend to see legal competences as ‘control 
mechanisms’ and ‘constraints’ and the theory can be regarded as  state-centric. In contrast, 
legal competences may ‘enable’ Member State and EU actors. Despite this shortcoming, 
institutionalists can be seen as innovative because of the methods they use and the way they 
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apply them (liberally).144 As a result, institutionalism could indeed prove to be one of the 
‘nodal points’ where legal and political approaches come together.145  
2.2.5 EU external concepts: actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness 
Alongside the theoretical approaches, there are more and more concepts that concretise 
(and operationalise) the cooperation between EU and Member State actors. In the analysis 
of EU and Member State cooperation, particularly when in relation to the multilateral context, 
the following concepts are used abundantly: actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness. As 
previously stated, these concepts are mostly operationalised by observing the EU and 
Member States as a unitary ‘actor’ in relation to (other) nation states. 
 
The ‘actorness’ concept originates from Sjöstedt’s 1977 actor capability study, which 
analyses the European Community’s ability to function ‘actively and deliberately in relation to 
other actors in the international system’.146 This early conceptualisation already covered the 
capacity for ‘autonomous’ action, although in relation to external actors. Moreover, it focused 
on ‘state-like’ characteristics. Other authors thus point to a ‘capability-expectations gap’, 
meaning that the EC could deliver less than it promised due to a lack of capability.147 When 
applying this concept to the cooperation between EU and Member State actors, some say 
that increasing supranationalism leads to ‘more actorness’ while more intergovernmentalism 
leads to less actorness.148 Jupille and Caporaso identify four dimensions of actorness: 
authority, autonomy, external recognition and internal cohesiveness.149 Interestingly, 
authority refers to the extent of delegated competences from the Member States to the EU, 
which ‘can take many different shapes and varies greatly by policy area’.150 The delegation of 
authority can be formal, resulting from Treaty articles, or it can be informal, resulting from 
practice. This way of examining authority operating ‘beyond competences’ is echoed in 
further studies. Vanhoonacker and Pomorska argue that important sources of authority are 
‘not only the legal competences of an actor but also the expertise in a particular issue’.151  
  
The concept of internal/external ‘cohesiveness’ is sometimes a sub-notion of actor capacity, 
but can also be an autonomous concept. The concept of cohesiveness is related to the 
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infamous debate on the ‘single voice’ of the EU and Member States, but goes further by 
requiring authority of such voice, external recognition and autonomy from Member States.152 
The operationalisation of this concept is sometimes driven by formal competences. However, 
these competences are then often taken at face value and define by themselves the 
cohesiveness of the EU and Member States. A more thorough analysis of legal competences 
and its effects on cohesiveness is rarely conducted.153   
 
There is growing literature on effectiveness where the EU is seen as a collective actor. The 
concept of effectiveness has traditionally been equated to the achievement of certain goals. 
This effectiveness literature traditionally focuses on either purely EU-led (such as trade) or 
Member State-led (such as CFSP) international processes. 154 Recent contributions focus 
more closely on mixed competence policy areas such as climate action. Moreover, the 
effectiveness literature is including input and process taken along instead of ‘only’ paralleling 
effectiveness with outcomes. Oberthür and Groen (2015) have made a strong recent 
contribution by proposing an assessment framework of effectiveness.155  
 
The three concepts are still not fixed in their definition and operationalisation, as systematic 
research on the representation behaviour of EU Member States at the United Nations since 
the Lisbon Treaty ‘is still developing’.156 The concepts are therefore often mixed. As an 
example, the concept of effectiveness traditionally presumes a positive and direct correlation 
between the degree of internal cohesiveness and EU’s external effectiveness.157 These 
‘causal links’ have however recently been questioned, with the text of the Lisbon Treaty used 
to support this line of critique.158 In that sense, the inclusion of the political effects of 
competences and legal competences as operationalisation could help to bring these 
concepts to fruition. Oberthür and Groen (2015) for instance, already see scope for further 
investigation into their effectiveness ‘assessment framework’ by including additional internal 
factors including ‘mixity of competences and coordination arrangements under the Lisbon 
Treaty’.159 This dissertation could contribute to qualify and nuance the rich literature on EU 
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and Member State coordination by focusing on the independent and interacting effect of legal 
competences.  
 
2.3 Legal perspective on legal competences and EU - Member State 
cooperation  
The above analysis already demonstrates that ‘the’ political theoretical perspective does not 
exist. A legal perspective is in that sense more concentrated on some specific sources. For 
legal scholars, it is clear that the sources of power come originally (and primarily) from the 
Treaty provisions, the case law of the Court of Justice (both internally) and (when externally) 
the Statute of the international organisation. As a general principle, EU actors only have the 
competences conferred upon them by the Treaties.160 However, the provisions in the Treaty 
are sometimes unclear and leaving the Court of Justice with the job of clarification under one 
important condition: whenever asked for its opinion or judgment by the institutions or Member 
States. Moreover, the external multilateral context does occasionally make it more difficult for 
EU actors, especially for the European Commission, to play a significant role because the 
Statute of the international organisation sometimes fails to allow a regional integration 
organisation such as the EU to become a full member. This section focuses briefly on these 
three sources of legal competences and points to the relevant literature on EU and Member 
State cooperation and the effects of these sources. 
2.3.1 Treaty provisions 
The Treaties on the European Union (TEU) and on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) are the ‘alpha and omega’ from a legal perspective: they started the process of 
European integration and define its limits in terms of legal competences.161 As the result of 
an ‘ever closer union’162 the EU and Member States nowadays divide competences on 
‘nearly every issue of political life’163 summarised in the catalogue of competences (Art 2-6 
TFEU). The legal principle of the conferral of powers (Art 5 TEU) entails that the Union can 
only act once a competence has been created. In parallel, one should keep in mind the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. These principles mean that the Union shall act 
only in so far as ‘the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member State (..) but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level’ (Art 5(3) TEU) for all policy areas besides exclusive EU 
competences.164. 
 
Overall, however, the EU and Member States need each other in cooperation and this is 
legally prescribed by the principle of sincere cooperation (Art 4(3) TEU): the Union and 
Member States shall ‘in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow 
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from the Treaties’.165 This principle interestingly continues with the following sentences 
thereby leaving out the role of EU actors:  
 
“The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts 
of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment 
of the Union's objectives.”  
 
The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s actorness by confirming its separate legal 
status according to Art 47 TEU. Therefore, from a legal perspective the EU is a different 
entity than a  collection of 28 Member States. Several Treaty articles provide a solid basis for 
the Union to establish a formal, substantive presence at international organisations.166 Since 
the Lisbon Treaty this physical presence is often taken care of by ‘Union Delegations in third 
countries and at international organisations (that) shall represent the Union” instead of earlier 
Commission Delegations or diplomats from the Member State holding the rotating 
Presidency. 167   
 
While the EU internal division of competences is quite straightforward, some parts of the 
Treaties have however been rather difficult to decode in the sense of delimitation of 
competences. The EU’s external competences in particular suffer from this shortcoming. 
Legal scholars have marked the external relations arrangement of the Lisbon Treaty as 
‘rather unsatisfactorily’168, ‘fuzzy’169 or even a ‘failure’170. The case law of the Court of Justice 
can thus be viewed as another source of competence (and power). 
2.3.2 Case law Court of Justice and general principles 
The final adjudicator of the use of competences in the EU is the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. As previously stated it is important that the Court is ‘asked’ for their legal 
opinion. There are most notably three ways in which the Court is asked to reflect on 
coordination between EU and Member State actors: in preliminary rulings, infringement 
proceedings and annulment actions. In preliminary rulings the Court is asked to interpret and 
ensure whether EU law is properly applied by national courts.171 Infringement proceedings 
are mostly taken against national governments that fail to comply with EU law. Only the 
European Commission or another EU Member State can start them.172 With annulment 
actions the Court can be asked to annul EU acts that are believed to violate the EU treaties 
or fundamental rights on grounds like ‘lack of competence’, ‘infringement of the Treaties’ or 
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‘misuse of powers’.173 The questions for annulment can come from EU Member States or EU 
institutions such as the Council, the European Commission and (in some cases) the 
European Parliament. An institution can also be brought to Court for the ‘failure to act’ 
contrary to the Treaties.174 
 
The Court is often perceived as ‘helpful’ in the participation of EU actors at international 
institutions as a means to exercise (internal) competences. 175  Some even state that the 
Court ‘accelerates’ the process of the EU actorness at e.g. international institutions.176 The 
Court uses the logic of the Treaty but comes up with its own principles when interpreting the 
law. As an example, on more than one occasion the Court has referred to the ‘principle of 
sincere cooperation’ to underline how Member States were no longer completely free to 
engage in international activities as they see fit even before that principle was codified in the 
Treaty. 177 The Court of Justice seems to consider this principle as very important, not only in 
terms of the final results, but also in relation to the conduct of international negotiations.178 
Moreover, it has been suggested that this principle manifests itself more as a strict duty to 
‘refrain from acting’ for Member State actors.179  
 
An even stronger principle stemming from the Court’s case law, and which could affect the 
conduct of sustainable development policies, is the principle of implied powers. This ‘ERTA 
effect’ means that EU external competences exist because there are internal rules. These 
internal rules, such as regulations and directives, form the basis for the external 
competences for EU actors.180 As a result, Member States and EU actors need to cooperate 
when entering international agreements or international negotiations by themselves, as some 
elements of such negotiations may fall within the competences of the Union. These implied 
powers find their sources both in the general competences, as prescribed by the Treaty, as 
well as in (secondary) legislation. It would then appear that the Dutch Foreign Service is right 
in expressing the opinion that the EU external competence framework is a dynamic process 
rather than a static one.181 The combined reading of this principle  and that  of sincere 
cooperation creates some (practical) difficulties and the ‘fluidity’ of competences results in a 
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field of ‘ingenious legal arguments’ and extensive case law, especially on EU external 
relations.182   
2.3.3 Statutes from (other) international organisations 
The Court of Justice has been keen on preventing other international courts and tribunals 
from affecting its autonomy on the interpretation and application of EU law.183 The EU now 
possesses its own legal personality184 and the Treaty requires consistency and coherence in 
the EU’s external relations185. Despite this, the different legal roles of the EU in international 
organisations have legal effects with possible consequences on cooperation. The EU is, for 
example, a full member of the World Trade Organisation and many fisheries organisations, 
which  coincidentally or not corresponds to its exclusive competences on these policy areas. 
186  In the case of shared competences, the picture is more blurred. The EU is for instance a 
full member of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), but it is not a member of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).  
 
The EU’s position at the United Nations should receive some specific attention. While the EU 
actively engages with numerous UN specialised agencies and aims for ‘effective 
multilateralism’,187 it is not a full member of the UN. In order for the EU to achieve full 
membership, an amendment of one of the key articles of the UN Charter (art 4(1)) would be 
required. However,  this is not on the UN (state-led) political agenda. After a first failed 
attempt in 2010, the Union received an extended status of participation in the General 
Assembly from 2011. 188 Nevertheless, this ‘membership saga’ at the United Nations General 
Assembly makes it clear that the EU and Member States are not only dependent on their 
own cooperation agreements, but also (and crucially) on the recognition of other states and 
international organisations. This means that the role of EU actors, alongside Member State 
actors, depends on the policy area (and internal competences), as well as its position within 
international organisations.  
2.4 A ‘politico-legal’ theoretical framework in practice 
2.4.1 Confronting legal and political perspectives 
The above analysis demonstrates that both legal and political theoretical perspectives on 
cooperation of EU and Member State actors contain helpful insights. Nevertheless, these 
insights are rarely challenged or pooled together.189 There is of course a ‘bridging’ 
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community working on e.g. the ‘political role’ of the Court190  or legal approaches such as 
critical legal theory and constitutionalism linking back to concerns in political science and 
sociology191.  However, in general, legal scholars do have a tendency to focus on ‘formal’ 
Treaty provisions and case law while the political theories are tested empirically, mostly in an 
‘informal’ context. Certain scholars claim that the formal rules play an ‘inferior role’ in actor 
capability192 and that the ‘legal division of labour is seldom strictly followed in 
practice’193.Others state that legal scholarship is ‘fatally flawed’ because the influences of 
non-legal factors are not seriously explored.194 The difference in focus becomes clear when 
examining the attention for the Court of Justice of the EU. As the final adjudicator of the use 
of competences, the Court is the central institution for legal scholars while it is often 
overlooked by political scientists.  
At the same time, the literature review on theoretical and conceptual debates (concerning for 
instance the role of institutions, actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness) reveals that 
there are some underlying invisible links between these approaches.195 In analyses of 
actorness and cohesiveness, the division of competences is sometimes included as an 
empirical factor. This inclusion was proposed in an assessment framework on effectiveness 
and these competence empiric studies could become one of innovative method 
institutionalism is famous for.  The notion according to which ‘institutions matter’ is 
fundamental to the approach in both (institutionalist) political theory and legal approaches. 
Moreover, from a legal perspective, the ‘in-between’ category of shared competences in 
particular is often disregarded while factual legal answers fall short of what happens in 
practice.  As the sustainable development policies mostly fall in these (mixed) shared 
competence categories, it is problematic that the debate is now often concentrated on 
academic silos. Because they both consider specific factors, it is imperative that the 
disciplines are bridged and not merged.196   
2.4.2 Legal competences: political analysis and operationalisation 
Political science has been influential in its empirical quest to know ‘which explanatory factors 
matter most (and which not at all)’.197 It is in that sense that a ‘political’ analysis of legal 
competences could deliver significant empirical results. The current study contributes to the 
accumulation of interpreting the legal, political and policy implications of the EU treaties. This 
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is done by means of a step-by-step empirical test of the effect of ‘legal competences on the 
formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable development policies and 
essentially on the EU and Member State cooperation in the conduct of these policies. In this 
sense, and following, among others, Jin (2014), this dissertation ‘steers the discussions 
surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon away from theoretical and legal perspectives to real-world-
evidence’.198  
For the operationalisation of the concept of ‘legal competences’ this dissertation adopts a 
broad approach. In every case study, this study examines the following legal sources: the 
catalogue of competences set down in art 2-6 TFEU,and the legal basis in other parts of the 
Treaties. In addition to the ‘fixed’ competences in the Treaty, this study also considers the 
Court of Justice case law, regulations and directives.  To complete the picture, this 
dissertation finally evaluates the status of the EU in international organisations as a legally 
defined power; this evaluation is based on the statute of the specific international 
institution.199 This analysis in fact bridges with political approaches by using semi-structured 
interviews to focus on the (perceived) effect of legal competences in practice. Part of this 
empirical quest is to answer questions such as why is the logic of the Treaty not being used 
or for instance why is the Court  not (asked to be) involved. Therefore, other (intervening) 
variables may play a role. 
2.4.3 Interactions with intervening variables: an operationalisation 
This dissertation focuses on the effect of legal competences on political practice. Therefore, 
the effects that work the other way around, i.e. political effects on legal decisions, are not 
part of this analysis, even though the allocation of competences could indeed be the result of 
a ‘specific constitutional and political bargain’.200 Nevertheless, this dissertation also 
assesses the effects of other variables operationalised from political theories to examine their 
effect on formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable development policies, as 
well as to explore their interactions with legal competences in practice. 
The following ‘variables’ derive from theoretical debates within the discipline: supranational 
versus intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of 
power and preference heterogeneity (see Table 2.2). The ‘variable’ socialization is 
deliberately chosen as part of the dependent ‘coordination’ variable, rather than as a 
separate ‘intervening’ variable. The variable ‘supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance’ stems from the main debate in the literature on European integration between 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. This concept is operationalised in the specific 
case studies on the direction of policies, in order to see whether there are ‘institutional turf 
battles’ between EU actors and Member State actors. Is it more EU- or Member State 
focused? The variable ‘EU’s position in the international constellation of power’ is heavily 
influenced by conceptual debates on EU’s external relations and by the concepts actorness, 
cohesiveness and effectiveness. While these concepts certainly have an internal dimension, 
                                                     
198 Jin. X. (2014) European Union representation at the United Nations: towards more coherence after the Treaty of Lisbon, PhD 
Thesis, Leiden University, accessed https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/22977. Cf Hosli, M.O., Van Kampen, E., 
Meijerink, F. and Tennis, K. (2010) ‘Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: The Case of the European 
Union’. Porto. Portugal. Accessed 9 October 2017 via the following website: http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-
porto/virtualpaperroom/082.pdf. 
199 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 261-286. 
200 Hix, S. and Høyland, B. (2011) The political system of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan), p. 19. 
59 
 
the latter is mostly covered by the other variables, as well as by legal competences. This 
variable is therefore operationalised through in-case variables such as CO2 emissions in the 
climate change case study and the amount of biofuels in the alternative fuels case study. 
Thus, both the external political context and the external ‘legal’ context are covered(see 
2.4.2).  
As is clear from the theories of social constructivism and sociological institutionalism 
preferences of Member State and EU actors are not fixed, and can converge over time 
through social interaction processes.201 Member States’ representatives involved in deciding 
or negotiating an EU position thus adopt a European orientation, due to the ‘socialisation’ in 
EU practices. 202 This concept is part of the operationalisation of the dependent variable 
‘coordination’ by means of questions on the frequency of contacts as well as the question 
whether EU and Member State officials feel being part of a ‘team’ or a shared context. 
Preference heterogeneity means that there are no aligning interests. Whether there is 
substantive convergence or divergence, i.e. preference homogeneity or heterogeneity is the 
way in which this concept is operationalised. This variable is used to account for a ‘rational’ 
institutionalist perspective. Moreover, even though there is no specific ‘historical 
institutionalist’ variable, this perspective is still operationalised through a historical 
institutional overview of all the case studies, which indeed also coincide with the overview of 
legal competences. These three ‘variables’ will be analysed in thier interaction with legal 
competences within the case studies and, above all, in the synthesis (chapter 7).  
Theory Operationalisation in intervening variable 
Neofunctionalism Supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance 
Intergovernmentalism Supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance 
Social constructivism and 
sociological institutionalism 
Socialisation (part of coordination/dependent 
variable. No autonomous intervening 
variable) 




EU’s position in the international constellation 
of power 
Table 2. 2 Operationalisation of intervening variables  
2.4.4 Limitations of this integrative approach 
While this approach certainly brings some new empirical insights on the political effect of 
legal competences, there are of course other sources of authority, such as expertise or the 
link with other policy dossiers, which are not covered in detail in this combination. 203 More 
importantly, there are some methodological limitations to this integrative approach which 
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need to be addressed. First, the methodologies used in political and legal approaches may 
well be complementary, but they are also difficult to combine and weighed against each other 
in practice. Empirical evidence, backed by secondary literature and document analysis204 is 
combined with a focus on legal texts and case law of the Court of Justice.  The combination 
of these methods has great potential, but prioritising the information is a challenge that 
cannot be covered in this exploratory exercise. 
Secondly, while aiming for an integrative approach, this examination does only cover parts of 
the scholarship of both disciplines. Legal approaches, despite their variety, share a focus on 
interpretation of Treaties and case law. Political theoretical approaches are however more 
diverse. It is therefore necessary to select specific theories and concepts and in its 
operationalisation choices are made to make these theories and concepts more detailed to 
allow for a workable construction.  
Thirdly, by focusing on ‘competences’, one should be aware that this question might be 
‘fundamentally also one of national constitutional norms’.205 As a result, some Member State 
actors, entities, or even specific fonctionnaires in EU institutions might lean more on the 
division of competences purely because of their national background.206 For example, for 
federal states like Germany, Austria or Belgium, a clear-cut division of competences is part of 
their national constitution, while the more unitary United Kingdom does not even have a 
single constitutional document. Moreover, and logically, people with a legal background 
might respond differently to the importance of legal competences in interviews than persons 
without a legal background.  
Fourthly, another methodological challenge is related to the fact that the work of the 
preferred study objects in the empirical part of this study (EU and Member State diplomats 
and officials) is surrounded with ‘secrecy’ and anonymity. 207 Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to hear different sides, to keep the interviews confidential and to combine multiple 
sources. At least in relation to using multiple sources, one could without a doubt say that 
such an integrative approach provides for triangulation of the findings. The next part of this 
dissertation focuses more in detail on the research design.  
SUMMARY CHAPTER 2 
This chapter reviewed the wide diversity of theoretical approaches and empirical concepts on 
EU and Member State coordination, both internally as well in a multilateral context. It  found 
that there is only scant and often indirect attention paid to the division of legal competences 
in empirical studies. When there is empirical notion, the operationalisation is often uncritical 
or incomplete. This is problematic, especially when analysing sustainable development 
policies, as these policies are often about (mixed) shared competences and both empirical 
and legal sources could assist in painting a fuller picture. Therefore, this dissertation chooses 
a ‘politico-legal’ theoretical framework in which the division of competences is broadly 
operationalised to include Treaty provisions, the Court’s case law, principles and secondary 
legislation. The political effect of this ‘variable’ on the coordination (and socialisation) of 
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sustainable development policies is tested alongside three variables operationalised from the 
theoretical approaches and empirical concepts: the supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power and preference 
heterogeneity. Thus, the dissertation tests the political effects of the division of competences 







Chapter 3: Research Design 
 
“A case study is more than a type of qualitative research. It is a ticket that allows us to 
enter a research field in which we discover the unknown within well-known borders 
while continually monitoring our own performance” (Starman, 2013: p. 42)208. 
 
The dissertation assesses the influence of legal competences on EU and Member State 
actors and coordination, specifically for ‘sustainable development’ policies. This assessment 
is conducted by means of employing legal as well as qualitative methods in comparative 
case studies. This section discusses the research strategy adopted for the investigations 
addressing the ‘puzzle’ of the effect of the legal competences on EU and Member State 
coordination in formulation, negotiation, implementation of sustainable development policies. 
The research design chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.1 presents the design itself, 
the methodological considerations, limitations and the way in which the findings can be 
generalised. Section 3.2 then outlines the methods of data collection as conducted for the 
case studies. To ensure reliability and comparability of the findings in these case studies the 
method of ‘process tracing’ is used. There are general questions that are asked in each case 
to guide and standardise the data collection. This makes comparison and accumulation of 
the findings possible. Section 3.3 presents the process of tracing routine that will be applied 
throughout all the case studies. 
3.1 Research design, methodological considerations and limitations 
This research comprises of comparative case study research on the EU’s sustainable 
development policies using a process tracing approach in a politico-legal fashion.  The legal 
competences are operationalised in such a manner that they encompass specific Treaty 
provisions, the Court’s case law, the external (UN) legal context as well as secondary 
legislation. This explorative study is conducted with the aim of examining the interaction with 
the political ‘conditions’, operationalised as intervening variables.209  
 
Based on the variables, broad sustainable development case studies are picked in which 
different empirical findings and settings are combined. In that respect, it makes sense to 
focus on cases in which negotiations are extensive and relate to different elements of 
competences and legal competences. As the purpose of this study is mainly to illustrate the 
usefulness of an empirical politico-legal analysis of EU and Member State coordination in 
sustainable development policies in a theory-generating context, the cases are selected from 
areas of empirical expertise.210 These empirical findings should nevertheless be based on 
multiple sources of information, which are brought together through triangulation.  
3.1.1 A comparative case study design and case-selection 
The research question as formulated in chapter 1 will be assessed by means of a 
comparative case study design incorporating three different cases. The main purpose of the 
case studies is to ‘illuminate the political mechanisms’ of legal competences by looking 
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beyond the formal Treaties and case law, and by triangulating the findings.211 This 
dissertation makes use of three case studies that are studied as if they were one.212 These 
case studies can be viewed as ‘parallel’ studies as the cases/policies are all still ongoing and 
have been studied concurrently.213 The individual case studies are compared to the other 
cases in the synthesis (see chapter 7).  
 
The key term ‘case study’ has been used ambiguously referring to a whole set of 
heterogeneous research designs and with a ‘definitional morass’ of confusing definitions.214 
While debate exists regarding a precise definition of a case study, this dissertation follows 
the definition of Simons (2009: 21) who states that a case study is “an in-depth exploration 
from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular (..) policy (..) in a 
‘real life’ context”.215 By using this definition, case studies can be based on multiple methods 
and ‘analytical eclecticism’ thereby merging different views and findings.216  
 
The efficacy of case studies may be ‘more powerful’ in the domain of discovery ‘in which 
these same different bits of evidence must be fully integrated to create an exploratory 
account with internal validity’.217 As such, case studies help in theory development.218 As the 
relationship between legal competences and EU and Member State action on sustainable 
development is heavily under-theorised, the case studies serve the objective of theory 
development.  
 
There are several advantages of case studies, in comparison with quantitative methods for 
example. Firstly, case studies are useful for ‘serving the heuristic purpose of inductively 
identifying additional variables and new hypotheses’.219  By placing legal competences at the 
centre case study design offer the possibility to analyse complex events and take into 
account (and centralise) specific variables. Secondly, concepts such as ‘coordination’ are 
difficult to measure and are in need of a detailed consideration of contextual factors, which is 
difficult in a quantitative context.220 Thirdly, case studies can accommodate complex (causal) 
relations.221 The relation between legal competences, ‘political’ intervening variables and 
coordination of policies can definitely qualify for such a complex relationship. Moreover, case 
studies are better ‘connected to everyday life’ and do therefore include the awareness that 
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human behaviour is not essentially driven by a theory or rules.222 Due to importance of this 
human behaviour in coordination, taking into account new variables including legal 
competences could qualify or nuance some of the more dogmatic theories on EU and 
Member State coordination (of sustainable development policies).  
 
The three cases are selected to achieve a maximum of variance along relevant dimensions, 
referred to as a ‘diverse case method’ understood to be exploratory (hypothesis seeking) 
with a minimum of two cases required.223 As has been stated by King et al. (1994) a case-
selection strategy on the basis of an intentional selection on the dependent variable presents 
problems.224 This dissertation sees its central aim to explore how legal competences 
independently affect Member State and EU actors in EU sustainable development policies in 
different places of the policy cycle and both in internal and external EU dimensions. 
Accordingly, these differences cannot qualify as real ‘selection on the dependent variable’ as 
the dependent variable is the coordination process on sustainable development policies. 
Negotiation, implementation and formulation are no more than different stages in the policy 
process. As such, individual cases are selected in such a way that the analysis has the ‘most 
diverse information’ that the author is able to collect on the effect of the independent and 
intervening variables on the coordination by EU and Member State actors.225   
 
The research design differs substantially from other attempts that analyse EU external action 
on sustainable development issues and the few that take into account the catalogue of 
competences. First, others such as Van Schaik (2013) use the categories of exclusive, 
shared and complementary competences as ‘ideal types’ of competence in defining the 
selection of their case studies.226 However, as this dissertation is primarily focused on the 
broad effect of legal competences and interaction with intervening variables it does not make 
sense to focus on these categories only. As previously indicated cases do almost necessarily 
‘not fall neatly within these ideal types since international agendas often combine topics 
where the competence division varies’.227 Therefore, the dissertation choses to combine the 
legal competences with intervening political variables. 
 
Secondly, the cases include both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions of the policy areas as 
well as the presence of absence of an international treaty-based forum. Thirdly, the case 
studies in this dissertation have a different location in the policy cycle, by focusing on 
negotiation (UNFCCC), implementation (SDGs) and policy formulation (transport and 
alternative fuels).  
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3.1.2 Limitations and considerations case study design 
There are some limitations of the ‘broad’ approach of analysing policy formulation, 
negotiation and implementation in a comparative case study design. One of the most obvious 
limitations is that it is difficult,or even almost impossible, to make general conclusions on the 
basis of individual cases. Therefore, one should be cautious. Nevertheless, case studies are 
useful for a ‘falsification’ test of earlier (political) theories that could possibly be refuted (or 
qualified) in sustainable development policies.228  The case studies cannot be repeated as 
each case is then already different. This problem is mitigated by using a step-by-step 
approach and by sharing the data and findings.229 Nevertheless, these case studies are 
conducted with specific background knowledge and by a specific approach of interviewing, 
which makes replication and repetition difficult.  
 
Another limitation of this broad and diverse case study design might be the selection of 
cases. While the cases are large and complex there is a focus established by dealing only 
with certain aspects of the case and by selecting the cases on certain aspects of the 
independent variables.230 As previously stated, the cases examine essentially different parts 
of the policy making chain and compare these outcomes. Furthermore, the cases are 
different in their internal and/or external dimension. While it might be more difficult to 
generalise the findings (see below 3.1.3) this approach takes a broad view on the 
coordination process of EU and Member State actors in sustainable development policies.  
 
A more problematic limitation of this selection approach might be that the cases are selected 
on the basis of the legal aspects of the independent variables instead of e.g. intervening 
political-theoretical variables. Nevertheless, these selection criteria are more ‘objective’ than 
subjective identifications whether EU and Member State actors are, for instance, more or 
less socialised or whether there is a greater intergovernmental or supranational reflex in the 
coordination process. Therefore, while the selection criteria on the basis of legal aspects 
could indeed  be considered as a limitation, alternative approaches might be even more 
problematic and subjective.     
 
Taking into account the internal and external dimension of EU sustainable development 
policies in one dissertation also has limitations, especially from a legal perspective. As has 
been held earlier (see chapter 2) the internal division of competences is much more 
demarcated in the Treaties than the external competences. Therefore, it appears that the 
internal and external dimensions of EU sustainable development policies differ too much in 
their legal competences to generalise the findings. While this argument makes sense, 
external legal competences could be identified by means of consideration of the Court’s case 
law. 231 This limitation is one of the reasons why the dissertation prefers to speak of ‘legal 
competences’ instead of the narrower Treaty-based competences to take into account both 
crucial dimensions of EU sustainable development policies. 
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3.1.3 How to generalise the findings? 
As previously mentioned, some methodological scholars criticise case studies for poor 
generalisability of findings.232 Some even state that when there is any reason to doubt 
whether the case stands for a whole population, the ‘utility of the case study is brought 
severely into question’.233 The same has been said about process tracing which ‘supplies a 
narrative account of the cases without providing a clear basis for generalising beyond 
them’.234 It was also held that case studies account for ‘methodologically unreflective’ 
research.235 
 
The methodological caveats, however, should not stand in the way of theory development or 
theory building.236 As Lakatos (1970) argued, science is a project that entails formulating 
theories and examining them in the light of empirical observations.237 These findings may be 
of greater or lesser generality. The overarching idea of this thesis is to select cases from 
different contexts (policy context, international-EU context, different historical circumstances) 
and different places within the policy chain, and analyse them by means of the same 
operationalisation, in order to achieve a large degree of theoretical relevance.238 These case 
studies can thus be appraised as ‘quasi experiments’ that can lead to valid analytical 
generalisations.239 The methodological process tracing approach adopted in this study 
follows a step-by-step approach and is perhaps more realistic by not having the ambition to 
prove exact causality. With a congruence analysis a ‘broad set of empirical observations is 
compared to different sets of expectations that are derived from distinct comprehensive 
theories’, according to Blatter, Haverland and Van Hulst (2016: 5-6).240 
 
Having the methodological limitations and case study considerations in mind, there will be 
some scope to generalise the research findings. The findings should be characterised as 
‘plausibility probes’, providing avenues for future research. These plausibility probes need in 
fact to be further tested in other cases to become more robust.241 The reflection on 
commonalities and differences between the cases included in the synthesis chapter of this 
dissertation is therefore of utmost importance.242 The case-specific situation will be taken into 
account in this comparative analysis.243  Moreover, besides the chosen legal and political 
variables, the semi-structured interviews leave open space ‘other explanations’. These 
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explanations can be case-specific and incidental, and need additional further testing as they 
were not originally foreseen. 
3.2 Data collection 
This dissertation makes use of multiple, corresponding methods in its investigation of how 
legal competences affect EU and Member State coordination in sustainable development 
policies. The combination of approaches helps to better explore all the different aspects of 
the research question. Mixed-method approaches are particularly suitable in cases when 
little is known about the topic of investigation, as in the case of the effect of mixed 
competences, because the different methods allow one to gain multiple complementary 
perspectives. The (legal and qualitative/empirical) parts of the case studies address different 
portions of the empirical puzzle, as they operating on different levels of abstraction. The 
absence of statistical analysis in this dissertation may be seen as a limitation. However, 
being this a theory-developing  study, it is argued that it paves the way for statistical analysis 
that can reveal (more) causal relationships,  by generating hypotheses for example.244 The 
next paragraphs elaborate further on the methods used in the analysis. 
 
The step-by-step legal analysis includes EU Treaties, the Court’s case law, the EU’s position 
in the multilateral legal context and (internal) regulations and directives. Furthermore, 
literature review considers both academic literature and official policy documents. The aim is 
to make a comparison with the findings of other political and/or legal (case-) studies on the 
topic. The literature review and even more the semi-structured interviews serve the 
exploratory purpose of the case studies, while also complementing the legal basis of the 
analysis by indicating the practical effect of legal competences and by addressing informal 
mechanisms. As far as the timeframe is concerned, the case studies take the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009) as their starting point and finish in July 2017. The UN 
Agenda 2030 was only adopted in September 2015 and implementation started from that 
date. The negotiation process is therefore also described from 2012, to provide more 
clarity.245 The interviews took place primarily in Brussels and The Hague from January 2014 
to July 2017. Some of the interviews were conducted via phone or Skype, as can be seen in 
the annex.  
 
The qualitative part of this study heavily relies on forty-seven semi-structured interviews with 
EU and Member State officials, (former) ministers, Members of the (European/national) 
Parliament, private sector representatives, Civil Society Organisations as well as academic 
experts.  As the potential ‘political’ consequences of the division of competences are 
relatively unexplored, the interviews provide a first step to explore potential causal 
mechanisms. Not only do the interviews help to identify empirical patterns, but they also 
provide an input for theorizing this relationship. The in-depth semi-structured interviews are 
not only used to develop the theory on the effect of legal competences, but also to test 
alternative paths, as indicated by the literature.246 The in-depth interviews furthermore help to 
gain insight into the actual negotiation process and implementation. The difficulty with the 
interviews, especially among negotiators, is the ‘secrecy’ and anonymity that the most 
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relevant objects of the study  are surrounded with (EU and Member State actors) .247 
Furthermore, in both the internal as well as the external dimension of EU policies, one could 
argue that these policies are not the exclusive preserve of state-to-state activity. On the 
contrary, increasingly large numbers of actors, such as civil society, businesses and other 
international organisations, take part in the negotiation and implementation of these 
policies.248   
 
As can be seen in appendix 1, the interviews have been used for a general overview of the 
history of shared competences in EU environmental, climate and development policies and 
for the specific case studies. Some of the interviews qualify for both ‘general’ and ‘case-
specific’ information. This is indicated in the annex. The interviews are anonymised and the 
interviewees are categorised as ‘EU officials’, ‘Member State officials’ or ‘other societal 
stakeholders’. The category of ‘EU official’ includes all experts working at the European 
Commission, European External Action Service, Committee of the Regions and EESC, even 
if they are seconded by the Member State. The ‘Member State officials’ work in national 
capitals at the central government, at the Council of the European Union or at Permanent 
Representations to the EU in Brussels. In some cases, experts are double counted as ‘EU 
official’ and ‘Member State official’, but only if they have served both functions within the 
timeframe considered by the study. The category of ‘other societal stakeholder’ is rather 
broad and includes private sector representatives, Civil Society Organisations, United 
Nations officials and Members of European Parliament. MEPs are not counted as ‘EU official’ 
because they do not work for the EU as such, but serve as popular representatives. The 
division of categories per case study is summarised below. 
 




Case study alternative 
fuels 
2 3 7 
Case study climate change 7 10 3 
Case study SDG 
implementation 
8 4 4 
General on competences 
and/or sustainable 
development 
2 4 0 
Total 19 21 14 
Table 3. 1 Semi-structured interviews per category and case study249 
The interviews are planned by taking into account a stakeholder analysis, organigrams of the 
EU institutions and Member States and snowball sampling250. Before the ‘real’ semi-
structured interviews took place, there have been some explorative interviews. These 
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explorative but structured interviews have been mostly conducted with academic researchers 
(not indicated in the interview list), but also with EU and Member State officials or other 
societal stakeholders. These interviews are indicated in the annex. Some ‘general’ interviews 
on the use of competences, especially the ones with former Ministers and EU and Member 
State officials, were sometimes counted and used for the case studies (see appendix). The 
interviews have been conducted with ‘elite’ officials such as lead negotiators and (former) 
Ministers, lower-level officials and other societal stakeholders.  
 
 Own initiative Referral 
Case study alternative fuels 10 2 
Case study climate change 10 8 
Case study SDG implementation 8 8 
General on competences and/or 
sustainable development 
3 2 
Table 3. 2 Semi-structured interviews: own initiative or referral per case study251  
The annex includes a ‘nonresponse’ rate indicating that the author has approached some 
actors, but they either declined the interview or could not be reached, or the author himself 
could not make it to speak to the actor during the interview stay. This ‘nonresponse’ rate is 
often not recorded by scholars, but seeing how many elite interviews were conducted by 
means of ‘snowball sampling’ the author finds it necessary to include this cathegory.252 With 
regards to the ‘snowball sampling’ technique, it means that actors can be approached 
through the referral of someone else. This is not the case for all interviews, as some are just 
actors approached because of their function in the organigram or at their website. Seventeen 
out of the forty-seven interviewees were approached due to referral by other interviewees. 
The rest (thirty) of the interviewees were approached by own initiative, based on the 
stakeholder analysis and organigrams or websites. The modality of approach with the 
different actors is recorded in the annex. An overview per case study is also included in 
Table 3.2. A possible shortcoming of using the snowball technique is to ‘become trapped in a 
network of interlinked respondents who see the world through the same lenses’.253 This flaw 
is however overcome by combining the snowball sampling technique with ‘own initiative’ 
interview invitations by function, as well as by interviewing EU and Member State actors 
themselves in combination with other societal actors. The weaknesses of interview data are 
moreover mitigated by using the interviews in conjunction with other forms of evidence.254  
 
The interviews were semi-structured and lasted approximately 45-60 minutes on average. 
The respondents received the general semi-structured questions at the latest 12 hours 
before the meeting.255 The author chose to send the semi-structured questions in advance to 
prepare the interviewees and to gain the most of their experience. One of the disadvantages 
of sending the semi-structured interview questions beforehand could be that respondents 
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study the material too much and come up with (overly) prepared and ‘official’ answers. 
However, this risk is pre-empted by interviewing actors with different backgrounds, different 
roles in the negotiations and different ‘stature’ (from policy officials to (former) Ministers) 
about the same process. Interviews have been used for the three case studies and for a 
general grasp of the historical institutionalisation of competences and/or the history of EU 
policies on sustainable development and international agreements.  
 
The list of semi-structured interviews (see annex 2) included direct and indirect questions on 
the most important variables, but also left open some room for background information as 
well as other explanations beyond the ‘politico-legal’ variables. The interviews were most 
often taped and always at least loosely transcribed in around four A4 pages with the most 
important quotes and answers to the questions. The interviews were coded on the basis of 
different ‘legal competences’ (competences, case law, regulations and directives, UN legal 
context), ‘intervening variables’ (supranational versus intergovernmental dominance, the 
EU’s position in the international constellation of power, preference heterogeneity) as well as 
‘other explanations’. The interviews were also useful to understand the practical process of 
coordination and, especially in the case of UNFCCC negotiations, socialisation. All interviews 
and codes have been saved with reference to the category (EU official, MS official, other 
societal stakeholder) and the date of the interview. Where appropriate, reference to these 
anonymised interviews is made in the footnotes of this dissertation. Given the confidential 
nature of the information provided in the interviews, as well as the promise to anonymise the 
findings, the interviews themselves are not included in this dissertation but transcripts have 
been made available to the supervisors of the study. 256  
 
Concerning the ‘ethical aspects’ of interviewing, the majority of the interviews has been 
recorded (see annex). Only the ‘alternative fuels’ case study a couple of interviews was been 
conducted with a research assistant, the rest were done alone. Semi-structured interviews by 
only one ‘interviewer’ has the advantage that the interviews, elaboration, transcription and 
analysis are being done by the same person. However, elite interviews contain the risk of 
being overwhelmed by both information and stature of the respondents. In addition, the 
researcher brings subjective elements into the knowledge-gathering process. This is 
definitely an asset to the research process as the author has been professionally involved in 
the subject of the study. However, they make specific ‘truth claims’ or even ‘causal claims’ 
almost impossible.257  
 
There are a couple of potential limitations and criticisms of this kind of semi-structured 
interview approach. First, as for every research based on interviews, it must be questioned 
whether this amount of interviews is sufficient for a substantiated base of findings. As this 
research is based on triangulation of findings, of which interviews comprise one of the 
sources, and the interviews themselves are planned after a stakeholder analysis, the amount 
of interviews is at least moderately sufficient. Secondly, one could criticise the ‘snowball 
sampling’ of this approach. This limitation is partly addressed by not taking over all 
references by interviewees and by starting some new ‘chains’ by means of organigrams and 
stakeholder analysis. A third limitation is the inclusion of elite interviews. The academic 
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debate on this source is still unfinished with some pointing to it as ‘critical sources of 
information about the political processes of interest’258 others state that ‘lower level officials’ 
may be better sources given their day-to-day involvement with these processes259. This 
dissertation argues that the combination of these ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ level officials as well as 
the inclusion of other societal stakeholders helps in triangulating the findings. Nevertheless, 
especially for elite interviews, the context is quite overwhelming when compared with the 
other interviews and therefore it might be advisable to do these kind of interviews with two 
persons to focus on content. Fourthly, the sending of interview topics in advance could be 
criticised because it could make the answers more ‘preconditioned’. A fifth and real limitation 
of the approach in this dissertation is that not all interviews were recorded due to a number of 
reasons, such as refusal by some interviewees.  
 
Some scholars have been particularly successful in gaining access to the negotiations, for 
example on climate change, and have become ‘participant-observers’.260 While this is a 
particularly attractive source of information, it has in addition negative effects on the 
individual researchers’ ability to zoom out and critically evaluate the conduct of negotiations 
of (former) colleagues. Moreover, it makes it extremely difficult to replicate research, which is 
one of the cornerstones of academic research. With that in mind, the author has chosen not 
to actively participate in negotiations and or visit the large conferences of e.g. the UNFCCC. 
3.3 Data analysis 
The three cases will be researched in-depth by means of process tracing to identify the 
intervening causal mechanisms between shared (external) competences and the 
enabling/restraining influence on EU and Member State actors. Process tracing is used 
because the character of the relations between these ‘variables/conditions’ is unclear and the 
method allows for thorough investigation.261 Interviews make particularly good evidence for 
process tracing research.262 Negative aspects of process tracing include the difficulty of 
choosing the right amount of empirical and legal material for one case, overestimation of 
causal mechanisms, and the difficulty of replication of research.263 To limit these 
shortcomings this research makes use of a clear simple operationalisation and by being firm 
but modest in its conclusions, paving the way for future research. 
3.3.1 Process tracing: a step-by-step  approach 
Process tracing is a specific method in which the researcher examines histories, documents, 
interview transcripts and other material to ‘see whether the causal process a theory (..) 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the values of the intervening variables in that case’ as 
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George and Bennett (2005:6) held.264 For every case study, a logical step-by-step approach 
is followed. This includes the following steps and is visualised in Figure 3.1: 
1) Legal inventory: assembling Treaty provisions, the Court’s case law, the external 
(multilateral) legal context as well as secondary legislation related to the case.  
2) Review and policy documents, searching EU websites and academic archives based on 
keywords related to the case. 
3) Review (primarily empirical based) academic literature 
4) A stakeholder analysis, listing the stakeholders in a particular policy area/case study. 
These stakeholders were contacted for semi-structured interviews using organigrams (own 
initiative) and/or referral (snowball sampling).  
5) Conduct and work out semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, preferring to record 
the interview, but as a minimum make a 3-4 page summary of the interview;  
6) On the basis of the materials, identifying how legal competences affect EU and Member 
State actors in specific mixed competence policy arrangements;  
7) Identifying how intervening variables affect EU and Member State coordination, taking into 
account the (non-) interaction with legal competences. These intervening variables are 
‘supranational versus intergovernmental dominance’, ‘the EU’s position in the international 
constellation of power’ and ‘preference heterogeneity’. Moreover, this sixth step includes 
analysis of ‘other explanations’ that could affect EU and Member State coordination and that 
has been brought up in the interviews.    
8) Overall assessment potential influence legal competences and interaction with/autonomy 
from other intervening variables and other explanations for the specific case. 
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Figure 3. 1 Process tracing: a step-by-step approach 
This broad process tracing approach will be used for all three case studies. Seeing the 
explorative objective of this dissertation, no weighing in sources is applied. Notwithstanding 
this impartiality, the most original contribution of this study and value added to the existing 
literature is the use of semi-structured interviews. Therefore, in the actual description of the 
cases, synthesis and conclusion these interview findings receive additional attention. The 
overall assessment is however based on triangulation, e.g. by cross checking interview 
statements with official documents, which improves the validity and reliability of the 
findings.265   
SUMMARY CHAPTER 3 
This chapter outlines the comparative case study research design of this dissertation. The 
case studies are selected on broad general principles that apply to all cases: a ‘mixed 
competence’ arrangement with ‘shared competence’ at the centre and clear EU and Member 
State coordination processes and outcomes. Furthermore, to account for a broad variance of 
cases this dissertation concentrates on different ‘stages’ of the coordination process: 
(internal) policy formulation, (external) negotiation and (internal and external) 
implementation. Concerning the data collection, each case study relies on the same sources: 
legal documents (Treaty provisions, cases before the Court of Justice of the EU, regulations 
and directives) policy documents, academic literature and semi-structured interviews. For 
each case study, process tracing is used with similar use of legal and empirical sources. By 
means of a step-by-step approach the effect of the ‘legal competences’ on (dependent 
variable) coordination is tested autonomously and in interaction with intervening variables 
‘supranational versus intergovernmental dominance’, ‘the EU’s position in the international 
constellation of power’ and ‘preference heterogeneity’.   
                                                     




Chapter 4: EU and Member States Formulating Policies on 
Alternative Fuels for Private Vehicles 
4.1 Introduction 
“We need to speed up action in the decarbonisation of the transport sector and its 
switch to alternative fuels”. (Speech European Commissioner on Climate Action and 
Energy Miguel Arias Cañete, 17 March 2015)266 
The issue of ‘alternative’ transportation fuels such as electricity, hydrogen and biofuels 
receives a lot of attention in the European Union. This increasing attention is the result of two 
current trends. Firstly, traditional combustion engines, especially diesel engines, are under 
severe criticism as a result of recent emission scandals including ‘Dieselgate’.267 Secondly, in 
the European Union transport is nowadays almost entirely dependent on (imported) fossil 
fuels, particularly petroleum based fuels like gasoline and diesel. Ninety-four percent of 
transport relies on oil products, of which ninety percent is imported.268  These fuels need to 
be replaced by cleaner alternatives to reduce import dependency, decarbonise the economy 
and contribute to international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable 
Development Goals.269 The transport sector accounts for twenty-five percent of energy-
related greenhouse gas emissions in which seventy percent of the emissions and much of 
the air pollution comes from road transport.270 Moreover, transport is the only sector in the 
EU where greenhouse gas emissions have actually increased in the last decades,271 thus 
causing many EU Member States, the European Commission as well as companies to fine-
tune their fuel ambitions promising the phase-out of traditional combustion engines for 
private vehicles in the EU.272  
A European ‘alternative fuels strategy’ supports a comprehensive mix of fuels, ensuring 
‘technological neutrality’ and diversification of energy supply.273 The four alternative fuels 
most often noted are electricity, hydrogen, advanced biofuels and natural gas blended with 
biomethane.  The policies on alternative fuels for passenger cars need to be formulated by 
the European Union and its Member States, sharing competences on policy areas including 
transport, energy and climate action.274 European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker recently re-committed to an ambitious ‘decarbonisation’ of the economy by 2025 
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while pointing to the current ‘mismatch’ in aligning promises, expectations and delivery, e.g. 
in the ‘car emissions scandal’.275 
Current research tends to focus on the ‘technical’ and ‘economic’ aspects of the future of 
fuels, focusing on the differences between (primarily) electrical and hydrogen fuel cells when 
compared with traditional combustion engines.276 Moreover, for biofuels in particular, 
research is oriented on related aspects such as land-use as well as more emotive topics. 277  
The EU and its Member States together receives some attention but especially in 
comparison with larger producers like the United States and China.278 Some authors focus 
on the normative aspects of the EU’s fuel policies.279 However, there is only scant attention 
for the decision-making processes and institutional background within the European Union 
and even less for the mixed legal competences underneath them. This is problematic as 
policies on alternative fuels are mainly driven by government policies.280 The EU and Member 
State incremental process based on these competences could provide useful information 
about the policy formulation on more sustainable policies in practice. 
The present chapter addresses whether legal competences enable or impede coordination of 
EU and Member State actors when formulating policies on alternative fuels. The main 
research question addressed by this chapter has been the following: How do legal 
competences affect EU and Member State coordination in policy formulation on alternative 
fuels for passenger cars? As the goal is to bring together the political and legal discourse, the 
effect of legal competences (independent variables) is assessed in relation to the following 
intervening (political-theoretical) variables: supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power and preference 
heterogeneity. Moreover, this chapter addresses some other explanations that appear to 
hinder or enable coordination. 
 
The findings of this chapter stem from multiple sources of information, which are brought 
together through triangulation. More specifically, this study makes use of a step-by-step 
process tracing approach revising legal documents (Treaty provisions, cases before the 
Court of Justice of the EU, regulations and directives), policy documents and academic 
literature. The qualitative part of this case study additionally relies on eleven 45-60 minutes 
long semi-structured interviews with leading negotiators, EU and Member State officials, 
(former) ministers as well as experts (see Table 4.1). These interviewees were approached 
after a stakeholder analysis and by means of organigrams/websites (‘own initiative’) and/or 
by referral (snowball sampling).281 With regards to the timeframe, this analysis focuses on the 
                                                     
275 European Commission (2017) ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe: reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025’. 
276 Offer, G. J., Howey, D., Contestabile, M., Clague, R. and Brandon, N. P. (2010) ‘Comparative analysis of battery electric, 
hydrogen fuel cell and hybrid vehicles in a future sustainable road transport system’. Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 24-29 
and Shafiei, E., Davidsdottir, B., Leaver, J., Stefansson, H., and Asgeirsson, E. I. (2015) ’Comparative analysis of hydrogen, 
biofuels and electricity transitional pathways to sustainable transport in a renewable-based energy system’. Energy, Vol. 83, pp. 
614-627. 
277 Cf Demirbas, A. (2009) ‘Political, economic and environmental impacts of biofuels: a review’. Applied Energy, Vol. 86, p.  
S109. 
278 Su, Y., Zhang, P. and Su, Y. (2015) ‘An overview of biofuels policies and industrialization in the major biofuel producing 
countries’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 50, p. 995. 
279 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 32, p. 114. 
280 See a.o. Su, Y., Zhang, P. and Su, Y. (2015) ‘An overview of biofuels policies and industrialization in the major biofuel 
producing countries’. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Vol. 50, pp. 991-1003. 
281 These interviews have been conducted from July 2016 to March 2017; eight of these interviews have been conducted 
together with Thijs Bonenkamp, MSc graduate in International Relations & Diplomacy at Leiden 
University and research assistant at Leiden University.  Three of these interviews have been conducted by the author alone and 
notes have been shared with Thijs Bonenkamp and colleagues from Delft University (Dr Reinoud Wolffenbuttel and Delft 
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process from the 2009 Fuel Quality Directive until July 2017.282 The interviews have mainly 
been focused on biofuel policies, but other fuels and scenarios were included in the semi-
structured interviews and were analysed.283 The organised approach leads to an overall 
assessment of the potential influence of legal competences, interaction with/autonomy from 
other intervening variables and other explanations for this specific case. The results from this 
study can, however, only be valued as ‘plausibility probes’, providing interesting avenues for 
future research, but  still needing further testing in relation to other cases to become more 
robust.284 
Category No of interviews 
EU official 2 
Member State official 3 
Other societal stakeholder 7 
Table 4. 1 No of semi-structured interviews for case study alternative fuels 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the alternative fuels and the 
situation in other parts of the world compared to the ‘typical’ EU policies. Section 4.3 
describes the EU coordination process and the policies that have been formulated 
(dependent variable). Section 4.4 zooms in on the legal aspects, i.e. the effect of legal 
competences in the UN legal context, Treaty’s competences, the Court’s case law and the 
regulations and directives that are relevant in the framework of the Single Market. In the fifth 
section, these legal aspects are then compared with intervening variables such as 
‘supranational versus intergovernmental dominance’, ‘the EU vs the rest of the world’ and 
preference heterogeneity. This section offers also some additional possible explanatory 
variables such as stakeholder interests and the emotional state of the debate. Finally, it 
evaluates whether the EU and its Member States are legally enabled or restrained by the 
division of competences or whether ‘political’ (or other) issues play a more prominent role. 
The chapter ends by providing suggestions for future research.   
4.2 Alternative fuels  
This section zooms in on alternative fuels such as electricity, hydrogen and biofuels. After a 
basic explanation of alternative fuels, the section continues with an overview of the popularity 
of alternative fuels outside the EU, in countries like China, Brazil and the United States. It 
then shows how the EU is distinctive in its appreciation of alternative fuels and that the issue 
                                                                                                                                                                      
University graduate Luke Middelburg.  The interview questions have been sent to the interviewees beforehand. The interviews 
have not been taped. Please see chapter 3 (research design) and the annex for more information on the interviews . 
282 For more information, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/transport/fuel.htm. After finishing the case study (July 2017) 
the European Commission launched an action plan on the alternative fuels infrastructure. Cf European Commission (2017) 
‘Towards the broadest use of alternative fuels - an Action Plan on Alternative Fuels Infrastructure under Article 10(6) of Directive 
2014/94/EU, including the assessment of national policy frameworks under Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/94/EU’ 
(SWD(2017)365 final), 8.11.2017, Brussels. 
283 These interviews were originally part of a non-technical study funded by Ford Poling Challenge in cooperation with Delft 
University (The Netherlands), presented at a biofuel workshop in The Hague in October 2016: 
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/events/2016/10/renewable-energy. Delft University measures the gasoline/ethanol/water 
composition of biofuels as part of the overarching technical study. This non-technical research has been conducted in close 
cooperation with technical experts at Delft University and with the other non-technical expert, Thijs Bonenkamp, who is focusing 
on legislation and underlying motives on biofuels in the European Union and specific Member States Poland, The Netherlands, 
France and Sweden. We continued our cooperation afterwards, aiming for a (forthcoming) cross-disciplinary article on biofuels 
and EU policies.  
284 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
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of alternative fuels is led by government policies and not so much by specific multilateral 
agreements.  
4.2.1 Alternative fuels 
Alternative fuels can make a useful contribution to transport decarbonisation, by means of 
lower greenhouse gas emissions and lesser effects on air quality than the currently used oil- 
and gas-based fuels. The four types alternative fuels that are often suggested as main 
options for passenger cars (and light duty vehicles for medium distances) are electricity, 
hydrogen, compressed natural gas (CNG) with biomethane and advanced biofuels.285 These 
alternative fuels are often seen as a ‘mix’, ensuring both technological neutrality as well as 
diversification of energy supply. One of the most reasonable alternatives before total 
electrification is for example the obligation of fuel suppliers to provide a certain share of 
alternative fuels or blend them.286 A small change towards more ‘flexi-fuel vehicles’ or ‘dual-
fuel technology’ is then needed.  
Electricity as transport fuel would decrease CO2 emissions, improve energy efficiency and 
could provide for innovative vehicle solutions. Electricity as a power source causes the most 
radical shift for passenger cars: it requires a completely different fuel infrastructure from 
those for liquid-fuel-powered internal combustion engines, and it changes energy supply from 
a single energy source (e.g. oil) to a universal energy carrier that can be produced from all 
primary energy sources like sun and wind. With battery-driven technologies, it could help to 
balance the intermittent supply of these renewable energy technologies in energy production. 
These battery storage facilities are one of the unique parts, and the loading phase takes 
longer than re-fuelling liquids. Moreover, battery-based cars are yet more for the ‘shorter’ 
range while fuel-based cars could provide for longer distances and heavier private 
vehicles.287 
Like electricity, hydrogen is a universal energy carrier, which can be used as a fuel for 
transport. It can in fact be used in a fuel cell with an electric motor as a complementary 
solution to storing  electricity in batteries, but it can also be used as a fuel in ‘traditional’ 
internal combustion engines. As an alternative fuel for transport, one would need to build the 
necessary refuelling infrastructure for hydrogen. These costs are ‘comparable’ to the ones of 
the electricity infrastructure. The CNG with biomethane can be seen as a ‘transition fuel’ 
because it can be used in established combustion engines. Additional refueling stations 
could ‘easily be supplied’ from the existing natural gas distribution network throughout 
Europe.288 
Biofuels are an additive/substitute liquid fuel that can be produced from biomass resources 
such as plants, agricultural and forestry residues and a large portion of waste streams.289 
Biofuels have recently become attractive for transport due to their environmental benefits. 
Nevertheless, much (agricultural) land is needed for the production of biofuels. Agriculture, 
urbanization, settlement, transport infrastructure, ecosystems, preservation of wildlife, goods 
                                                     
285 See e.g. Report of the European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels: Future Transport Fuels (2011) 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/urban/cts/doc/2011-01-25-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf. 
286 European Commission (2016) ‘A European Strategy for Low-Emission Mobility’, COM(2016) 501 final, 20.07.2016, Brussels. 
287 Report of the European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels: Future Transport Fuels (2011) 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/urban/cts/doc/2011-01-25-future-transport-fuels-report.pdf. 
288 Provided the quality of gas is sufficient for CNG vehicles. Cf European Commission (2013) Communication ‘Clean Power for 
Transport: A European alternative fuels strategy’, COM(2013) 17 final, 24 January 2013, Brussels. p. 6. 
289 Demirbas, A. (2009) ‘Political, economic and environmental impacts of biofuels: a review’. Applied Energy, Vol. 86, p. S108. 
79 
 
and services compete for land use increasingly, this phenomenon was caused by population 
growth and a rising middle class.290  It is a hot topic of debate whether biofuels currently have 
to compete between food security and the fuel economy, especially with their (first-
generation) food-based fuels.291 To tackle the concerns raised by this ‘first generation’ 
biofuels, more ‘advanced’ generations of biofuels were developed. The ‘second generation’ 
of biofuels derive from biomass, non-food crops including woods and waste, which is already 
more acceptable. The ‘Third-generation biofuels’ are biodegradable from algae. Microalgae 
are considered as a feedstock for biofuels production already since the 1950s.292  
 The debate with regards to the ‘sustainability’ of alternative fuels concerns mostly 
(advanced) biofuels. Critics look at the question of sustainable land use and clean production 
rather than at the blend itself. An important process is therefore indirect land use change 
(ILUC). As previously noted, cropland that was originally used for (other) agriculture such as 
growing food or feed is now typically used for biofuels production. This means that previously 
non-cropland including grasslands and forests need to be displaced for biofuels production or 
other agriculture production. ILUC risks negating the greenhouse gas savings that result from 
increased biofuels, as grasslands and forests typically absorb high levels of CO2.293 
Unfortunately scientific consensus on how to monitor and control ILUC is currently lacking.294  
There is however, increasing attention on the import of raw materials necessary for the 
batteries of electric vehicles, e.g. lithium.295 Remarkably, these ‘sustainability considerations’ 
are not particularly relevant for the production process of cars, thus leading to the 
observation that the ‘greenness’ of alternative fuels seems more of an ethical political 
question than an economic or technical question.296  
4.2.2 EU and the international context: the example of bio-ethanol 
In countries all over the world the production of alternative fuels needs to be promoted via tax 
exemptions, subsidies, blending mandates or other (financial) incentives. The choice of fuels 
depends on country characteristics such as the traditional vehicle market share 
(diesel/gasoline), the prominence of the domestic car industry (and e.g. agricultural industry 
for biofuels) and the ‘drivers’ of alternative fuel policies. Among these drivers are CO2 
emission reduction, promotion of agricultural/rural development297, tackling air pollution298, 
fuel diversity, reducing the dependency on imported petroleum and energy security299, 
foreign exchange savings300 and employment301.  
                                                     
290 European Academies Scientific Advisory Council EASAC (2012) ‘The current status of biofuels in the European Union, their 
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Large government programmes help to drive the production of ‘alternative fuel’ , as 
demonstrated by the example of bio-ethanol (biofuel). Brazil used to be the only country 
where ethanol (biofuel) production was profitable and came close to competing with 
gasoline.302 More than 80 percent of the vehicles in Brazil use ethanol blended fuels303 and 
flexi-fuel vehicles have become mainstream since the early 2000s304. Brazil started this 
phenomenon in the 1970s with its ProAlcool programme.305 In Brazil, ethanol is produced 
from sugar cane, which is considered ‘the most sustainable option currently in the market’ 
according to Afionis and Stringer (2012: 116). 
The United States is now the largest producer of biofuels since 2006, having overtaken 
Brazil.306 American Bioethanol is mainly produced from large-scale corn growing. Ethanol 
produced in the U.S. is considerably more expensive than the sugar cane-based ethanol 
from Brazil. Nevertheless, it is less expensive than the ethanol from grain and sugar beet in 
Europe.307 In the U.S., the production is largely incentivised by the government. A typical 
feature of american biofuel production is the close relation with security issues, promoted by 
the U.S. armed forces.308 Energy independence appears to be a significant motive behind 
biofuel policies in the United States and Brazil, together with the promotion of their own 
(agricultural) industries.  
For people in rural areas of oil importing developing countries biofuels such as bioethanol 
give ‘prospects of new economic opportunities’ according to Demirbas (2009: 108). Many 
developing countries could end their import dependence by focusing on bioethanol 
production, as a number of tropical countries have a productive advantage when it comes to 
biofuels.309 However, experiences in other continents show that this needs to be driven by 
governmental policies.310  China is already incentivising this development with large 
bioenergy and biopolicy programs supported by the Chinese government311 and biofuels are 
subsidised in countries including Malaysia, Argentina and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the 
recent situation of low oil prices and the decline in gasoline and diesel prices has ‘affected 
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discretionary blending economics’ in certain markets leading to increased scrutiny of support 
policies for biofuels and structural challenges.312 
Historically, the EU production of biofuels is biased towards billions of liters of biodiesel 
instead of million liters of bioethanol.313 As compared to countries such as U.S. and Brazil, 
the ethanol industry is considerably less powerful and incapable of competing with ‘big oil’. 
Biofuels still need to be imported and this is takes a much higher energy yield per hectare 
than biofuels produced from ‘homegrown’ biomass in Europa.314 Ethanol production is thus 
not profitable in the EU without substantial fiscal support.315 The ‘ethanol awareness’ of 
consumers also seems to be much lower in the EU than in other countries. This is expected 
to change as future legislation might obligate car producers as well as gasoline stations to 
inform consumers about the amount of ethanol in fuel blends. The spread of ‘advanced 
biofuels’ seems to be anew opportunity for EU leadership according to its recent Strategy for 
Low-emission mobility (p. 4). 316  
 
The example makes clear that the EU is not incentivising the bio-ethanol programme in to 
the same extent as other major economies. One could argue that this is different for other 
alternative fuels. Nevertheless, this case might only be convincing for ‘electricity’ where there 
is indeed growing consumer awareness and EU sales of electric vehicles are only topped by 
China.317 However, as this research later shows, this is not the result of a large coherent 
government programme. 
4.3 EU coordination and policies 
Coordination is the process of contacts between diplomats and officials from EU institutions 
(especially the European Commission) and Member States with the purpose of discussing an 
issue of common interest and working towards a common position and adjusting different 
positions in multiple ways. These coordination processes can be internal (within the EU) or 
external (internationally) and include the discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination. 
The coordination process of policy formulation on alternative fuels is not particularly 
socialised, in the sense that representatives involved in formulating EU policies do not first 
and foremost adopt a European orientation due to the socialisation of EU practices. 
Socialisation is therefore not a result of the coordination process. There is a more general 
tendency to meet and coordinate domestically in EU Member States.  
The policies in the EU and Member States on alternative fuels are characterised by some 
classical ‘U-turns’ and quite large differences across Member States. Nevertheless, the more 
‘overarching’ energy and climate commitments are clear and originate from high-level 
conclusions and strategies at EU institutions. As an example, in the February 2011 European 
Council agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 percent before 2050 in 
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comparison to the levels in 1990.318 In 2014 the European Council agreed to the 2030 
climate and energy framework, with the aim of a 40 percent reduction by 2030 when 
compared to 1990 levels, a minimum 27 percent of power sourced from  renewable energy 
as well as at least a 27 percent improvement in energy efficiency. This framework, although 
especially focused on the timeframe beyond 2020, asks for a ‘comprehensive and 
technology neutral’ approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and risks related to 
fossil fuel dependency.319 
The more transport-related strategies follow smoothly on from these broad commitments and 
are oriented on transport ‘decarbonisation’. The recent Strategy on Low-Emission Mobility 
(2016) and the earlier White Paper on Transport Policy (2011) make the broad commitments 
more applicable to transport.320 The 2013 ‘Clean Power for Transport’ strategy supports a 
comprehensive mix of alternative fuels, ensuring technological neutrality and diversification 
of energy supply. The strategy identified four priority fields for further EU actions to promote 
alternative fuels, which are still relevant: 1) the lack of fueling infrastructure; 2) the 
development of common technical specifications; 3) consumer acceptance and 4) the 
technological development, including fuel production and vehicles/vessels.321 
The Directives that have effect on (alternative) fuels mostly originate earlier, namely in 2009. 
The ‘Fuel Quality Directive’ was adopted in that year, seeking to reduce greenhouse gas 
intensity in fuels and moreover create a single fuel market while regulating the sustainability 
of biofuels. 322 In parallel, the ‘Renewable Energy Directive’ in 2009 aimed for a 10 percent 
target of biofuels in transport. 323 The 2014 directive on ‘alternative fuel infrastructure’ focuses 
more on the deployment of infrastructure.324 Member States could develop their own ‘national 
policy frameworks’ setting out the market development of alternative fuels and deployment of 
relevant infrastructure.325  Reporting obligations on ‘third countries’ alternative fuels 
certification schemes are also an important policy measure. The EU is known for its stringent 
sustainability criteria for alternative fuels imported from countries outside the EU, although 
the certification scheme itself has lately been subject to critical scrutiny. 326  
 
The amendments on alternative fuels, especially biofuels, and other policies make it clear 
however that the policies are quite difficult to follow for stakeholders in the EU. In 2012, after 
the many protests over rising food prices and scientific reports,327 the 10 percent target of 
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biofuels in transport target from RED2009 was amended to 7 percent without food-based 
biofuels. In the more recent ‘Strategy on Low-Emission Mobility’ (2016, p. 5) the Commission 
suggests to phase out all subsidies to these first generation biofuels by 2020. The transition 
towards advanced biofuels was adopted for after long and difficult ILUC discussions in 
November 2015. Without regard to the drivers of these policies, the effects of these policies 
are clear: the car industry currently  towards electrification and cleaner alternative fuels such 
as hydrogen. While originally included in the list of alternative fuels, blending biofuels with 
gasoline as well as solutions like CNG with bio-methane seems only to be a transitional 
phase. Symptomatically, few funds promote biofuel-related research: the DG CLIMA-
managed NER-300 programmes have almost stopped and the Horizon2020 research 
funding on biofuels almost stopped after 2015/2016.328 In comparison, there is much more 
EU attention directed towards electrification. References for alternative fuels are not yet 
clearly stated in transport policy documents themselves. Moreover, the responsibility is 
dispersed across Directorates-General in the European Commission with DG Energy and 
DG CLIMA responsible for Fuel Quality and Renewable Energy Directives, and DG MOVE 
(transport) and DG AGRI (agriculture) mostly sidelined. DG DEVCO (as well as foreign 
ministries in Member States) is further involved in monitoring the ‘global’ effect of discussions 
such as food versus fuel.  
 
The ‘U-turns’ in policies on alternative fuels the Member States have led to fragmented 
initiatives, with some countries focusing on hydrogen (e.g. Germany), others on electrification 
and newer EU13 Member States focusing on the traditional combustion engines or instead 
food-based biofuels. The fragmented responsibility chain seems to be copied within Member 
States, with a large role for finance ministries in taxation. Different market failures show that 
the EU is moreover missing the opportunity to become a world leader in advanced 
sustainable fuel and vehicle technology. The recent Communication ‘Europe on the Move’ 
(2017) could lay the framework for more coherent action on alternative fuels, but the 
implementation of this strategy is beyond the timeline of this study. 
One of the most dramatic ‘anti-coordination’ practices has been the ‘collusion’ between 
German carmakers coordinating their activities in more than a thousand meetings according 
to the investigative reporting of Der Spiegel.329 These practices are contrary to the very idea 
of European coordination. There have been examples of technical coordination practices, 
such as the ‘European Expert Group on Future Transport Fuels’.330 However, these kinds of 
groups have only temporary assignments, mostly focused on technical expertise rather than 
decision-making processes.   
4.4 The division of competences, legal issues and policy formulation 
How does the division of competences in the Treaty affect the policy formulation on 
alternative fuels for private vehicles in the EU and the Member States? This section starts 
with an overview of the multilateral context that is not specifically focused on alternative 
fuels. Thereafter, the research briefly analyses how shared competences on transport, 
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climate change and energy have an effect on alternative fuel policies together with exclusive 
competences (trade) and Member State autonomy (taxation, energy mix). Furthermore, the 
legal issues important to the functioning of the single market, e.g. the Emission Trading 
System and Effort Sharing Decision, are discussed. The section ends by analysing the 
effects of case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of the opening 
infringement proceedings in Member States.  
4.4.1 Multilateral context 
The alternative fuel market is a global market. The EU and its Member States cannot act on 
their own and need to follow international guidelines. There are a number of important 
international institutions and agreements at the United Nations level. First, the Paris 
Agreement, concluded in 2015 within the UNFCCC framework, is a universal, partly legally 
binding global climate agreement setting out a global action plan to limit global warming to 
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 331 The Paris Agreement is set to come into effect 
at the latest in 2020. The EU is implementing these guidelines through the 2030 Climate and 
Energy Package. 
 
Secondly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an important standard setter. WTO 
standards attribute strict rules on state aid and (non-) tariff barriers. Therefore, it is 
impossible for example to subsidise the agricultural sector in the EU to make biofuel 
production more profitable.  The issue of sustainability criteria for (bio)fuels is entering the 
agenda of the WTO.332 
Thirdly, the Agenda 2030 and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) set universal 
goals for the future. While transport and future fuels do not have a specific overarching goal 
or targets, many related targets are covered within for example SDG 2 (food security), SDG 
7 (energy), SDG 9 (infrastructure), SDG 11 (sustainable cities), SDG 12 (responsible 
production and consumption) and SDG 13 (climate action). The EU, as well as (local and 
national) governments of EU Member States, plays a role in facilitating cross-sector 
collaboration for the SDGs.333   
Besides these three ‘overarching’ institutions and global commitments, the EU and its 
Member States are involved in international negotiations, such as the International Transport 
Forum (OECD), the UNECE World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) 
and specific multilateral negotiations on guidelines, including the Worldwide Harmonized 
Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP).  The EU (and the Member States) also act bilaterally 
with important biofuel producing countries, such as the United States, Brazil, China and 
developing countries like Indonesia. The European Commission supports the ‘Global Fuel 
Economy Initiative’334 as well as the G20 work on the vehicle fuel economy335. Nonetheless, it 
is fair to say that the multilateral negotiations only indirectly (and often voluntarily and not 
universally)336 relate to the issue of alternative fuels and therefore the fuel conditions for 
                                                     
331 See chapter 5.  
332 Daugbjerg, C. and Swinbank, A. (2015) ‘Globalization and new policy concerns: the WTO and the EU's sustainability criteria 
for biofuels’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 429-446. 
333 See chapter 6. 
334 https://www.globalfueleconomy.org/about-gfei/endorsements with an endorsement by Jos Delbeke, Director-General DG 
Climate Action.  
335 G20 Energy efficiency action plan: voluntary collaboration on energy efficiency (2014), 
https://ipeec.org/upload/publication_related_language/pdf/11.pdf.  
336 Brazil is e.g. not a member of multilateral forums such as the International Transport Forum and WP.29. 
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private vehicles are left within the remit of governments themselves. The issue of alternative 
fuels is ‘barely’ discussed in a multilateral context.337 Therefore, the remainder of this section 
will focus on EU and Member State legal competences on alternative fuels. 
4.4.2 Competences EU and alternative fuels: overview and practice 
Transport is a common policy of EU and Member States. By following the logic of the Treaty, 
the issue of transportation fuels could be interpreted as falling under the transport policy 
‘shared competence’, where both the Union and the Member States have legislative 
power.338 The issues related to alternative fuels are however not only in the field of ‘transport’ 
policies but also connected to climate action and energy. EU action in these fields is justified 
on the grounds of subsidiarity as provided for in Articles 91, 191 and 194(1) TFEU. These 
policy areas are also ‘shared competences’ even though this is an highly debated issue .339 
 
The large ‘energy’ component visible in the leading role of DG ENER could influence policy 
to be more lenient towards the ‘energy mix autonomy’ of Member States. Energy is 
considered as perhaps ‘the only field’ in which the EU has moderated its common - almost 
teleological - drive towards an ever closer union.340  In its 2001 Green Paper on energy 
security, the Commission regrets that the Union ‘suffers from having no competence (..) in 
energy matters’.341  Article 194 TFEU also shows the difficulty of combining common policies 
and national autonomy, coined as a ‘double-edged sword’ by officials of the European 
Parliament.342 
 
Alternative fuels for private vehicles are actually not limited to the domains of energy, 
transport and climate, they can in fact be considered as an emblematic ‘mixed competence’ 
example. In almost all policy areas related to alternative fuels (primarily transport, energy, 
environment, agriculture and development cooperation), the EU and Member States share 
competences, with trade and taxation as notable examples343. Member State governments 
hold the right to decide the amount of taxes that they wish to levy for different types of fuel, 
while there is a European minimum as stipulated in the Fuel Taxation Directive.344 Both in 
internal and external forums the EU and Member State actors need to coordinate their 
actions. In practice, though, the interviews portray an environment in which the European 
Commission sets the limits and boundaries of fuels and transport policies and it is up to the 
governments of Member States to support and/or hinder the introduction and deployment of 
these alternative fuels (infrastructures). The energy mix autonomy and taxation autonomy 
                                                     
337 Interview other societal stakeholder, 28-7-2016. 
338 Art 4 TFEU, e.g. internal market, environment, transport, energy, consumer protection, agriculture. 
339 Kamphof, R., Bonenkamp, T., Selleslaghs, J.M.H.M.R. and Hosli, M.O. (2017) ‘External competences in energy and climate 
change’ in Leal-Arcas, R. and Wouters, J. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing), 
pp. 30-47. 
340 Leal-Arcas, R. and Rios, J.A. (2015) ‘The Creation of a European Energy Union’ European Energy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 
27 and Andoura, S., Hancher, L. and Van der Woude, M. (2010) ‘Towards a European Energy Community: A Policy Proposal by 
Jacques Delors’. Notre Europe, p. 7. 
341 Cf Lavenex, S. (2004) ‘EU external governance in 'wider Europe'. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 692. 
342 Braun, J.F. (2011) ‘EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a new policy and business as usual’, EPIN 
Working Paper Vol. 31, p. 7. 
343 The EU has exclusive competence on trade but Member States have autonomy on taxation issues. 
344 Directive 2003/96/EC of the Council restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and 
electricity, 27 October 2003, OJ L 283. See https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/road/road_charging/fuel_taxation_en for the 
overview of derogations.  
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are often used by Member State actors to hinder EU-wide deployment of alternative fuel 
infrastructure.345 
4.4.3 Single road fuel market: legal barriers 
The concept of sustainable development is directly linked to the internal market in the 
Treaties.346 The internal market is encouraging EU integration and ‘was and is the hard core 
of the EU’ in the field of transport and energy policies.347 As a result, there is a single market 
for road fuel and vehicles, and refineries and other fuel production facilities are widely 
distributed throughout the EU. Many interviews highlight the importance of directives in this 
area.348 Moreover, the EU is known for its stringent sustainability criteria that apply when 
entering the internal market.349 However, some legal considerations have to be kept in mind, 
as they affect the functioning of this ‘single market’ on alternative fuels. First, as indicated 
before, there are substantial barriers resulting from national taxation schemes, not only on 
transport fuels, but also on energy. This ‘lack of harmonization’ appears to conflict with the 
security of supply objectives and can lead to ‘excess tax competition’.350 
 
Secondly, the alternative fuels are not part of the more stringent Emissions Trading System 
(ETS). Instead, the division of competences (see above) shows that these are ‘non-ETS’ 
sectors most often within the discretion of Member States. This affects the necessity of 
emission reduction commitments and the legally binding nature of such commitments. The 
emission reduction effort has been differentiated in a reduction of 43 per cent for the  EU 
ETS-sector  and one of 30 per cent for the non-ETS sector  by 2030 when compared to 
2005. Furthermore, there is no ‘sector-specific’ goal for transport in the non-ETS emission 
reduction target, although it is noted that measures include ‘a shift away from transport 
based on fossil fuels’ in the context of the Effort Sharing Decision. These overall reduction 
commitments are, however, a shared burden together with e.g. buildings, agriculture, small 
industry and waste.351 Moreover, while the Effort Sharing Decision from the 2030 EU Energy 
and Climate Package sets some national annual binding targets for emissions not covered 
under the EU emission trading scheme (ETS), those specifically relevant for biofuels, 
emissions from land use, land use change and international shipping are not included. 352 As 
a result, some Member States feel that the specific transport emission reduction efforts can 
be transferred to other Member States who do not have a large automotive sector.353    
 
Thirdly, many of the policies related to alternative fuels for private vehicles are regulated 
through directives, such as the fuel quality directive, renewable energy directive and directive 
on alternative fuel infrastructure. This gives more freedom (and time) to Member States to 
                                                     
345 Interview Other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 28-7-2016.  
346 Cf Article 3(3) TEU: “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment 
and social progress, and a high level of protection andmprovement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance.” 
347 Pelkmans, J. (2016) ‘Why the single market remains the EU’s core business’. West European Politics, Vol. 39, No. 5, p. 
1095. 
348 Interview EU official, 7-9-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 20-7-2016, Interview MS official, 10-8-2016, Interview 
MS official, 7-9-2016. 
349 Interview MS official, 10-8-2016. 
350 Steenberghen, T. and Lopez, E. (2008) ‘Overcoming barriers to the implementation of alternative fuels for road transport in 
Europe’. Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 16, No. 5, p. 584. 
351 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort_en. 
352 DG Climate Action (2016) http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/effort/index_en.htm; accessed 22-8-2016. 
353 Interview other societal stakeholder, 28-7-2016. 
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pursue the provisions as they see fit when compared to directly enforceable regulations. The 
many amendments (see section 4.2) show that this is hindering coordination in formulation of 
policies, thus leading to the private sector becoming hesitant in investments. While the 
necessary vehicle modifications, including the introduction of ‘flexi-fuel vehicles’, are 
relatively cheap and easy,354 these activities are currently being postponed.   
4.4.4 Court of Justice: threatening with infringement proceedings 
The semi-structured interviews show that the issue of alternative fuels for passenger cars 
used to be a policy area where regulatory measures were ‘softer’. These softer measures 
included stimulation of clean technology, deployment of infrastructure for alternative fuels, 
subsidies, research projects and demonstration zones. In a way, these ‘softer’ measures 
meant that the Court of Justice of the European Union was not an actor in this policy area. 
Nevertheless, the recent ‘scandals’ with traditional combustion engines, especially diesel 
engines, have paved the way for a harder line of sanctions, thus causing threats of fines and 
opening of infringement proceedings due to ‘laxity on car emissions’.355 Moreover, the 
directives are legally binding and therefore enforceable by the European Commission and 
the Court of Justice. In that sense, it is not the absence of legal competences itself but 
instead the absence of using this legal competences that explains policies on alternative 
fuels356. Therefore, the next section points to more ‘political’ issues that affect EU and 
Member State actors in their policy formulation on alternative fuels.   
4.5 Political issues and policy formulation 
This section zooms in on the so-called ‘political’ issues that affect policy formulation on 
alternative fuels for private vehicles in the EU and Member States. After an evaluation of the 
‘institutional turf battles’ between the Council and the Commission and the distinctive profile 
of the EU against the rest of the world, the ‘preference heterogeneity’ of Member States is 
offered as an important variable explaining the level of coordination of policy formulation on 
alternative fuels. The remainder of the section focuses on other explanatory variables, such 
as the interests of ‘other societal stakeholders’, the emotional state of the debate, and 
scientific uncertainty.  
4.5.1 Supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
Transport policies in general are traditional ‘institutional turf battles’ in which Member States 
are reluctant to transfer powers to the European Commission.357 Even after the ‘Dieselgate’ 
scandal, the Commission was not put in charge with ‘tougher competences’, as consumer 
affairs Commissioner Jourouva puts it.358 While the inclusion of transport in ETS and national 
‘hard targets’ is often suggested as a solution, 359 this is rejected by the Council and  some 
Member States, especially Germany. Interestingly, there is also ‘intra-institutional’ 
                                                     
354 Interview MS official, 10-8-2016.  
355 Teffer, P. (2016) ‘EU states under pressure for laxity on car emissions’, 9 September 2016, 
<https://euobserver.com/dieselgate/135011>. 
356 After the case study has been conducted, the Commission has asked Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania and Sweden to fully transpose EU rules on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure (Directive 
2014/94/EU) in October 2017. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to infringement proceedings in the near future. 
357 Egenhofer, C. (2011) ‘The EU should not shy away from setting CO2-related targets for transport’, CEPS policy brief, No 
229/January 2011, p. 4. 
358 Teffer, P. (2017) ‘Dieselgate: EU disappointed with VW's treatment of customers’, EUObserver, 21 February 2017. 




competition which causes many DGs (and ministries) to have different powers. Mostly, DG 
ENER takes the lead with policy initiatives, but competences and responsibilities are 
dispersed across DGs with DG MOVE (transport) and DG AGRI (agriculture) remarkably 
absent.360 The European Parliament is slightly less involved due to its lack of technical 
expertise, but the MEPs had a louder voice in the ‘emotional’ debate on biofuels in the late 
2000s and early 2010s.361       
4.5.2 EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
A strong and difficult ‘external environment’ affects EU and Member State actors in policy 
formulation with relation to ‘the rest of the world’. Many scholars blame this on the typical 
historical evolution, its hybrid supranational-intergovernmental polity as well as the shared 
competences between the EU and Member States, with the consequence that the EU is 
viewed as a ‘normative power’ in world affairs, especially in environmental diplomacy.362 
There is already large import dependence on traditional (oil-based) fuels, with the reliance ‘a 
very sparse number of energy suppliers’ meaning they could use this situation as a ‘political 
weapon’.363 While reducing import dependence is raised as a motivating factor in alternative 
fuel policies one can argue that there is a greater import dependence in the case of 
alternative fuels, e.g. the raw materials for electric vehicles and more ‘sustainable’ biofuels 
such as the ones based on sugarcane. This would then cause the European Commission to 
play a larger role and the EU could use its combination of ‘aid and trade’ muscle in pursuit of 
multiple objectives.364 However, while there is a global market for alternative fuels, the 
multilateral context is weak. Moreover, as Afionis and Stringer (2012: 115) state, the EU has 
been ‘inconsistent’ in using its powers in relation biofuels. In practice, it seems as if the EU 
and its Member States, when acting together as a large trading entity, seeks to protect its 
own (agricultural, automotive) industries first rather than promoting environmental diplomacy. 
Thus, the external environment has only a moderate effect on EU and Member State policy 
formulation, reducing the call or larger Commission powers.    
4.5.3 Preference heterogeneity 
As indicated by the literature, ‘preference heterogeneity’ – in the sense of (the absence of) 
aligning interests – could be considered a primary cause of EU and Member State behavior 
in policy formulation above or alongside legal powers. This study shows a large preference 
heterogeneity across Member States in the choice of alternative fuels. That might be a 
positive development, as the ‘mix’ of alternative fuels could help in reaching  objectives and 
targets. However, the preference heterogeneity present in the case of alternative fuels is 
hindering coordination of policy formulation, because it is a mix of divergent and often 
contradictory preferences. The European Commission does not have the necessary powers 
to coordinate this situation. The substantive divergence is largely the result of historical fuel 
                                                     
360 Interview EU official, 7-9-2016, Interview MS official, 7-9-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-9-2016, Interview EU 
official, 31-3-2017. 
361 Interview other societal stakeholder, 3-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview EU official, 31-3-
2017. 
362 Manners, I. (2002) ‘Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, 
No. 2, pp. 235-258. Cf Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and 
challenges’. The International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 35-50. For a more critical contribution, see Afionis & Stringer (2012) 
and Falkner (2007). 
363 Leal-Arcas, R. and Rios, J.A. (2015) ‘The Creation of a European Energy Union’ European Energy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 
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364 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 32, p. 115, see also Van Schaik, L. and Kamphof, R. (2015) ‘Now or never: using the EU’s 
trade power as leverage for a climate deal in Paris’. Clingendael Policy Brief, November 2015. 
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choices, different job markets and strong stakeholder interests and lobbies in Member 
States. The ‘imbalance’ of diesel and petrol (and alternative fuels) makes it very difficult to 
come up with an integrated EU approach and blending is very country-specific.365  To 
illustrate,Scandinavian countries are more oriented on biomass than other countries, the 
‘EU13’ countries are focused on traditional fuels, Germany has a large car industry and 
France has a large agricultural industry (for food-based fuels).366 These stakeholders and 
divergent interests all have  powerful representatives in Brussels. Therefore, as has been 
stated by Falkner (2007: 508), EU ‘leadership’ on environmental issues needs to be analysed 
against the background of the (domestic) political economy of European biotechnology.367 
Until now, according to the interviews, this has resulted in ‘soft’ measures stimulating clean 
technology and alternative fuels, sometimes with intermittent subsidies.368 This might turn 
into a harder line, for example with e.g. CO2 taxation369 and ‘punishing’ traditional 
combustion engines, but this is very much dependent on national preferences.  
4.5.4 Alternative explanations 
While the explanations above definitely affect EU and Member State cooperation in policy 
formulation on alternative fuels, alongside legal considerations there are some other factors 
that were  raised in the interviews. This section ends with two of these factors. Firstly, and 
especially in the case of biofuels, the ‘U-turns’ in EU policies have been the result of 
‘emotional’ debates and inconclusive ‘science-based’ policies on food vs fuel. The ILUC 
debate on this matter paralyzed the implementation of biofuel policies for at least three years, 
until the issue was eventually solved in 2015. Earlier, the Fuel Quality Directive and 
Renewable Energy Directive were amended, which can be attributed to the heated ‘food 
versus fuel’ discussions. The alternative fuel discussion has been hijacked by emotive 
arguments according to some of the interviews. 370 In that way, these discussions on 
alternative fuels can be compared with other ethical discussions in the EU such as the 
debates on genetically modified organisms, carbon capture and storage, nuclear power and 
radioactive waste.371  
 
The uncertainties have led some people to state that it is logical that the ‘precautionary 
principle’ is used and that, in this case of ‘unknown risk’, production is decreased or halted.372 
These ‘precautionary’ objectives could also affect EU and Member State action. However, 
one could argue that these ‘precautionary principles’ pave the way for more concrete action 
to decrease fossil fuels while the policy formulation on alternative fuels is rather slow. 
 
Secondly, an alternative explanation for EU and Member State policy formulation on 
alternative fuels is the influence of ‘other societal stakeholders’ in this policy area  This 
seems indeed a credible explanation. In Europe, the automotive industry has been hesitant 
                                                     
365 Interview other societal stakeholder, 19-7-2016. 
366 Interview other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview MS official, 7-9-2016. 
367 Falkner, R. (2007) ‘The political economy of ‘normative power’ Europe: EU environmental leadership in international 
biotechnology regulation’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 508.  
368 Interview EU official, 7-9-2016. Interview EU official, 31-3-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 20-7-2016. 
369 Egenhofer, C. (2011) ‘The EU should not shy away from setting CO2-related targets for transport’, CEPS policy brief, No 
229/January 2011. 
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9-2016, Interview EU official, 7-9-2016, Interview EU official, 31-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder, 19-7-2016. 
371 Cf Di Lucia, L. and Nilsson, L. J. (2007) ‘Transport biofuels in the European Union: The state of play’. Transport Policy, Vol. 
14, No. 6, pp. 533-543. 
372 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
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to act in the absence of credible long-term regulatory measures from the government, even 
holding back in quite ‘simple’ moves like introducing flexi-fuel vehicles.373 There are some 
more outspoken strong interests and lobbies, such as the oil industry and fuel suppliers 
against the large-scale introduction of bio-ethanol. On the other hand the agricultural industry 
also has a heavy lobbying presence in Brussels supportive of (food-based) alternative fuels. 
Concurrently, the agricultural lobbyists seem to be more strategically positioned to prioritise 
trade concerns and to hinder progress on relaxing import tariffs from outside Europe.374 Of 
course, there are national equivalents of all these EU-wide interest groups with differing 
stakes across EU Member States. Furthermore, civil society organisations are particularly 
vocal on the topic of alternative fuels, aggregated by CSOs such as Transport & 
Environment. Among their concerns are food vs fuel, the interests of developing countries, 
poor working conditions in developing countries375 (stricter) environmental standards as well 
as biodiversity.376 All interests of stakeholders find their way into reports by Members of the 
European Parliament, who are equally keen to contribute to this debate.377  However, as it is 
the case also for other politicians, they do not seem to be driven by technological neutrality, 
but rather by their own preferences for electricity; in this way transition (biofuels, biogas) and 
alternative fuels (e.g. hydrogen) end up being neglected.378  
 
The drive for alternative fuels seems to be led by the European people who highly value 
environmental protection .379 Conversely, consumers seem to be rather hesitant to choose 
flexi-fuel vehicles and high alternative fuel blends. s it has been discussed in the previous 
section, the EU and Member State governments and their directorates/ministries play a very 
powerful role in this field by means of measures, taxes and subsidies. Importantly, according 
to the interviewees biofuel policies with in the European Commission  are  especially driven 
by DG Energy and DG Climate Action; DG Agriculture, DG Environment, DG Mobility and 
Transport and DG Trade are considerably less active in this regard.380 The same might be 
true for governmental stakeholders within EU Member States. Accordingly, the distinction 
between EU and Member States might be a bit too abstract as, in practice, it is more up to 
individual ministries, or, in the case of the European Commission, specific DGs.  The 
different interests of these actors make it very difficult to coordinate policy formulation on 
alternative fuels across the EU. 
4.6 Discussion/conclusion 
The main question addressed in this chapter has been the following: How do legal 
competences affect EU and Member State coordination in policy formulation on alternative 
                                                     
373 Interview MS official, 10-8-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 20-7-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 28-7-
2016.  
374 Afionis, S. and Stringer, L. C. (2012) ‘European Union leadership in biofuels regulation: Europe as a normative power?’. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 32, p. 120. 
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fuels for passenger cars?  As the objective of this study to combine political and legal 
perspectives, the effect of the division of competences is analysed alongside  ‘political’ 
issues, such as the supranational versus intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in 
the international constellation of power and preference heterogeneity. This research is based 
on review and analysis of literature, policy documents, case law, legislation, and is 
complemented by twelve semi-structured interviews with (mainly) EU and Member State 
officials at policy adviser ranks, (assistants of) Members of Parliament and ‘other 
stakeholders’ in the car industry, agricultural industry as well as Civil Society 
Organisations.381 The study focuses on a timeframe  between the introduction of the 
Renewable Energy Directive and Fuel Quality Directive (2009), almost coinciding with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and July 2017.  
‘Legal competences’ may not be considered crucial when explaining policy formulation on 
alternative fuels by EU and Member State actors, but reviewing the Treaty provisions, the 
Court’s case law and legal documents like directives provides for some clarification for  (the 
lack of) coordination. First, mixed competences on alternative fuels make it sometimes 
difficult to coordinate. The EU and Member States share competences in policy areas such 
as climate change (environment), transport and energy. Even though the Commission has  
exclusive competence on related fields (such as trade),  there is no multilateral context in 
which these trade competences could be used and additionally other competences in which 
Member States are more autonomous,   such as taxation, are deemed more important. 
Moreover, within the primary shared competence of energy, the ‘energy mix’ is within the 
remit of individual Member States, which negatively affects the EU cooperation on alternative 
fuels .  Secondly, the legal context of the Single Market makes it clear that transport (and 
energy) is sometimes a category that is distinct from more binding procedures like the 
Emission Trading System. Thirdly, the Court’s case law could help in bringing the EU and 
Member States together. However, the Commission has not started infringement 
proceedings on the lack of cooperation in the automotive sector. Fourthly, the directives on 
fuel quality, alternative fuel infrastructure and renewable energy give some guidance. 
However, the past few years have seen many ‘U-turns’ in policies which affected the 
directives.  
When comparing the effects of these procedural arrangements and legal competences with 
alternative ‘political’ issues, some explanations seem stronger, while others seem less 
important. Large ‘preference heterogeneity’ between and within Member States seems to 
affect EU and Member State actors in formulating policies more heavily than the differences 
between the EU and the ‘rest of the world’. Moreover, the interviews and, to a lesser extent, 
the literature, demonstrated that there are two alternative explanations that seem to have a 
strong effect. First, the scientific uncertainty and emotional state of the debate on alternative 
fuels, primarily on biofuels, seem to have an effect on policy formulation. Secondly, the 
alternative fuels policy area is characterised by powerful (domestic) stakeholders with often 
divergent interests, such as the car industry, oil industry, CSOs and the agricultural industry. 
Moreover, the ‘governmental’ stakeholders within EU and Member State seem to have 
divergent interests with often (national) ministries and (European Commission) DGs having 
opposing views on this topic. These explanations affect EU and Member State coordination 
alongside and often above legal considerations, meaning that they explain EU and Member 
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State coordination more than legal coordination in this specific case study.  The effect of the 
explanations is visualised below (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4. 1 Variables and effects on EU and Member State coordination in alternative fuels 
policy making 
The adoption and ratification of the Paris Agreement, greater energy security concerns, 
concerns about traditional combustion engines and higher ambitions on alternative fuels 
could lead to legal and political debate on whether it would more effective, efficient and 
closer to the rationale of the Treaty, to grant the Commission a bigger role. Recent years 
have seen many U-turns in EU and Member State policies, which proved to be detrimental to 
mass-scale introduction of e.g. flexi fuel vehicles. Some of the stakeholders speak of a 
classical ‘chicken and egg situation’ in which stakeholders keep each other in custody on this 
topic before moving forwards.382 The situation on alternative fuels in other parts of the world 
already makes it clear that governmental policy could really encourage this agenda. In that 
sense, one would expect a larger discussion on legal competences on alternative fuels in the 
near future, and more specifically on ‘energy mix’, taxation and climate action.  
Further research 
The European Commission appears to be right in its recent strategy on Low-Emission 
Mobility in which it holds that the EU could lead on the introduction of some alternative 
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fuels.383 This leading potential could indeed be used for other transport sectors beyond the 
scope of this study, like aviation, shipping and (heavy-weight) freight, as there is not yet a 
sustainable alternative for these heavy polluting industries as it has been held in strategic 
visions of Member States.384  Nevertheless, the automotive industry could in addition take the 
lead towards more sustainable fuels. With electrification still in its infancy, blending of fuels 
can contribute towards a more sustainable future, in the transitional phase and within the 
European Union. While the mass-scale introduction of flexi-fuel vehicles seems far-fetched, it 
is definitely possible to take incremental steps towards alternative fuels and increasing 
awareness thereof.  More political and legal research on this topic could reveal the 
‘institutional’ constraints that currently hinder the real introduction of a ‘single market’ on 
alternative fuels. This study already claims that the nature of policy change in the EU is more 
‘incremental’ than ‘radical’. A more historical institutionalist approach could therefore use 
these build-up of incremental steps to explain (the absence of) EU-wide policies on 
alternative fuels. One of the explaining factors might be the current difficulty of multilateral 
cooperation on this topic, which keeps EU and Member State decision-makers within their 
own (conservative) ambition cycle heavily influenced by domestic stakeholders.  
 
Moreover, one could have a better appraisal of other explaining factors that this study came 
across. The increasing importance of other societal stakeholders like the private sector, 
lobbying actors and CSOs seem to have strong, but divergent, effect on technology-neutral 
fuel policies for private vehicles. Furthermore, the scientific uncertainty seems to have 
affected the cooperation rather heavily and lessons could be learned from other ‘ethically 
loaded’ topics in the EU such as GMOs or nuclear waste. Additionally, the experience of 
working together with technical experts and technical universities has proven refreshing, and 
combinations of these disciplines could work well in explaining decision-making on global 
challenges including emission reduction in transport.     
 
SUMMARY CHAPTER 4 
The chapter identified how the allocation of competences, i.e. legal competences, affect EU 
and Member State actors in their policy formulation on alternative fuels for passenger cars 
such as electricity, biofuels and hydrogen. The ‘mixed’ competences on energy, transport 
and climate affect coordination on alternative fuel policies. Taxation, land use policies and 
energy mix choices remain within the discretionary autonomy of Member States. Moreover, 
the related directives on topics including fuel quality have been amended due to scientific 
uncertainty. With regards to the UN legal context, the topic of alternative fuels is not covered 
by a multilateral platform. The Commission seems hesitant to start infringement proceedings 
against misconduct involving traditional combustion engines. Therefore, (other) political 
factors like large preference heterogeneity between Member States and between individual 
ministries/DGs seem to have important effects. This study likewise points to alternative 
explanations such as (domestic) stakeholder interests and the emotional/science-critical 
debate, which affects coordination on alternative fuel policies.  
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Chapter 5: ‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC Climate Negotiations 
5.1 Introduction 
“The Paris Agreement is the first of its kind and it would not have been possible were it 
not for the European Union. Today we continued to show leadership and prove that, 
together, the European Union can deliver." (President of the European Commission, 
Jean Claude Juncker, State of the Union Speech, 14 September 2016385) 
 
The European Union (EU) and its Member States have been leading actors in constructing 
the international climate policy framework since the early 1990s.386 The topic of climate 
change has been identified as a ‘saviour issue’ for the success of the EU integration project. 
387 Internationally, the recent emissions of greenhouse gases were the largest in history; the 
atmosphere and oceans have warmed, the amount of snow and ice has diminished and the 
sea level has risen.388 With that institutional importance and climatological urgency in mind, 
the EU has been committed to a multilateral response to combat climate change.389 After the 
‘failure’390 of the Copenhagen conference (2009), both from a multilateral perspective and in 
terms of EU conduct, the Paris Agreement has been hailed as a success of (EU) climate 
diplomacy.391   
 
Research on the EU and Member States in international climate change negotiations tends 
to focus on EU actorness and effectiveness, respectively the EU’s ability to function ‘actively 
and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’392 and its ‘goal-
attainment’ in these international negotiations.393 As such, the ‘leadership’ of the EU in the 
framework of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
evaluated more positive or negative depending on the goals set.394 The empirical studies that 
analyse internal coordination structures of the EU and Member States (in climate 
negotiations) focus primarily on the balance of power between (large) Member States in the 
                                                     
385 European Commission, ‘Paris Agreement to enter into force as EU agrees ratification’ [2016] , press release, Strasbourg, 4 
October 2016, accessed << http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3284_en.htm>> 14 June 2017. 
386 Lefevere, J.. Runge-Metzger, A. and Werksman, J. (2015) 'The EU and international climate change policy' in Jos Delbeke, 
Peter Vis (eds), EU Climate Policy Explained (Routledge), p. 109. 
387 Van Schaik, L. and Schunz, S. (2012) ‘Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Normor 
InterestDriven Actor?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 169. 
388 Pachauri, R.K. (2014) Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014) < 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf> accessed 16 December 2016. 
389 Kamphof, R. (2018, forthcoming) ‘UN Environment Programme (UN Environment) and UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC): EU Action Between Legal Competences and Political Power’ in Odermatt, J, and Wessel, R.A. 
(eds) Research Handbook on the EU’s Engagement with International Organisations’ (Edward Elgar Publishing). 
390 Falkner, R., Stephan, H. and Vogler, J. (2010) ‘International climate policy after Copenhagen: Towards a ‘building blocks’ 
approach’. Global Policy, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 252-262. 
391 Oberthür, S. (2016) ‘Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics’. Global Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 
119-130. 
392 Sjöstedt, G. (1977) The external role of the European Community (Famborough, Saxon House), p. 16. 
393 Groen, L. and Niemann, A. (2013) ‘The European Union at the Copenhagen climate negotiations: A case of contested EU 
actorness and effectiveness’. International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 308-324. Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The 
Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment 
Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1319-1335. Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2017) 
‘Explaining goal achievement in international negotiations: the EU and the Paris Agreement on climate change’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, pp. 1-20 (published online). Delreux, T. (2014) ‘EU actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness in 
environmental affairs’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, pp. 1017-1032. Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU 
Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
394 Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’. The 
International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 35-50. Bäckstrand, K., and Elgström, O. (2013) ‘The EU's role in climate change 
negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 1369-1386. Parker, C. F. and 
Karlsson, C. (2010) ‘Climate change and the European Union's leadership moment: an inconvenient truth?’. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 923-943. 
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Council and the Commission395, ‘socialisation’ of representatives from Member States396, the 
EU position in the international negotiations concerning the environment and preference 
heterogeneity in the sense of ( absence of) aligning interests.397   
 
The EU and its Member States are often considered as an unitary actor. It is in fact not 
common to see the European Union sharing competences and legal competences with 
Member States when acting in international climate negotiations. As a result, little is known 
about the political effect of these legal competences despite calls for more cross-disciplinary 
research in both legal and political science contributions on the role and functioning of the 
EU within international institutions.398 The division of competences between the EU and its 
Member States is one of the crucial issues in institutional discussions.399   It is a delicate 
question, which often results in either diminishing the ‘creeping’ competences of the EU or 
supporting the idea of a ‘single voice’.400 Climate change is, however, a multifaceted issue as 
it includes shared, exclusive and supportive competences. By combining legal and political 
perspectives, i.e. formal rules and informal practices, the practical effects of ‘mixed 
competences’ could be analysed in more detail. 
 
The present chapter identifies whether legal competences enable or impede coordination of 
the EU and Member State actors at UNFCCC negotiations. The main question addressed in 
this chapter has been the following: How do legal competences affect EU and Member State 
coordination in negotiations at the UNFCCC? As such, the effect of legal competences 
(independent variables) is compared and assessed alongside other more common  issues 
(and ‘intervening variables’), such as supranational versus intergovernmental dominance, the 
EU’s position within the international constellation of power, and preference heterogeneity. 
Socialisation practices are seen as part of the (dependent variable) coordination of ‘team 
EU’. This chapter also addresses ‘other explanations’ raised in the semi-structured interviews 
that could hinder or enable coordination in the negotiations of ‘Team EU’ at the UNFCCC. 
 
The findings in this chapter arebased on multiple sources of information, which are 
considered together through the triangulation technique. The case study makes use of a 
step-by-step process tracing approach, revising legal documents (Treaty provisions, cases 
before the Court of Justice of the EU, regulations and directives), additional policy 
documents and academic literature. The qualitative part of this study additionally relies on 
                                                     
395 Laatikainen, K. and Smith, K. (eds) (2006) The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave).  Cf Dykstra, H. (2009) ‘Commission versus Council Secretariat: an analysis of bureaucratic rivalry in 
European foreign policy.’ European Foreign Affairs. Review Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 431-450. 
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confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 261-286. Groen, L. and Niemann, A. (2013) ‘The European Union at the Copenhagen climate 
negotiations: A case of contested EU actorness and effectiveness’. International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 320 and Oberthür, 
S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More 
Comprehensive Assessment Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1319-1335. 
399 Cf Benz, A. (2010) ‘The EU’s competences: The ‘vertical’ perspective on the multilevel system’. Living Reviews in European 
Governance – LERG. 
400 Pollack, M. A. (2000) ‘The end of creeping competence? EU policymaking since Maastricht’. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 519-538. 
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twenty semi-structured interviews with (leading) negotiators, EU and Member State officials, 
(former) ministers as well as other societal stakeholders (see Table 5.1).401 These 
interviewees were approached after a stakeholder analysis and found on the basis of 
organigrams/websites (‘own initiative’) and/or referral (snowball sampling technique). As 
previously mentioned, the findings are brought together through triangulation. With regards to 
the timeframe, this analysis focuses on the process starting with the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Conference (2009) until July 2017, and it includes the UNFCCC COP21 in Paris 
(2015). The main emphasis is on the large international climate change conferences (COP), 
but environmental day-to-day diplomacy is also part of the analysis and the questions in the 
semi-structured interviews. The process tracing approach leads to an overall assessment of 
the potential influence of legal competences, and of the interaction with/autonomy from other 
intervening variables and other explanations for this specific case. The results from this study 
can only be considered as ‘plausibility probes’, providing interesting avenues for future 
research, but it is acknowledged that they need further testing in other cases to become 
more robust.402 
Category No of interviews 
EU official 7 
Member State official 10 
Other societal stakeholder 3 
Table 5. 1 No of semi-structured interviews for case study EU in UNFCCC negotiations 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes the multilateral negotiation 
processes at the UNFCCC from 2009 to 2017 more extensively. After a broader UN 
overview, the coordination procedures of the ‘Team EU’ approach with EU and Member 
State officials is introduced in section 5.3. The following section (5.4) introduces the ‘legal’ 
issues and powers, including also the division of competences related to the climate 
agreement and the role of the case law and principles established by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. The fifth section considers more ‘political’ issues and intervening 
variables, which might have a different effect than the legal division of competences would 
prescribe. This section focuses on the supranational versus intergovernmental dominance, 
the external negotiating context and preference heterogeneity. Other explanations that might 
disproportionately affect EU and Member State coordination and were raised in the 
interviews are identified. In the final section it is evaluated whether the EU and its Member 
States are legally enabled or restrained by the division of competences or whether ‘political’ 
issues play a more prominent role. The chapter ends with the suggestion of some avenues 
for future research.   
5.2 Multilateral environment UNFCCC (2009-2017)  
5.2.1 UNFCCC 1992-2017 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), adopted during 
the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, is the principal framework where discussions on global climate 
efforts take place. The most important forum is the annual Conference of the Parties (COP). 
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402 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
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The COP is the supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC and all 195 members are 
invited to participate in these meetings. The EU is a party to the UNFCCC and so also are all 
the EU Member States individually.403 The COPs have been described as ‘incredibly gigantic’ 
events and are the culmination of a year of time-consuming, difficult preparations and 
missions by officials and Ministers. EU Member States have taken part in the organisation of 
recent COPs, such as COP15 (Copenhagen, Denmark), COP19 (Warsaw, Poland) and 
COP21 (Paris, France).  
The EU has been involved since the very start and has been one of the leading actors in 
saving the international climate regime by adhering to the Kyoto Protocol when the United 
States declared their opposition to such Protocol in 2001.404 The EU has the most far-
reaching emission reduction commitment of all big economies. The goal is to reduce 
emissions by 40 percent before 2030, when compared to 1990 levels.  However, there have 
been rounds of failed negotiations to define a universal climate framework. The most 
outspoken failure for the EU in this regard  was probably the Copenhagen conference in 
2009.405 
The subsequent COPs led, however, to the successful COP21 in Paris (2015). The 
interviews show that in 2009 there was  not much hope for a renewed alignment to 
international climate change commitments.406 The Mexican Presidency in Cancun (COP16) 
in 2010 has however been successful in starting a bottom-up process involving both 
developing and developed nations and asking them to come up with climate pledges. This 
process continued with nationally determined contributions in the years after. The Paris 
Agreement marks the success of a universal multilateral agreement on climate change 
mitigation. During COP21, the ‘Team EU’ delegation of the EU and its Member States built a 
coalition of both developed and developing nations, which resulted in securing a successful 
international climate agreement.407 As stipulated in the Paris Agreement, climate pledges 
now need to be tracked to ‘make emission pathways consistent with holding the increase in 
the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels’.408 This 
‘stocktake’ process will begin end of 2018. The EU and all twenty-eight Member States have 
ratified the Paris Agreement by November 2017.409  
5.2.2 Paris Agreement: legally binding?  
The UNFCCC negotiations are very technical and have a large scope, including climate 
change mitigation, adaptation and the means of implementation (a.o. finance and capacity 
building). Substantive legal issues such as the legal form or character of a UNFCCC 
                                                     
403 UNFCCC website (2017) Parties to the Convention and Observer States’ http://unfccc.int/parties_ 
and_observers/parties/items/2352.php 
404 Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’. The 
International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 36. 
405 See footnote 4. For a popular exposé see Meilstrup, P. (2010) ‘The runaway summit: the background story of the Danish 
presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference’. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010, pp. 113-135. 
406 Interview EU official, 9-4-2014. Interview MS official, 7-10-2015.  
407 Oberthür, S. (2016) ‘Where to go from Paris? The European Union in climate geopolitics’. Global Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 
119-130 and 'How the EU helped build the ambition coalition' (EUClimateAction Storify, January 2016) 
<https://storify.com/EUClimateAction/how-the-eu-helped-build-the-coalition-ambition> accessed 30 November 2016.     
408 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015) Paris Agreement, 
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf, Accessed 13 December 2016. 
409 The case study was conducted until July 2017 when 26 EU Member States ratified the Paris Agreement. In August 2017 
(The Netherlands) and November 2017 (Czech Republic) the remaining EU Member States ratified the agreement, cf 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php, Accessed 15 November 2017.  
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agreement are therefore central issues to the COP negotiations.410 The Paris Agreement is a 
Treaty that falls under the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. 
However, not every provision of the agreement creates legal obligations. The Paris 
Agreement is composed of both a ‘binding’ part, as well as of voluntary, non-binding 
commitments. The run-up to the Paris Agreement has been a ‘bottom-up’ process including 
‘intended’ or voluntary nationally determined contributions which focus on transparency, 
accountability and precision.  As demonstrated in a recent UNFCCC synthesis report, these 
aggregated INDCs will not prevent a temperature rise of more than 2°C, the overall objective 
for the climate deal.411 They are, moreover, essentially voluntary and some of the 
commitments made by developing countries are conditional on the availability of climate 
finance. Therefore, a structural ‘stocktake’ is required to update commitments and meet the 
overarching goal to stay within a maximum of 1,5 to 2 degrees’ temperature rise. 
 
The bottom-up process of the Paris Agreement differs from the more ‘legally binding’ Kyoto 
Protocol, which included for instance a carbon budget and a maximum of tonnes of CO2 
emissions per (EU) Member State. From a legal perspective, the Paris Agreement could be 
considered as a step backwards when compared to the Kyoto Protocol. However, in contrast 
to the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol was not a ‘universal’ agreement.412 The ‘political’ 
significance of the Paris Agreement is therefore higher than the one of the Kyoto Protocol, 
despite its ‘softer’ measures. As indicated by Bodansky (2016: 142), the issue of the legal 
character “though important, is only one factor in assessing the significance of the Paris 
outcome”.  
5.3 ‘Team EU’ coordination 
Coordination is the process of contacts between diplomats and officials from EU institutions 
(especially the European Commission) and Member States with the purpose of discussing an 
issue of common interest and working towards a common position.. These coordination 
processes can be internal (within the EU) or external (international) and include the 
discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination.  
The EU and its Member States have invented a very specific institutional arrangement of 
coordination in their UNFCCC climate diplomacy. Within the ‘Team EU’, composed of 
representatives from the EU institutions and the Member States, one can identify ‘lead 
negotiators’ and ‘issue leaders’. Lead negotiators are appointed by the Council Working 
Party on International Environment Issues (WPIEI). Lead negotiators have their institutional 
affiliation in either Member States or the European Commission and have an important 
‘external’ representation role during COPs. In practice, most lead negotiators are from large 
Member States (Germany, France, and United Kingdom) or Member States with a specific 
interest (e.g. Sweden). The Commission lead negotiator originates from the Directorate 
                                                     
410 Bodansky, D. (2016) ‘The legal character of the Paris Agreement’. Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. 142. 
411 UNFCCC (2015) ‘Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions’, 
<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/07.pdf> Accessed 26 July 2017. 
412 Cf Kamphof, R. (2018, forthcoming) UN Environment Programme (UN Environment) and UN Framework Convention on 
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General Climate Action (DG CLIMA). During the Paris COP21 Team EU had four ‘lead 
negotiators’.  
Apart from the lead negotiators, Team EU has many ‘issue leaders’ assisting lead 
negotiators on specific issues. Their main task is not to represent the EU internationally, but 
to assist lead negotiators. Additionally, there are expert groups supporting the Council 
working group WPIEI gaining more and more authority to develop negotiating positions.413 
Importantly, the six-month Presidency of the Council of the European Union also plays a 
large role in coordination of WPIEI and in representing ‘The EU and the Member States’ 
externally. The Commission, with over 80 percent representation by DG CLIMA, plays an 
important role in substantive expertise and continuity. While the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) has an important informative role in preparing the negotiations and 
collaborating with third countries, the thematic expertise is limited. The Members of 
European Parliament also have an interest in these issues and keep informed, but the 
UNFCCC negotiations remain an intergovernmental process. 
The interviews portray the Team EU daily agenda during the COPs as very time-consuming, 
starting with a Presidency chaired coordination meeting of EU and Member States in the 
morning, and followed by the plenary. During lunch breaks, multiple bilateral meetings take 
place, especially with third countries or regional blocs. In the late afternoon and evening, 
Team EU evaluates the day and lead negotiators are usually still active with bilateral 
meetings.414 This system allows for the ‘pooling of expertise’ of the Commission and Member 
States, which results in the Team being “among the best-prepared negotiators in the world at 
diplomatic and administrative level” according to Kaczyński (2016: 267).415 The 
representatives are ‘blended’ into the negotiation team. Nevertheless, if one is not part of the 
‘core’ team EU, it might prove difficult to have access to all the information. There is still 
some Member State autonomy when it comes to nominations to certain bodies, substantive 
financial questions (see later), or the organisation of the COP in the territory of the Member 
State.   
UNFCCC negotiations could be perceived as a process of ‘socialisation’ in the way EU and 
Member State actors coordinate. Socialisation means that EU Member States’ 
representatives involved in deciding on and negotiating the EU position in international 
institutions first and foremost adopt a European orientation, leading to the ‘socialisation’ in 
EU practices.416 The interviews show that the ‘Team EU’ approach, with all its preparatory 
work before and after the COP negotiations, unequivocally affects the EU unity, cooperation 
and expertise in climate negotiations.417 Lead negotiators meet in many occasions. ‘Issue 
leaders’ and other support staff have also frequent contact.418 The European (and global) 
‘UNFCCC crowd’ has been fairly stable up to the Paris Agreement, with many diplomats 
being active in this policy area for at least 5 to 10 years. This seems to contribute to a 
pragmatic decision-making process.  One could argue that the legal ‘duty of loyal 
cooperation’ is a key driver of this process, but that would be far-fetched, as legal powers are 
                                                     
413 Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’. The 
International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 38. 
414 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 24-1-2014, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
415 Kaczyński, P. M. (2012) ‘A Gordian Knot or Not? EU Representation in UN Climate Negotiations’ in Laursen, F. (ed) The 
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417 Interview MS official, 24-1-2014, Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 13-6-2017.  
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in general not used so often (at least directly) . The ones directly involved often hail the 
‘Team EU’ method, but there are some disadvantages. As some authors state, socialisation 
can lead to ‘groupthink’, which could have a negative impact on effectiveness.419 Moreover, 
the process depends on individual characteristics and relationships, leaving it vulnerable to 
different preferences.  
5.4 The division of competences, legal issues and EU negotiation 
How does the division of competences in the Treaty affect the conduct of UNFCCC climate 
negotiations by Team EU? This section focuses on internal aspects and gives an historical 
overview of how the role of competences on environment and climate change evolved, 
especially after 2009. Furthermore, the ‘negotiation mandate’ of the EU and the Member 
States is discussed, as well as the effects of case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and regulations and directives.  
5.4.1 UN(FCCC) Statutes and (legal) documents 
As the previous section indicated, the UN multilateral context and Statutes have a strong 
effect on coordination between the EU and Member State actors. The UNFCCC arrangement 
is described as a peculiar arrangement within the UN system, as it differs from all other UN 
processes.420 Given the large scope of the UNFCCC negotiations, numerous substantive 
legal questions can be raised.421 The Kyoto Protocol is considered more legally stringent422, 
but many legal questions remain. The whole process becomes very technical and legal, 
especially during the final stages of the negotiation of agreements and texts.423  
5.4.2 Competences EU: historical overview and practice 2009-2017 
A simple search of ‘climate change’ or ‘climate action’ in the Treaties of the European 
Union424 leads to one result only: Article 191 TFEU (environment) where it is stated that (1) 
‘Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives’ (..) - 
‘promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change’. This international level is apparent in 
Art 191(4) TFEU: ‘within their respective spheres of competence, the Union and the Member 
States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international 
organisations’. Article 192 TFEU clarifies that some policy areas fall outside this scope, 
including provisions ‘primarily of a fiscal nature’, measures affecting land use and measures 
affecting a Member State’s “choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply’. Apart from this, the ‘environment’ policy area is falls under the 
area of shared competences according to a combined reading of articles 4 and 191 TFEU.  
 
The wording of the Treaty suggests that climate action is part of the ‘environmental policy’. 
The environmental policy received particular attention in the Treaties starting from the entry 
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into force of the Single European Act (1986) which introduced the idea of the Single Market. 
Some Member States were hesitant, as they feared that supranational environmental policies 
would result in the weakening of their own agendas in this area. However, the environmental 
powers were increasingly necessary and received significant attention in the ‘slipstream’ of 
trade policies425. The Union, or better the Community at that time, used the international 
attention for this topic from the Brundtlandt Commission and the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’ (1987) to become a part of the preparatory works for an international 
(UNFCCC) framework in 1992. It thus ‘quickly developed an external dimension’ 426 and 
‘considerably improved its leadership record’ since then.427  In parallel, the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) introduced the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaties.428 The international 
negotiations are clearly, ‘by reason of scale’, a shared competence area in which Member 
States are represented in UNFCCC separately, alongside the European Commission.    
 
The absence of a clear reference to ‘climate’ in the catalogue of competences and the multi-
faceted and all-encompassing international climate negotiations leave some room for (legal) 
arguments and manoeuvring. Some say that the policy field of environment and climate 
change constitutes a typical example of a shared pre-emptive competence within the sub-
classification of shared competences. 429 This implies that both EU and Member State actors 
may engage in diplomatic relations with third (state) partners and international organisations, 
as long as EU action does not lead to a pre-emption of Member State initiatives and the 
principle of sincere cooperation (see next paragraph) is taken into account. Some are even 
of the opinion that climate change could be regarded as an ‘exclusive’ competence of the 
Commission.430 The mere fact that  the Commission does not conduct the negotiations by 
itself makes the the latter claim  far-fetched. Delreux (2006:236) is probably right in holding 
that ‘In the field of EC external environmental policy, EC competences are ‘most of the time 
shared’431  and primarily mixed. This is evident from the signing of the climate agreements as 
a ‘mixed agreement’.  
 
The issue of competences in climate change negotiations could potentially spark political 
debate (and conflict). However, the interviews show that competences are not a primary 
issue during (internal and external) negotiations.432 This ‘silence on competences’ is 
especially the case after 2011, when a major conflict on external representation was 
solved.433 Sometimes competences would seem to be back on the table, especially when 
                                                     
425 Russo, E. (2017) ‘Towards an Exclusive Competence of the EU to Conclude Climate Agreements?’. European Foreign 
Affairs Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 203 even states that ‘before the entry into force of the Single European Act the European 
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427 Oberthür, S. and Roche Kelly, C. (2008) ‘EU leadership in international climate policy: achievements and challenges’. The 
International Spectator, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 35-50. 
428 Art 5(3) TEU. Cf section 2.3. 
429 However, one could argue that the EU’s legislative intervention is limited to minimum harmonization of environmental policy. 
Member States can lay down stricter legal norms to protect their public goods. Consequently, “the pre-emptive effect mentioned 
in Art. 4 (TFEU) does not actually take place, since the Member States can continue to legislate even in the domains covered by 
EU legislation, as long as they comply with the minimum norms laid down by the Union”, Cf Claes, M. and De Wite, B. (2016) 
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Institutional Law (Edward Elgar Publishing), p. 58. 
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there is an issue of giving ‘support’ to other (developing) countries by means of e.g. finance 
or capacity building, as these areas are not part of shared environmental competences.434  
The habit of leaving competences aside is consequently challenged every so often, but it is 
not a primary issue, and Member States and the EU work together ad-hoc in Team EU on 
the highly technical and complex UNFCCC texts. While some argue that the working 
arrangements with ‘issue leaders’ and ‘lead negotiators’ derive from the Treaty,435 they are 
so peculiar/specific for climate change that the legal origins are then not so clear anymore.   
5.4.3 Negotiation mandate and external representation 
While competences are not integral part of the internal discussion, the negotiation mandate 
for Team EU in climate negotiations could still be seen as the legal ‘elephant in the room’. 
The Treaty is quite clear about the division of responsibilities in external representation. 
Article 17(1) ensures that the European Commission is responsible for external 
representation, with the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
Council of the European Union and the Commission assisted by the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ‘shall ensure the consistency’ of EU’s 
foreign policies and ‘shall cooperate to that effect’.436 One would thus expect the following 
steps to be followed in the scenario of a mixed agreement: a Recommendation by the 
Commission, followed by a Council Decision with negotiating directives and then European 
Commission (and Member State) representation.  
 
The current ‘negotiation mandate’ , however, does not strictly adhere to the rationale of the 
Treaty and differs, as a matter of fact, from all other policy areas, as there is not even an 
explicit mandate, besides that for European Council conclusions where unanimity is required. 
The European Council conclusions and strategies then form the basis for meetings of the 
Council of Ministers, such as the Environment Council or ECOFIN (economic and financial 
affairs). The Council Working Group WPIEI plays a considerable role by leading negotiations. 
The most ‘atypical’ feature of ‘Team EU’ in climate negotiations is probably the important 
external role attributed to the six-month Presidency of the Council of the European Union. As 
a result, one of the smallest Member States, Luxembourg, was coordinating and 
representing the EU in bilateral meetings with e.g. China and the United States during 
COP21 in Paris, France. While the ‘pooling of expertise’ argument (see section 5.2) is indeed 
strong, there are also disadvantages related to this peculiar arrangement. For instance, the 
(European) Council conclusions, i.e. the so called the ‘negotiation mandate’, freely circulate 
after adoption, which makes it easier for third parties to negotiate with the EU. Some hold 
that the Copenhagen conference failed due to the ‘transparency’ of the EU negotiation 
mandate and differences among Member States.437 The peculiar negotiation mandate and 
the upgraded role of the Presidency are symptomatic of the fact that the rationale of the 
Treaty is not being followed. This may cause the use of infringement proceedings, which 
would logically start from the desks of the European Commission. However, infringement 
proceedings are often considered as politically risky, since they would lead to a standstill on 
the arrangement in question. 
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5.4.4 Court of Justice, regulations and directives: implied powers and the duty of sincere 
cooperation 
The judge of the use of competences and legal competences within the EU is the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. While the internal division of competences is delineated in 
the Treaty, the external competences are not clearly established therein. Such identification 
is therefore largely based on decades of (pre-Lisbon) case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. The Court favours the participation of the EU in international organisations 
as a way to exercise its competence, and the fluidity of competences in external relations 
has ‘provided a fertile field for ingenious legal argument’ over the interpretation of the 
Treaties.438 With regards to climate change negotiations, the case law is relevant in relation 
to at least three aspects: implied powers, the principle of loyal cooperation and mixed 
agreements. 
 
First, the case law on ‘implied powers’ provides that EU external competences exist because 
there are internal rules which form a legal basis to imply external competence.439 Given the 
large amount of regulatory climate (and energy) packages adopted in recent years, one 
could infer that the Commission has the competence to represent the Union and Member 
States more substantially than in UNFCCC negotiations. For instance, the 2030 Energy and 
Climate package created targets in three key areas to achieve the above-mentioned goals: 
(1) a 40% cut in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 levels; (2) at least a 27% 
share of renewable energy consumption and (3) at least 27% energy savings compared to 
the business-as-usual scenario.440    
 
Secondly, even when Member States are not excluded from acting on an individual basis in 
international organisations due to their ‘implied powers’, they are still not entirely free to act 
as they see fit, since they have obligations, stemming from EU Law, such as the principle of 
loyal cooperation.441 There is a feeling among Member State actors that they cannot ‘colour 
outside the lines’, as they have to work within the remit of Team EU in climate negotiations 
and cannot go below the level agreed in previous EU arrangements including the EU Climate 
and Energy Package.442 Accordingly, one could argue that they use the principle of loyal 
cooperation, although they do not directly refer to case-law, but more to the cooperation code 
of conduct in Team EU.  
 
The current procedure is definitely not following the logic of the Treaty and there are many 
reasons why a case could be initiated before the Court. However, the Commission may be of 
the opinion that the Member States in Team EU have so far been acting according to the 
principle of loyal cooperation and that the current (positive) cooperation in Team EU works 
better than the negative ‘checks’ of Member States in the WTO trade regime, where the EU 
has exclusive competences. Furthermore, climate change itself might be evaluated as too 
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treacherous and too prominent of a topic to start an infringement procedure when compared 
to ‘lighter’ topics such as mercury, where the Commission dared to bring the conflict to the 
Court of Justice.443  Alongside these legal reasons, there is the pragmatic argument that the 
procedure itself will take months of inter-service consultations. Despite having legally 
attributed competence to do so  both in the Treaty and in case law, as suggested before 
there are often ‘political’ reasons why the Commission (or Member State(s) and the Council) 
do not start infringement proceedings against the atypical institutional arrangement of Team 
EU in climate negotiations or the use of mixed agreement. These ‘political’ reasons are 
evaluated in the following section.  
5.5 Political issues and EU negotiation 
The Team EU climate change regime is different from what one would expect when looking 
at legal competences. Indeed, the absence of legal clarity may lead to (perceived) political 
flexibility. Therefore,  ‘political’ reasons might explain the conduct of EU and Member States 
negotiations at UNFCCC. As indicated before, the literature on actorness, cohesiveness and 
effectiveness points to intervening variables including the ‘supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance’, ‘preference heterogeneity’ and the ‘EU’s position in the 
international constellation of power’. These explanations have been tested in the twenty 
interviews. The section ends with an exploration of alternative explanations such as the 
influence of other societal actors (e.g. private sector, CSOs), the influence of politicians and 
the legal background of the negotiators.  
5.5.1 Supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
In the traditional institutional discussions between the Council and Commission the issue of 
competences and legal competences does not have a pivotal role, as indicated above. While 
many officials see the current state of play as ‘unique’ and ‘peculiar’, questioning the 
procedure from a legal perspective would be seen as a hostile act.444 The many preparatory 
meetings in the Council working group WPIEI are time-consuming and lead to internal 
political discussions and extensive position papers, especially before the COP. These 
positions are adopted as a result of the work of  lead negotiators and their institutional 
affiliation is, due to the ‘Team EU’ constellation, not questioned. The role of the Presidency 
within the Council is however difficult at times. However, the institutional ‘turf battles’ come 
together in Working Groups   as large Member States expect a Member State-oriented 
Presidency while the Commission expects the Presidency to coordinate and not to be too 
interfering on substantial and technical UNFCCC-related issues covered by DG CLIMA. 
Interviews show that during the negotiations an enormous ‘esprit de corps’ takes place and 
almost every meeting is attended by both Member State and Commission representatives 
working together, or to be more negative, checking one another.445 The European Parliament 
is less influential during the negotiations, as these are intergovernmental processes. 
However, in the preparatory phase the EP demands ambitious policies especially within the 
(leading) ENVI committee. 
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5.5.2 EU vs the rest of the world: the international negotiating environment 
As it has been held by Van Schaik (2013), among others, the international negotiating 
context plays a large role in the EU and Member State ‘Team EU’ conduct at international 
climate negotiations.446 This finding is consolidated by the interviews.447 In general, after 
Copenhagen, the EU and Member States can be considered a cohesive team from an 
external perspective, both before and during the negotiations. During the UNFCCC COP 
meetings, these external negotiations (with third states) are conducted mostly by lead 
negotiators, and at times in parallel by bilateral Member State-third country meetings. When 
the Ministers and Commissioners enter the final stages of negotiations, this process is 
sometimes a bit less structured, but they remain part of a unitary team. Since the introduction 
of the ‘Climate Diplomacy Action Plan’,448  the EEAS, Commission and Member States are 
coordinating their climate diplomacy in third countries in the preparatory phase. The EU and 
Member States have four general instruments they use to influence others: persuasion and 
diplomacy, issue linkage, financial assistance (aid) and trade benefits or (the threat of) trade 
measures and sanctions.449  
 
As argued by Oberthür and Groen (2015:1326), the EU adopted an overall centric, 
moderately conservative position (as compared to the outlier ambitious position in 
Copenhagen) which helped to team up with other countries.450 Nevertheless, the EU’s 
engagement with strategic partners seems to be driven by a preference for an ambitious 
international climate deal. The EU worked together with the ‘environmental integrity group’ 
(e.g. Mexico, Switzerland, Korea), Small Island and Developing States, (parts of) the 
Umbrella Group (e.g. New Zealand, United States), AILAC (Latin American countries) and (in 
Paris) the former colonies of EU Member States, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries to form a ‘High Ambition Coalition’.451 In spite of these coalitions, some argue that 
the China-United States climate statement was more influential than EU diplomacy as a 
reason why the Paris Agreement was adopted. The EU is the third largest emitter and is 
therefore less influential than these two countries. Moreover, critics argue that the EU has 
more difficulties with the topics of climate adaptation and finance issues/means of 
implementation than mitigation, which is making the cooperation with the G77 (developing 
countries) more difficult.452 Notwithstanding the fact that the EU played a role in the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, the upcoming challenge of large economies such as the United 
States weakening the global climate deal could change the international negotiating 
environment, testing EU unity.  
5.5.3 Preference heterogeneity 
As indicated by the existing literature, ‘preference heterogeneity’ – in the sense of (the 
absence of) aligning interests – is considered a primary cause of EU and Member State 
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449 Van Schaik, L. and Kamphof, R. (2015) ‘Now or never: using the EU’s trade power as leverage for a climate deal in Paris’. 
Clingendael Policy Brief, November 2015. 
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negotiation behaviour. The interviews portray an environment where there is a general 
convergence on the topic of climate change, especially on the necessity to tackle climate 
change internationally.453 On sub-issues, there are often one or two outliers, which makes it 
sometimes difficult to come to a unanimous decision. Most notably Poland had been critical 
about the (ambitious) EU position before COP21,454 but in the end ranks were closed during 
the negotiations. One of the often-used explanations for the general (external) tendency 
towards cooperation is that the EU itself has the most ambitious climate policies, which 
makes it in the interest of all EU Member States to aim for a global ambitious climate deal.  
 
While preference homogeneity was clear in the run-up to the negotiation of the Paris 
Agreement, there are at least two upcoming challenges. First, the new UNFCCC 
‘stocktake’455 monitoring and reporting mechanisms on mitigation, adaptation and finance will 
most likely encourage the EU and its Member States to upgrade their NDC ambitions in the 
coming years to contribute to the global goal to stay within the 1,5 to 2 degrees temperature 
rise. Secondly, Brexit might have an effect on EU unity. When compared to many other 
policy areas, the British were fairly positive about EU climate policies and diplomacy and 
contributed with ambitious policies and many seconded national experts.456 In addition, 
France and Germany were positive about EU action on this topic, but the balance might be 
shifted with a British exit from the EU. The question is whether the ‘unanimity’ requirement in 
this peculiar institutional arrangement would then not feel as a procedural milestone. 
Moreover, as indicated before, there is much more preference heterogeneity as well as 
procedural autonomy for Member States on related and more actual topics, such as climate 
finance, land-use, effort sharing and other means of implementation.  
5.5.4 Alternative explanations 
While the issues analysed above definitely affect EU and Member State cooperation in 
climate change negotiations alongside (or beyond) legal considerations, the interviews t 
raised some additional factors   . This section considers three of these factors.457 First, as 
indicated in the literature there are many ‘other societal stakeholders’ that have been active 
in climate negotiations and EU decision-making and diplomacy in general. Among these, it is 
particularly relevant to mention private sector organisations and companies458, Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) and local authorities459. Many interviews indeed stress the growing 
importance of these stakeholders for example since the 2014 Lima Paris Action Agenda460 or 
the large ‘parallel’ process of the ‘Open Tent Zone’ in which companies, CSOs and 
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governments present their climate commitments and deliverables. Nevertheless, while this 
process helps to raise ambitions and awareness, the real UNFCCC negotiations still keep 
being an intergovernmental process following the UNFCCC rulebook.461  
 
Secondly, the role of politicians becomes important especially during the UNFCCC COP 
negotiations. The Heads of State and their overwhelming presence during the negotiations in 
Copenhagen has been pinpointed as one of the explanations for its failure.462 ‘Team EU’ has 
been falling apart despite a common negotiation mandate. In Paris (2015), the Heads of 
State were not active during the last days of the conference, but were instead mostly 
represented by environment ministers, aspect that to some has contributed to the result. 
There is considerable debate as to whether foreign affairs ministers and finance ministers 
could conduct the climate negotiations, but the practice is that environment ministers (and 
‘climate change’ Commissioners) still take the lead during COP negotiations. The 
involvement of politicians in the final phase of the negotiations could explain why less 
attention is paid to legal processes.   
 
Thirdly, while DG CLIMA is in the lead for the UNFCCC negotiations, other DGs are also 
interested and present. Additionally, Member States’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministries of the Environment are active in UNFCCC negotiations. Interestingly, finance 
ministers and finance ministries are absent. These findings point to some divergence 
between the DGs/ministries, which seems to be more relevant than the preference 
heterogeneity between EU and Member States.463 
5.6 Conclusion/Discussion 
The main question addressed in this chapter has been the following: How do legal 
competences affect EU and Member State coordination in negotiations at the UNFCCC? As 
the objective of this study is to combine political and legal perspectives, the effect stemming 
from the division of legal competences is compared with recurrent ‘political’ issues, such as 
the ‘supranational versus intergovernmental dominance’, the EU’s position within the 
international constellation of power and preference heterogeneity. This research is 
substantiated by a combination on the one hand of a review and analysis of literature, case 
law, legislation and additional policy documents and, on the other hand, of twenty semi-
structured interviews with primarily EU and Member State officials at ranks ranging from 
(former) Ministers, lead negotiators and Heads of Delegation to policy officers and support 
staff. In addition, some other stakeholders were interviewed to add an external 
perspective.464 The study focuses on the period from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
(December 2009) to July 2017 including important UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) such as Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015). 
 
The coordination of the EU and Member State actors can be seen as a process of 
‘socialisation’. Team EU works a way that means that Member State officials are ‘socialised’ 
in a European manner due to the structure of cooperation with ‘lead negotiators’ and ‘issue 
leaders’. This specific coordination is however not what one would expect on the basis of 
legal competences. The Treaties’ division of competences would make one expect a large 
                                                     
461 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017.  
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463 Interview EU official, 14-10-2015, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017.  
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coordinating role for the European Commission in mixed competence external climate 
negotiations. However, the ‘Team EU’ approach in climate negotiations portrays a different 
picture that is contrary to the logic of the Treaty in multiple aspects. These include the 
disproportionate external relations impact of the six-month Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, the peculiar ‘negotiation mandate’ based on (unanimous) Council 
conclusions, as well as the inadequate use of ‘implied powers’ in external representation, or 
limited external impacts of internal policies and legislation, contradictory to ERTA case law. 
There are thus ample grounds to start legal procedures against the current unique but 
unwieldy institutional arrangement of ‘Team EU’ in international climate change negotiations. 
Despite the procedural arrangements that have the tendency to contravene legal practice 
and principles, ‘political’ considerations prevail allow these practices to continue the ‘high 
politics’ arena of climate action. The explanations often offered in other studies indeed could 
explain this situation. The institutional ‘turf battles’ seem to be restricted to the (internal) 
negotiation phase before the mass COP negotiations start. Further, within the international 
negotiating environment, the EU and its Member States have a fairly convergent preference 
for binding international climate deals on mitigation. The (legal) ‘duty of loyal cooperation’ 
has been mostly used in the conduct of international negotiations from 2011 and there is a 
modus vivendi not to discuss internal legal competences alongside the already very complex 
technical substantive UNFCCC texts. 465 The effect of the variables and explanations is 
visualised below in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5. 1 Variables and effects on ‘Team EU’ coordination in UNFCCC negotiations 
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With the adoption and ratification of the Paris Agreement there are many upcoming 
challenges that could spark the legal and political debate whether it is not more effective, 
efficient and closer to the  Treaty logic and case law to grant the Commission a bigger role  
in this field. These upcoming challenges might change the status quo of the political factors 
that are now supportive of the Team EU process. These challenges include the upcoming 
UNFCCC ‘global stocktake’ of climate pledges, which most likely encourages the EU and 
Member States to raise their ambition on mitigation, adaptation and finance. Other 
challenges constitute the announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by the United 
States, which will likely change the international negotiating environment and probably 
affects internal EU unity. Furthermore, the British exit from the EU might have considerable 
effect on ‘Team EU’, due the UK’s disproportionate input of expertise and the (almost unique) 
substantive convergence with other leading Member States on this specific topic. This 
balance of power might change with a British exit. Furthermore, the ‘post-ratification’ issues 
such as climate finance, effort sharing, energy mix and financial aid are more in the 
discretionary autonomy of the Member States than earlier top priorities like climate change 
mitigation, where the EU and Member States have a track record of collective goal-setting. 
That might affect the legal competence discussions in the future. 
Further research 
 
The results from this study can only be valued as ‘plausibility probes’ due to the experimental 
and pioneering nature of a combined legal-political study and the amount of semi-structured 
interviews. In that way this study provides interesting avenues for future research as it is 
acknowledged that the results and methodology needs further testing in other cases to 
become more robust.466 As indicated, climate change negotiations are unique in the UN 
structure and the ‘Team EU’ approach with the large role of the Presidency is distinct from 
the approaches in other policy areas where the EU and Member States work together.467 The 
officials and experts working on UNFCCC issues are rather isolated from other issues, 
working predominantly on climate action for at least five to ten years.468 As such, this method 
could nevertheless be extrapolated to other policy areas. The idea of assessing the effect of 
the legal competences and to compare that with (other) ‘political’ factors such as (the 
absence of) institutional turf battles, the EU’s position in the international constellation of 
power and preference heterogeneity could indeed lead to relevant cross-disciplinary findings 
that are largely absent in the literature.  
 
With regards to the methodology, one could use other tools like surveys to assess the effect 
of legal competences. In addition, it could help to better integrate the ‘external/international’ 
dimension  by involving officials from ‘third countries’ and discovering how they perceive the 
EU and the Member States’ behaviour in ‘Team EU’ negotiations.469 EU climate diplomacy 
currently appears to be dominated by ‘inward-looking’ scholars focused on internal EU 
procedures and rules. Delreux (2006) rightly states that “key to understand the negotiation 
                                                     
466 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
467 Interview MS official, 13-6-2017. 
468 Interview EU official, 31-5-2017, Interview MS official, 14-6-2017. 
469 Cf Parker, C. F., Karlsson, C. and Hjerpe, M. (2017) ‘Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from 
Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement’. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 239-252. This survey “was principally 
focused on obtaining a strategic sample of the two largest and most important categories of COP participants, namely members 
of party delegations, such as negotiators and representatives of government agencies, and NGO representatives and 
researchers” to understand  whether the EU was being perceived as a leader in climate change negotiations, p. 243. 
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behaviour of the EU on the international environmental scene is the domestic (EU) decision-
making process’.470 However, views and preferences of third parties such as BRICS or other 
Regional Integration Organisations might reveal relevant insights into the actual effects of EU 
and Member State negotiation behaviour during climate change negotiations.  
 
In addition, one could conduct a more thorough assessment of other explaining factors that 
this study mentioned. The increasing standing of other societal stakeholders including the 
private sector, CSOs and local authorities is apparent during the UNFCCC COPs, but the 
effect on the traditional intergovernmental process, especially since the Paris Agreement and 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is still under-theorised. Apart from this, the 
background of negotiators themselves might have an effect on the relevance of legal 
competences, as one would expect more attention to be paid to the division of competences 
by legally trained experts from federal Member States. One could in addition study the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which seems to have garnered more thematic 
expertise after the adoption of the Global Strategy in 2016. Furthermore,  ‘high politics’ 
events such as Trump’s announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the upcoming 
Brexit and President Juncker’s “Scenarios on the Future of Europe”471 might have a 
considerable impact, but it is most likely too early to investigate these  issues. 
 
SUMMARY CHAPTER 5 
The chapter identified how the allocation of competences, i.e. legal competences, affect EU 
and Member State actors in international UNFCCC climate change negotiations. This study, 
based on the review of documents, case law and twenty semi-structured interviews finds that 
the ‘Team EU’ approach in climate change negotiations does  not coincide with the logic of 
the Treaty and the Court’s case law in many aspects. The large role of the Presidency, a 
‘negotiation mandate’ based on unanimous Council conclusions, and inadequate parallel 
external powers when compared to internal competences for the European Commission give 
the impression that legal competences are considered less important and that the Treaty and 
the Court’s case law is often not used. In contrast, the UN legal context and UNFCCC 
statutes are having a strong effect on coordination alongside issues often-cited in the 
literature such as the EU’s position in the international constellation of power and 
socialisation (here identified as part of the dependent variable, coordination). The 
Commission seems hesitant to criticise the current coordination process, because of the 
importance of unified EU external action on climate change for the EU’s future. However, 
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decision-making process’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 232. 






Chapter 6: EU and Member State Implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 and Sustainable Development Goals 
6.1 Introduction472 
“Our intention is to make the implementation of the SDGs a team effort” (First Vice-
President Timmermans, European Commission, 10 May 2016)473 
With the new United Nations Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, the EU and its 
Member States are asked to evaluate their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dimensions and work 
towards reaching 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 at the latest.474 The 
EU is ‘fully committed to be a frontrunner in implementing the SDGs according to its recent 
Communication ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future’.475 As indicated by the 
European Commission itself “ultimately, sustainable development is an issue of 
governance”.476  This highlights the importance of evaluating implementation of the Agenda 
2030 by both the EU and Member States, as implementation is a ‘shared responsibility’.477 
With an absence of legally binding targets at UN level, it seems as if the actual 
implementation of the Agenda 2030 is a ‘political choice’ at EU and Member State level.478 
Research on the ‘governance’ of sustainable development policies by the Union tended to 
focus on concepts such as (in)coherence and means of evaluating negotiation structures, 
e.g. the EU in international climate change (UNFCCC) negotiations.479 In that sense, the 
implementation of international agreements is often examined. Moreover, the issue is of 
implementation is often not viewed from a combined political-legal perspective. This is 
problematic as the delicate (political) discussions about the (legal) division of competences is 
one of the often quoted difficulties that is hindering coordination, thereby specially focusing 
on either the issue of ‘creeping competences’ by the Commission480 or instead the absence 
of a logical single coordination point that the European Commission could provide. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is extremely difficult to change the division of competences, it 
is nevertheless essential to elaborate on its effects in (empirical) practice.  
                                                     
472 An amended version of this chapter has been published as UNU-CRIS Working Paper, cf Kamphof, R. (2018) ‘EU and 
Member State Implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals’. UNU-CRIS Working Paper, W-
2018/1.   
473 European Commission (2016) Statement - Remarks by First Vice-President Timmermans – European Parliament Plenary 
Debate 10 May 2016 – Follow-up and State of Play of the Agenda 2030 and Sustainable Development Goals. Accessed via 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/timmermans/announcements/remarks-first-vice-president-
timmermans-european-parliament-plenary-debate-10-may-2016-follow-and_en. At 14 August 2017.  
474 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017. 
475 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM(2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016. 
476 Ibid, p. 14. 
477 Council of the European Union (2017), A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development - Council conclusions, 10370/17, 20 June 2017, para 11 and 24. This ‘shared responsibility’ also addresses “sub 
national governments and public administrations at all levels, the private sector and investors, social partners, scientific 
community and civil society organisations (CSOs)” (ibid, para 24). 
478 Kamphof, R. and Spitz, G. repr Kaleidos Research (2016) Ready to change? European actors and their challenges and 
opportunities of the 2030 Agenda, in Partos, FMS, Woord en Daad (2016, eds) Ready for Change: global goals at home and 
abroad, Ready for Change, May 2016, retrieved from 
https://www.partos.nl/fileadmin/files/Documents/Partos_RFC_Publication_May_2016.pdf. 
479 Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: 
Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1319-
1335.  Niemann, A. and Bretherton, C. (2013) ‘EU external policy at the crossroads: the challenge of actorness and 
effectiveness’. International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 261-275 and Vogler, J. (1999) ‘The European Union as an actor in 
international environmental politics’. Environmental Politics, Vol. 8. No. 3, pp. 24-48. 
480 Pollack, M. A. (2000) ‘The end of creeping competence? EU policymaking since Maastricht’. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 519-538. 
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There have been few investigations with regards to the political effects of legal competences, 
let alone for sustainable development policies and implementation of international 
agreements.  As a result, little is known about the political effects of the mixed competences 
and the relationship between legal competences and EU and Member State coordination on 
sustainable development policies is under-theorised.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the influence of legal competences and see this in interaction with (other) 
intervening variables. The objective is to see how legal competences interact with other 
issues often analysed in the literature, and operationalised as ‘intervening variables’. To 
achieve this goal, this study makes use of a step-by-step process tracing approach revising 
Treaty articles, official policy documents, the UN legal context, cases before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, as well as academic literature. The qualitative part of this 
study relies primarily on sixteen semi-structured interviews with EU and Member State 
officials, (former) ministers, Members of the (European/national) Parliament, Civil Society 
Organisations, as well as experts (see Table 6.1 and appendix). The findings are brought 
together through triangulation. The process tracing approach leads to an overall assessment 
of the potential influence of legal competences, of the interaction with/autonomy from other 
intervening variables and other explanations for this specific case. 
Category No of interviews 
EU official 8 
Member State official 4 
Other societal stakeholder 4 
Table 6. 1 No of semi-structured interviews for case study SDG implementation 
The main question addressed in this chapter is the following: How do legal competences 
affect EU and Member State coordination in implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and the 
SDGs?  From the outset, it was expected that the division of competences would enable the 
European Commission in its coordination efforts. However, as this chapter will show, the 
effects are much more nuanced and the ‘political’ factors are much more powerful than one 
would have expected. The effect of the legal competences (independent variables) is 
compared and assessed together with recurrent issues such as  supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
and preference heterogeneity (‘intervening variables’). This chapter also addresses ‘other 
explanations’ that were raised during the semi-structured interviews; these could either 
hinder or enable EU and Member State coordination efforts to implement the UN Agenda 
2030 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. 
The outline of this chapter is the following. Section 6.2 describes the negotiation of the UN 
2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals more extensively and from an EU 
perspective. The following section (6.3) describes the coordination of implementation plans 
within the EU and Member States. Section 6.4 assesses then the effects of legal 
competences, including the (broad) division of competences, the relevant Court’s case law 
and the UN (soft) legal context. Thereafter, section 6.5 assesses the effect of additional 
intervening variables that have been raised in the semi-structured interviews and compares 
them with what the legal division of competences would prescribe. ‘Other explanations’ 
identified in the interviews are equally discussed in the fourth section. In the final section 
(discussion), it is evaluated whether the EU and its Member States are indeed legally 
enabled or restrained by the legal competences or whether ‘political’ issues play a more 
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prominent role. However exploratory, this study may offer some insights to develop a larger 
interdisciplinary ‘assessment framework’ on sustainable development issues, especially with 
regards to the implementation of international sustainability agreements.481  
6.2 UN Agenda 2030, Sustainable Development Goals and EU negotiation 
The United Nations document ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development’ was adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit on the 25th of 
September 2015.482 The EU and its Member States have played an active role during the 
negotiation phase of the Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), which 
lasted roughly from 2012 (Rio+20) to  2015. After the adoption, the EU and its Member 
States started to implement the Agenda. The timeframe starts with the process of negotiation 
2012 to the implementation phase from September 2015 until July 2017 with a focus on the 
implementation phase. This section will describe the process of negotiation and 
implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 with a specific focus on the EU institutions and the 
Member States. 
6.2.1 Negotiating the Agenda 2030 
During the negotiation of the Agenda 2030, the formal leading role within the European 
Commission was with DG ENV (environment) and DG DEVCO (development). This was a 
logical combination, as the ‘post-2015’ process leading to the Agenda 2030 combines the 
previously separated Rio+20 process on the environment and the Millennium Development 
Goals.483 The process in the Open Working Group has been open, inclusive and 
participatory, but also demanding in its coordination. Colombia proposed a new form of 
negotiations in 2012 in which there were only seventy seats and countries should cooperate 
in ‘troikas’.  As a result, EU Member States were divided in troikas together with countries 
that are not part of the European Union. For example, France and Germany worked together 
with Switzerland, while the United Kingdom and The Netherlands formed a team with 
Australia. This process has been set up to avoid regional bloc negotiations, as these had 
hindered some UN processes in the past. 
The EU Member States coordinated their position in a Joint working group of the Council, 
combining three groups: the Working Party on International Environment Issues (WPIEI), the 
Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV) and the United Nations Working Party 
(CONUN).484 The European External Action Service has assisted this joint working group and 
the European Commission has been part of the negotiations.  During the negotiation phase, 
three Communications were adopted. Firstly, the Communication called ‘a decent life for all’ 
                                                     
481 For negotiation cf Kamphof, R., and Wessel, R.A. (2018) ‘Analysing shared competences in EU external action: the case for 
a politico-legal framework’. Europe and the World: A law review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 38-64. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2018.02. Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's 
Performance in International Institutions: Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1319-1335 and Kleistra, Y. and van Willigen, N. (2014). ‘Evaluating the Impact of EU 
Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges.’ In Koops, J.A. and Macaj, G. (eds) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 52-69. 
482 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017. 
483 Griggs, D., Stafford-Smith, M., Gaffney, O., Rockström, J., Öhman, M. C., Shyamsundar, P., ... and Noble, I. (2013) ‘Policy: 
Sustainable development goals for people and planet’. Nature, Vol. 495, No. 7441, pp. 305-307. Interview EU official, 31-5-
2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
484 Coreper decided on 30 November 2017 to set up a specific Working Party on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
which will report to Coreper II and the General Affairs Council. The specific Agenda 2030 working party has been installed after 
the analysis conducted for this dissertation and has not been part of the study. 
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(2013), integrating poverty eradication and sustainable development.485 This was followed by 
a 2014 communication outlining the EU and Member States vision of what a ‘post-2015’ 
agenda could look like. The EU proposed a ‘universal’ and ‘transformative’ agenda and 
indicated potential targets and priority areas.486 The third and last Communication was 
released in February 2015 following Council conclusions in December 2014. This 
Communication was not only about the Sustainable Development Goals but also prepared 
the related Financing for Development conference, which was then held in Addis Ababa in 
July 2015.487  
The interviews portrayed a picture of overall EU unity despite the difficult coordination 
process.488 Especially in the last months of the negotiations, Vice President Timmermans, 
responsible for sustainable development, kept a closer eye on the negotiations. Despite that, 
the actual lead within the Commission stayed with DG ENV and DG DEVCO.489 With regards 
to Member States, on some topics one to two ‘outliers’ could use their ‘troika’ coordination 
structure to work more autonomously. However, the internal process of working together in a 
joint working group and delivering annual Communications have led to a communal effort.490 
Moreover, the EU position as outlined in the Communications has had a large influence on 
the result of the Agenda 2030. The ‘integrated’ notions of poverty eradication and sustainable 
development feature prominently in the Agenda, as well as notions such as ‘transformation’ 
and ‘universality’. While the EU has not been fully supportive of the number of goals, (17 
goals have been called ‘too many’ according to multiple interviews), the EU supported a 
comprehensive agenda from the start. The EU has however been less positive about the 
‘soft’ monitoring and review mechanism of the High Level Political Forum.  
6.2.2 The Agenda 2030 and 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
The new United Nations Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development was adopted on 25 
September 2015 and has transformed the global development agenda from a North-South 
agenda to a universal/ Global one. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to 
eradicate poverty, fix climate change, and reduce inequality. The 17 SDGs (see Table 6.2) 
are interrelated and require action both in the EU and its Member States, as well as in 
developing countries. Compared to their predecessors, i.e. the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs, 2001-2015), the ‘2030 agenda’ (2016-2030) is a ‘universal’ agenda for various 
actors worldwide and devotes attention to global public goods such as energy access, 
resilient infrastructure, sustainable use of oceans, and inclusive economic growth.491 
Sustainability and security are given a prominent place, alongside the traditional poverty 
reduction targets that were already part of the MDGs. Moreover, both the Global South and 
the Global North are expected to contribute. Being the agenda fairly ambitious , with 17 
‘goals’ and 169 ‘targets’, both the implementation and the financing of the SDGs will be 
                                                     
485 European Commission (2013) ‘A decent life for all: Ending poverty and giving the world a sustainable future’, COM(2013) 92 
final, 27.2.2013. 
486 European Commission (2014) ‘a decent life for all: from vision to collective action’, COM(2014) 335 final, Brussels, 2.6.2014. 
487 European Commission (2015) ‘A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015’, 
COM(2015) 44 final, Brussels, 5.2.2015. 
488 Interview EU official, 31-5-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
489 Interview EU official, 31-5-2017, Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. 
490 Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
491 United Nations (2014). The road to dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet. 




complex, for developed and developing countries.492 This level of ambition is so high that 
even in a highly developed country like Sweden over 75 percent of the ‘non-development 
cooperation’ targets require at least some work.493 
Leaders from all parts of the European society have shown support for the new agenda. The 
prominent delegation to the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 2015 
included the Vice-President of the European Commission and many Heads of State. ‘SDG 
advocates’ include prominent European figures like HM Queen Mathilde (Belgium), Mr Paul 
Polman (CEO Unilever), Her Royal Highness Crown Princess Victoria of Sweden. In the UN 
2030 Agenda for sustainable development it is acknowledged that regional frameworks, such 
as the EU, ‘can facilitate the effective translation of sustainable development policies into 
concrete actions at national level’ (para 21), but that each country has ‘primary responsibility 
for its own economic and social development’ (para 41). Remarkably, the EU did not have an 
implementation strategy when the Agenda 2030 was adopted.  
6.3 EU coordination of SDG implementation 
Coordination is defined in this dissertation as the process of contacts between diplomats and 
officials from EU institutions (especially the European Commission) and Member States with 
the purpose of discussing an issue of common interest, and working towards a common 
position. These coordination processes can be internal (within the EU) or external 
(international), and they include the discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination.  
The coordination of the implementation of the Agenda 2030 starts from the adoption of the 
SDGs in September 2015. Almost fourteen months after the adoption of the UN Agenda 
2030, the European Commission presented its implementation strategy in the 
Communication ‘next steps for a Sustainable European future’ dated 22 November 2016.494 
This Communication has been presented together with the renewed European Consensus 
on Development.495 In the meantime, the European External Action Service presented the 
Global Strategy in June 2016, which touches upon the issues of the UN Agenda 2030 and 
the Sustainable Development Goals, but only refers to it in some parts of the Strategy.496  
In its Communication on the implementation of the Agenda, the European Commission 
shares its commitments on the goals and targets. The Commission foresees two ‘working 
streams’. The first working stream is to evaluate the current situation and identify concerns 
linked to sustainability, aiming to embed the SDGs into a European policy framework and 
among the Commission’s priorities. The second work stream goes beyond the 2020 
perspective and prepares a ‘long term implementation of SDGs’.497 As such, the first working 
stream relates to the ten priorities of the current College of Commissioners chaired by 
                                                     
492 Kamphof, R., Spitz, G. and Boonstoppel, E. (2015). Financing development now and in the future: Implications for the 
Netherlands and beyond. Amsterdam: Kaleidos Research/Stichting NCDO. Retrieved from 
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a National Agenda’. Stockholm Environment Institute Working Paper no 2015-10. 
494 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM(2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016. 
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President Juncker (2014-2019),498 and many other strategies and frameworks that have 2020 
as a deadline, e.g. the Europe 2020 Strategy499 and the Multiannual Financial Framework 
2014-2020500.  
Interestingly, the coordination of the Agenda 2030 is in the hands of the Secretariat-General 
and there is close coordination with (the Team of) the Vice President of the European 
Commission, Mr Frans Timmermans. The team responsible for the EU coordination in the 
Secretariat-General has had previous experience on economic issues including the 
European Semester. There is an informal structure composed by 20 Commissioners that had 
six informal meetings on the political implications of the Agenda 2030. The coordination 
involves not only DG ENV and DG DEVCO, who have been involved in the negotiation of the 
Agenda, but also DGs such as DG Trade, DG GROW and DG SANTE.501  
Without a specific EU implementation strategy and action plan, at least before November 
2016, EU Member States started implementation by themselves. This proved to be a ‘mixed 
record’ with some forerunners like Sweden, Finland and Germany and some Member States 
that have not even started the implementation. Nevertheless, by July 2017 fourteen EU 
Member States presented their action plans to the UN High Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development.502 Some Member States have a similar ‘centralised’ structure to 
the one of the European Commission, meaning that coordination happens at the Prime 
Ministers’ office level. Other Member States have coordinating structures from their ministries 
of Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation or Environment.503 The Member States have 
been critically following the coordination of the Commission and stated that they miss a ‘gap 
analysis’ in the Communication, in which the Commission should indicate what is currently 
missing in the implementation.504 
The Presidencies have not been very active in encouraging collective implementation of the 
Agenda 2030.505 Remarkably, the Heads of State in the European Council have not made 
any reference to the Agenda 2030 in their Conclusions until 22 June 2017, almost two years 
after adoption of the Agenda.506 The European Parliament has been quiet too, despite a 
critical report by the ENVI rapporteur (Seb Dance).507 Traditionally, the Agenda is primarily 
discussed in committees such as DEVE (development) and ENVI (environment). A more 
combined structure is currently absent. Within the Council, the joint working group of WPIEI, 
CONUN and CODEV is still active.   
                                                     
498 European Commission (2015) ‘Ten priorities for Europe: A new start for Europe:an EU agenda for jobs, growth, fairness and 
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499 European Commission (2010) ‘EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, COM(2010) 2020, 
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The ‘socialisation’ through which Member State officials adopt a European orientation due to 
the process of coordination. Strong socialisation is not identified in this specific case study 
due to different reasons. Firstly, the EU and Member State negotiators were mostly from DG 
ENV and DG DEVCO, and national development, foreign affairs and environment ministries. 
However, in the ‘implementation’ phase (also) other actors lead the coordination, and 
‘internal’ EU and Member State action is needed alongside external action/foreign affairs. 
The Council still makes use of the same joint working group (WPIEI, CONUN and CODEV) 
as in the negotiations, but there are many differences for example in the European 
Commission, where the Secretariat-General is in the lead. Therefore, concepts like 
‘adaptation’ or ‘adjustment’, rather than ‘socialisation’, seem to better describe the result of 
the coordination process to implement the UN Agenda 2030.  
6.4 The division of competences, legal issues and EU implementation 
The UN Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs are not considered as ‘legally binding’. 
Nevertheless, in an ‘ever closer union’ the EU and its Member States share competences on 
nearly every issue of European political life. How does this division of competences affect the 
implementation of the Agenda 2030 in the EU and its Member States? This section deals 
with the legal issues within the EU, but starts with the ‘soft’ targets of the United Nations 
Agenda 2030 in a UN legal context.  
6.4.1 UN legal documents and Statutes: soft targets 
The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is not a legally binding document. The 
countries that have adopted the Agenda are expected to take ownership and establish a 
national framework to achieve the 17 Goals. Therefore, “implementation and success will rely 
on countries’ own sustainable development policies, plans and programmes”.508 Regional 
frameworks such as the EU ‘can facilitate the effective translation of sustainable 
development policies into concrete actions at national level’.509  Nevertheless, the primary 
responsibility of implementation would seem to remain at the Member State level, as the UN 
is an intergovernmental system. 
The Sustainable Development Goals are not only ‘soft’ in the sense of being  non-legally 
binding. The monitoring and review mechanisms are also ‘soft’, being constituted by a UN 
High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) where countries can present 
their plans. This HLPF has many similarities with the above mentioned UN ‘Commission on 
Sustainable Development’ (CSD) in the Rio framework. CSD was established in 1993 as a 
functional commission under the UN Economic and Social Council in the aftermath of the UN 
Earth summit held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. The Commission was relatively weak; the 
implementation ‘had been unsatisfying’,510 and has not, for example, ‘enhanced, brokered, 
catalysed or ‘orchestrated’ collaborative partnerships’.511 Despite these shortcomings, the 
HLPF functions in a similar manner. The EU and Member States had argued for a more 
effective and stringent review mechanism in the negotiation phase, but lost this battle.  
                                                     
508 United Nations website http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/. 
509 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017, para 21. 
510 Bäckstrand, K and Kylsäter, M. (2014) ‘Old wine in new bottles? The legitimation and delegitimation of UN public–private 
partnerships for sustainable development from the Johannesburg Summit to the Rio+ 20 Summit’. Globalizations, Vol. 11, No. 3, 
p. 338. 
511 Ibid, p. 337. 
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Despite their soft legal character, the SDGs are the result of an inclusive global process 
during which many actors and citizens were consulted, especially when compared to the 
Millennium Development Goals.512 It is a structured, universal and almost all-encompassing 
global framework. While the UN speaks of ‘national ownership’ and ‘not legally binding’ 
targets, this may have a  stronger legal bearing within the EU and Member State actors, as a 
result of the EU’s commitments to sustainable development set out in the Treaty, the division 
of competences, as well as the far-reaching Court’s case law. The remainder of the section 
will deal with the legal arguments from the perspective of the EU, rather than of the UN. . 
6.4.2 SDGs and EU competences (Lisbon Treaty) 
The UN Agenda 2030 is a broad framework encompassing many policy areas. Given the 
‘universal’ bearing of the Agenda, the EU and its Member States are expected to achieve its 
goals both in developing countries, as well as ‘at home’. The EU has the ambition of 
‘effective multilateralism’.513 Moreover, the Treaty explicitly refers to the UN system in Art 
21(1) TEU, providing that: “The Union (..) shall promote multilateral solutions to common 
problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations”. Therefore, it is vital to check 
whether and how the SDGs are linked to the catalogue of competences of the EU as clearly 
set out and categorised in the Lisbon Treaty.  
Table 6.2, compiled by the author, gives an overview of all 17 SDGs, the main policy areas to 
which these are connected, what this means for EU competence on the specific policy area 
and where more information can be found within the Treaties. As it was demonstrated, it 
seems a right choice to bring the level of coordination to a ‘higher’ level in the Secretariat-
General and in the Prime Ministers’ offices in (some) EU Member States. The Agenda is 
extremely broad in policy areas, and competences differ per SDG from ‘no competence’ 
(SDG 11: sustainable cities and communities) to ‘CFSP-type competence’ (SDG 16: peace, 
justice and strong institutions) to ‘supportive competence’ (e.g. SDG3 Good Health and well-
being’), ‘shared competence’ (e.g. SDG15 life on land) and ‘exclusive competence’ (e.g. 
SDG14 life below water). The EU implementation strategy needs to reflect these differences 
in competences and it needs a credible ‘arbiter’ in coordination.   
Sustainable 
Development Goal 
Main policy area  EU competence? Treaty provision 





the exercise of EU 
competence ‘shall 





Art 4(4) TFEU. 
See also Art 3(5) 
TEU, Art 21(2)d) 
TEU, Art 208(1) 
TFEU 
                                                     
512 Brolan, C. E., Lee, S., Kim, D. and Hill, P. S. (2014) ‘Back to the future: what would the post-2015 global development goals 
look like if we replicated methods used to construct the Millennium Development Goals?’. Globalization and Health, Vol. 10, No. 
1, 19, p. 7. 




2. Zero hunger Agriculture Shared 
competence 
Art 4(2) TFEU. 
See also Art 38-44 
TFEU. 







Art 6(a) TFEU. 
(See also Art 
4(2)k) TFEU and 
168 TFEU. 
4. Quality education Education Supportive 
competence 
Art 6(e) TFEU. See 
also Art 165-166 
TFEU. 
5. Gender equality Social policy Shared 
competence 
Art 4(2)b) TFEU. 
See also Art 5 
TFEU, Art 8 TFEU, 
Art 151-161 TFEU. 




Art 4(2)e) TFEU. 
See also Art 191-
193 TFEU. 




Art 4(2)i) TFEU, 
see also Art 194 
TFEU, Art 122(1) 
TFEU. 
8. Decent work and 
economic growth 
Employment Coordination Art 5(2) TFEU. 
See also Art 145-
150 TFEU, Art 











(but the exercise of 
EU competence for 
technological 
development ‘in 




the exercise of that 
competence shall 






Art 4(2)h) TFEU 
and Art 4(3) TFEU 
and Art 6(b) TFEU. 
See also Art 173 











the exercise of EU 
competence ‘shall 





Art 4(4) TFEU, See 
also Art 8 TFEU, 
art 208 TFEU. 
11. Sustainable cities 
and communities 
Urban policy No EU 
competence 














Art 3(1)b) TFEU 
and Art 4(2)a) 
TFEU. See also 
Art 32 TFEU and 
Art 101 TFEU. 
13. Climate action Environment Shared 
competence 
Art 191(1) TFEU 
(no explicit 
indication ‘climate 
change’ in Art 4 
TFEU) 










Art 3(1)d) TFEU 
and Art 4(2)d) 
TFEU. See also 
Art 38 TFEU.  
15. Life on land Environment Shared 
competence 
Art 4(2)e) TFEU. 
See also Art 191-
193 TFEU. 




and Security Policy 
CFSP-type 
competence 
See e.g. Art 275 
TFEU: The Court 
of Justice of the 
European Union 
shall not have 
jurisdiction with 
See also Art 2(4) 
TFEU, Art 218(6) 
TFEU, Art 17(1) 
TEU, Art 18(2) 




respect to the 
provisions 
relating to the 
common foreign 
and security policy 










the exercise of EU 
competence ‘shall 





Art 4(4) TFEU, See 
also Art 8 TFEU, 
art 208 TFEU. 
Table 6. 2 Sustainable Development Goals and EU competences514 
The interviews show that there is almost a ‘reversed subsidiarity’ reflex, as Member States 
do not necessarily agree with exclusive EU competence, while at the same time feeling that 
the EU is the best coordinator, given its extensive policy and legislative framework.515 This 
does not necessarily stem from the division of competences, as many feel that ‘shared 
competence’ green policy areas, such as environment and climate, would qualify for this 
reversed subsidiarity, while other shared competences, including social areas, transport and 
agriculture, do not qualify.516 This is an important subsidiarity-related finding especially due to 
the legalistic, bureaucratic ‘culture’ within the EU institutions. Especially the Commission, 
where there is a more top-down idea of competences as described by the Treaty which 
defines the boundaries of one’s work. The broad field of  sustainable development, combined 
with a ‘new’ universal agenda and Treaty-based action, makes it however difficult for the 
European Commission to play its coordinating role . This may be one of the legal reasons 
restraining the Commission from acting more extensively on the SDGs.    
6.4.3 Regulations and directives 
Being the SDGs soft legal instruments, and as such not legally binding, some turn to more 
stringent EU regulations and directives as instruments to achieve  the targets set out in the 
UN Agenda.517 Nevertheless, the approach chosen by the Commission is  to ‘motivate’ EU 
Member States to contribute to the SDGs, rather than to threaten the use of infringement 
procedures.518 The large amount of internal regulations and directives in the single market as 
                                                     
514 Systematic compilation by the author. The main policy area has been assigned based on the text in the UN Agenda 2030 for 
Sustainable Development and compared with the policy areas as indicated in the Treaty (Art 2-6 TFEU).  The treaty provision(s) 
are based on the competences as well as substantive provisions. 
515 Interview MS official, 12-6-2017, Interview MS official, 4-5-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 8-6-2017. 
518 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 4-5-2017.  
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well as the legalistic top-down culture makes it difficult to start a systemic transformation from 
the Commission.519  
6.4.4 Court of Justice 
The Court’s case law underlines that the division of competences is not clear-cut and that the 
Treaty may not always provide a priori answers. The ERTA case-law520 is particularly 
relevant with regards to the EU and Member State’s SDG implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030. The adoption of the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs ‘represent[s] a change of paradigm of 
the international policies on development cooperation’.521 The EU has a commitment to 
implement the SDGs both in its internal and external policies. Therefore, as the Court’s 
reasoning in ERTA and follow-up case law also suggests, internal and external policies are 
more and more streamlined. The internal and external dimension of the SDGs may start a 
new chapter in ‘parallelism’ of EU competences. The interviews highlight some 
inconsistencies, as some are of the opinion that the ‘internal’ competences are much 
stronger, while others stress the decisiveness of external action, which is not mirrored by 
internal action.522 The Court’s case law, combined with the Agenda 2030, provides space to 
‘parallelise’ these dimensions in SDG implementation. 
The controversies reflected in recent and pending cases on the scope of the EU’s external 
competences relate more and more to ‘sustainable development’ issues. Opinion 2/15 on the 
EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (related to the scope of Foreign Direct Investment) 
covers a specific part of ‘the commitments concerning sustainable development’ in this Trade 
agreement. As trade is normally under the area of exclusive competence, the Court was 
asked to reflect on these broader ‘new generation’ EU trade and investment agreement, 
inclusive of environmental and social issues.523 The Court comes to the far-reaching 
conclusion that (the free trade agreement) provisions on labour rights and environmental 
protection fall under the EU exclusive competence attributed to the Common Commercial 
Policy, as these provisions affect trade sufficiently. Therefore, the ‘objective of sustainable 
development forms an integral part of the common commercial policy’.524 This ruling could 
influence the discussion on SDG competences in the future.525 However, as EU Trade 
Commissioner Malmström reflected on another Trade Agreement:  
“From a strict legal standpoint, the Commission considers this agreement to fall under 
exclusive EU competence. However, the political situation in the Council is clear, and 
we understand the need for proposing it as a ‘mixed’ agreement, in order to allow for a 
speedy signature.”526  
                                                     
519 Interview MS official, 4-5-2017, Interview MS official, 10-5-2017. Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. 
520 Cf section 2.3. 
521 Website European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/sustainable-development-goals_en; Accessed 24 
November 2017. 
522 Interview MS official, 4-5-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. Interview EU official, 31-5-2017. Interview 
EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder (1) and (2), 7-6-2017. 
523 Cf Kleimann, D. and Kübek, G. (2016) ‘The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment 
Agreements in the EU. The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15 (November 2016)’. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Research Paper No. RSCAS 2016/58. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869873. 
524 Court of Justice of the European Union (2017) ‘The free trade agreement with Singapore cannot, in its current form, be 
concluded by the EU alone’, press release no 52/17, Luxembourg, 16 May 2017, accessed via 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170052en.pdf, Para 147. 
525 Interviews EU official, 12-6-2017, Interview MS official, 12-6-2017. 
526 European Commission - Press release ‘European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal’, 
Strasbourg, 5 July 2016; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm. 
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The next section will therefore focus on the ‘political issues’ that might have an effect on the 
EU implementation of the SDGs.  
6.5 Political issues and EU implementation 
This section analyses the political-institutional ‘turf battles’ between the Council and the 
Commission based on the dominant supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
discussion in political analyses. The section then continues with the EU’s position within the 
international constellation of power, which is often the primary focus in empirical analyses on 
EU’s actorness and effectiveness. Moreover, many political theories consider the notion of 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of policy preferences. Therefore, these ‘political issues/factors’ 
are analysed for the specific case study of EU and Member State implementation of the 
Agenda 2030. This section will conclude by considering other explanations, such as the 
involvement of ‘other societal stakeholders’ and the ‘political will’ in EU institutions and 
Member States.  
6.5.1 Supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
When analysing the current phase of EU implementation of the Agenda 2030 by means of 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, one could identify intra-institutional ‘turf battle’ 
taking place between the Council and the European Commission. For example, the Council’s 
conclusions of 20 June 2017 are critical about the Communication of the European 
Commission ‘next steps for a sustainable European future’. The Council urges the 
Commission “to elaborate, (by mid-2018), an implementation strategy outlining timelines, 
objectives and concrete measures to reflect the 2030 Agenda in all relevant EU internal and 
external policies”.527 However, this critical stance has nothing to do with the presupposed 
‘supranational’ direction of EU implementation. Instead, the Commission is criticised for its 
lack of ambition, the absence of a ‘gap analysis’ and more long-term coordination that goes 
beyond 2020. Therefore, this implementation negotiation could not be valued as a traditional 
supranational versus intergovernmental debate. Nevertheless, many Member States would 
like to see the ‘abstract’ coordination of the Agenda 2030 at EU level, but some interviewees 
warn that the more ‘concrete’ implementation at Member State level would then make it more 
difficult, as they would like to leave the burden to ‘neighbouring’ states, especially when the 
targets are not ‘legally binding’.528  
While this inter-institutional debate is rather the reverse of what one would expect, one could 
see important internal debates within the European Commission. By coordinating the EU 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the level of the Secretariat-General and the First Vice-
President of the European Commission, one could speak of a ‘coup d’état’ within the 
Commission. As has been identified earlier in this chapter the broad substance of the SDGs 
makes implementation coordination at ‘SecGen’ level a logical conclusion. Nevertheless, this 
has not been an automatic conclusion as the 14-month public silence after the adoption of 
the Agenda has revealed.   
                                                     
527 Council of the European Union (2017), A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development - Council conclusions, 10370/17, 20 June 2017, para 19. 
528 Interview EU official, 8-6-2017, Interview MS official, 4-5-2017, Interview MS official, 12-6-2017. 
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6.5.2 The EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
The EU and its Member States proved to be active and effective in the negotiation phase of 
the Agenda 2030 leading to a comprehensive multilateral agenda in which many of the EU’s 
wishes were recognised. It is in this light at least remarkable that the European Commission 
has waited for fourteen months to follow up with the actual implementation strategy. The 
postponement might be connected to the EU’s position in the international constellation of 
power as the EU and its Member States already belong to the ‘forerunners’ on many of the 
17 SDGs and targets. Furthermore, in many other third states the implementation strategies 
behind schedule.529  
6.5.3 Preference heterogeneity  
With regards to preference heterogeneity, it is difficult to analyse the substantive 
convergence between the EU and the Member States on the ‘broad’ concept of sustainable 
development. This primarily relates to the changing perception of the concept of sustainable 
development as is visible in the SDGs. While there is still no ‘universal’ definition of 
sustainable development besides the 1987 Brundtland definition530 the practical elaboration 
of the concept is broader than it was only a couple of years ago. Interviewees point to the 
‘environmental’ notion of the concept that was accepted in 2010.531 The idea that sustainable 
development encompasses ‘three dimensions’ (environmental, social, economic) and even 
‘security’ and ‘human rights’ dimensions is now more influential since the SDGs. That makes 
the ‘preference homogeneity/heterogeneity’ question difficult to answer. Interviewees point to 
the overall EU substantive convergence on environmental and climate issues at least from a 
UN perspective. However, there are more worries on topics such as ‘human rights’ where 
e.g. Poland and Hungary recently worsened the overall record of accomplishment of the EU. 
Furthermore, the idea that economic growth should stay ‘within planetary boundaries’ is 
sometimes debated. Therefore, one could speak of general substantive convergence on the 
concept of sustainable development in the EU, but with some significant uncertainties. This 
‘heterogeneity’ is increasingly visible between ministries/DGs of the European Commission 
instead of only between individual Member States or the European Commission and Member 
States. For example, finance ministries prove to be difficult partners in the new sustainable 
development paradigm.532        
6.5.4 Other explanations: societal stakeholders, DGs and ‘political will’ 
The previous sections have already demonstrated that there are many actors (potentially) 
involved in the EU implementation of the Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development 
Goals. This includes the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, most, if not all, of 
the Directorates-General, the Council and its joint Working Group (WPIEI, CONUN, CODEV), 
actors in EU Member States, the Presidency, EEAS, the European Council, the European 
Parliament and other societal actors such as the private sector, civil society organisations 
and cities and regions. The UN Agenda 2030 itself underlines that these challenges need to 
                                                     
529 Interview EU official, 8-6-2017. Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
530 ‘ensure that development meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’ 
531 Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 12-6-2017, Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. 
532 Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-
2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017. 
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be addressed in a ‘Global Partnership’533 as well as in effective public-private partnerships534 
with a wide variety of stakeholders. The agenda has been negotiated with considerable input 
from civil society actors including CSOs, the private sector and municipalities.  
The European Commission is taking this multi-stakeholder implementation more seriously. 
Normally, other societal actors are officially ‘only’ consulted in the drafting phase of 
legislation and policies. However, the Commission and specifically Vice President 
Timmermans started a new trend with the EU implementation of the Agenda 2030 by 
introducing a ‘high level’ multi stakeholder platform chaired by VP Timmermans.535 This 
multi-stakeholder platform is set up to create a ‘dynamic space’ that should help ‘to develop 
cooperation and coordination between the Commission and stakeholders on matters relating 
to the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals at Union level and should help to 
bring about an exchange of experience and best practices in the field of the Sustainable 
Development Goals’.536 Thirty persons will be selected for this stakeholder platform. 
Moreover, other EU institutions such as the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions play a role in involving other societal actors. While there is 
growing public and academic recognition of the role of the private sector in delivering SDG 
implementation and in global governance,537 many multinational corporations still have the 
individual Member State as their ‘entry point’. 
With soft targets (see section 6.4), many interviewees point to the ‘political will’ necessity in 
order to implement the Agenda.538 As indicated previously, the adoption of the Agenda 2030 
in 2015 at UN New York premises was attended by many European Heads of State and by 
level members of the European Commission, e.g. the First Vice President Frans 
Timmermans. Moreover, in some Member States such as Sweden and Germany, the 
coordination for the implementation is at the highest level and there is an informal meeting of 
around 20 Commissioners on implementation of the Agenda 2030. Notwithstanding this fact, 
the implementation phase itself cannot be considered as an example of long-term political 
leadership. Symptomatic in this regard is the absence of a reference to the Agenda 2030 in 
European Council conclusions until June 2017.539 Furthermore, the ‘second working stream’ 
of the Communication ‘next steps for a sustainable European future’ leaves many 
implementation questions unanswered until the next Commission (2019-2024) will start their 
term of office. In that sense, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda did not change the ten 
                                                     
533 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online from 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017, para 39. 
534 SDG Target 17.17: Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the 
experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships. 
535 See European Commission (2017) ‘Commission Decision on setting up the multi-stakeholder platform on the implementation 
of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU’, C (2017) 2941 final, Brussels, 22.5.2017. Cf European Commission (2018) 
‘From commitment to action: Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals through the next Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework of the European Union’. Advisory report to the European Commission by the Multi-Stakeholder Platform on the 
Implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU, March 2018. Accessed << 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/adopted-position-paper-on-the-mff_en.pdf>> 18 August 2018. 
536 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. 
537 See e.g. Bull, B., Bøås, M. and McNeill, D. (2004) ‘Private sector influence in the multilateral system: A changing structure of 
world governance?’. Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 481-498. White, C. L. (2015) ‘Exploring the role of private-sector 
corporations in public diplomacy’. Public Relations Inquiry, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 305-321. Andrade, J. C. S. and de Oliveira, J. A. P. 
(2015) ‘The role of the private sector in global climate and energy governance’. Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 130, No. 2, pp. 
375-387. 
538 Interview MS official, 12-6-2017. Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 8-6-2017. Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. Interview EU official (2), 
13-6-2017. Interview EU official (3), 13-6-2017. Interview MS official, 4-5-2017. 




‘Juncker priorities’ that were already present before 2015. Next to this, many other external 
and internal challenges like terrorism, ‘Brexit’ and migration occupy the European Union and 
its Member States. In more long-term policy documents such as the scenarios on the Future 
of Europe (until 2025), there is no explicit reference to implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 and the SDGs while the ‘leading role’ of the EU in the adoption and negotiation of the 
Agenda is highlighted.540   
6.6 Discussion 
The main question addressed in this chapter has been the following: How do the legal 
competences affect EU and Member State coordination in implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 and the SDGs? The division of legal competences between the EU and Member States 
has been raised as one of the top priority issues EU. The political elites and analysts often 
narrow this discussion down to either retreating the ‘creeping’ competences541 of the EU or 
instead supporting the supranational coordination of the European Commission, in the field 
of external relations especially.542 The United Nations Agenda 2030 for sustainable 
development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals are not ‘legally binding’ but the 
topics relate to the competences divided between the EU and Member States. On the basis 
of the literature review and sixteen semi-structured interviews with EU and Member State 
actors and other societal stakeholders from March to June 2017, the influence of the legal 
competences is evaluated against other, more ‘political’ influences. These are 
operationalised in the ‘intervening variables’ of intergovernmentalism versus 
supranationalism dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power and 
preference heterogeneity. Other related explanations were found in the interviews: most 
notably the (absence of) political will and the involvement of other societal stakeholders.  
 
Ministries and DGs of environment and development primarily conducted the EU and 
Member State negotiation of the Agenda 2030 between 2012 and 2015. The coordination of 
the implementation, especially at EU level, is nevertheless very much centralised at the level 
of the Secretariat-General and (in some Member States) at the level of the office of the Prime 
Ministers. The implementation phase also sees a larger role for many ‘new’ actors, including 
other societal actors such as CSOs and the private sector.  
 
As the 17 Sustainable Development Goals concerning a broad range of topics, 
encompassing the internal and external dimensions of EU and Member State policies, the 
Secretariat-General seems to be the best-placed coordination structure with overview of the 
division of competences at EU and Member State level. However, the legal competences are 
rarely used in implementation strategies like the European Commission Communication ‘next 
steps for a sustainable European future’. Instead, even from the Member States, the level of 
ambition and coordination by the Commission is criticised.543 The catalogue of competences 
in the Treaties, as well as case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, such as ERTA and the 
Opinion 2/15 on the Singapore Agreement, enable a larger role for the European 
Commission in both the internal and external dimension of its sustainable development 
                                                     
540 European Commission (2017) ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe: reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025’, p. 8. 
541 Pollack, M. A. (2000) ‘The end of creeping competence? EU policymaking since Maastricht’. JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 519-538. 
542 Macaj, G. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2014) ‘Beyond ‘one voice’? Global Europe's engagement with its own diversity’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No.7, pp. 1067-1083.  
543 Council of the European Union (2017), A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development - Council conclusions, 10370/17, 20 June 2017, para 19.  
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policies. Notwithstanding these legal arguments, this stronger EU coordination role is not 
taken up due to political reasons including ‘national ownership’ of the Agenda 2030 at the UN 
level, soft targets at the UN level, the existence of already ambitious sustainability policies at 
the EU level and the absence of EU targets beyond 2020. The legalistic, ‘Treaty-based’ 
culture of top-down competences seems to partly explain the hesitation of the EU in taking a 
larger coordination role implementing the transformative UN Agenda 2030 and its 17 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
The political reasons seem therefore more influential in deciding the fate of EU 
implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the 17 SDGs. Nevertheless, the classic 
‘intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism’ argumentation is almost reversed with what 
one would expect based on previous theories, as the Council is opting instead for more EU 
(Commission) coordination. The EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
seems rather detached from other countries and regional blocs. Regarding preference 
heterogeneity, there seems to be a significant substantive convergence on the ‘narrow’ 
environmental concept of sustainable development, but more divergence on the broader 
notion of sustainable development which includes topics such as ‘human rights’ and 
transformation of the economic growth paradigm. These discussions seem however to be 
taking place more between different ministries/DGs than between the EU and Member 
States. The most influential political argument enabling or restraining the implementation 
seems therefore to be political will.544 Two ‘political will’ developments seem to restrain 
coordination processes. Firstly, the ‘second working stream’ of the Communication ‘next 
steps for a Sustainable European future’ postpones many long-term implementation actions 
until the start of the next College of Commissioners (2019-2024). The current Juncker 
Commission could then focus on its own Ten Priorities and internal discussions such as on 
migration, security and Brexit. Secondly, at the Head of State level there has been no explicit 
reference to implementation of the Agenda 2030 in European Council conclusions until June 
2017. This is hindering coordination between EU and Member State actors. Therefore, while 
the legal competences could enable EU and Member State actors in coordinating 
implementation of the Agenda 2030 and SDGs, this is currently hindered by political will. The 
effect of the variables and explanations is visualised below in Figure 6.1. 
                                                     
544 Interview MS official, 12-6-2017. Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 8-6-2017. Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. Interview EU official (2), 








The results can only be valued as ‘plausibility probes’, providing interesting avenues for 
future research, but it is acknowledged that they need further testing over time to become 
more robust.545 While research on the effects of the treaty-based division of competences in 
practice may be the most obvious candidate, further research could in particular review the 
role of the Court in EU external relations and the effects of case law on political practice.546 
Indeed, this institution is still one of the more overlooked actors, with the role of the Court 
and the effect of its judgments on the role of actors in areas such as environmental policy or 
foreign and security policy hardly acknowledged in political analyses.547  
Furthermore, the interviews point to a couple of other topics related to the division of 
competence and EU implementation of the Agenda 2030 that can be worked out in more 
detail. This includes the concept of policy coherence for sustainable development,548 data 
                                                     
545 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
546 Cf Hillion, C. and Wessel, R. A. (2009) ‘Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: Clarification or 
Continued Fuzziness?’. Common Market Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 551-586. 
547 Cremona, M. & Thies, A. (eds) (2014) The European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing). 
548 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) ‘Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development 2017’ 
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and reporting549, a comparison with other regional blocs like ASEAN and MERCOSUR550, 
private sector involvement551, UN system transformation with the SDGs552 and the 
connection with the scenarios on the Future of Europe553 and ‘Brexit’. Overall, this analysis is 
to be understood as a plea to combine existing and new political and legal insights, to better 
understand the effects of legal choices on political practice (and vice versa). The present 
contribution has provided a number of reasons to further this new area of research. 
SUMMARY CHAPTER 6 
The United Nations Agenda 2030 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals are not ‘legally 
binding’ but the topics relate to EU internal legal rules and  powers defined by the Treaty. 
The main question addressed in this chapter is therefore the following: How do legal 
competences affect EU and Member State coordination in implementation of the UN Agenda 
2030 and the SDGs? Treaty provisions as well as case law of the Court of Justice of the EU 
theoretically enable a larger role for the European Commission in both the internal and 
external dimension of its sustainable development policies. However, these legal 
competences are rarely used in the European Commission’s implementation strategy. 
Instead, the broad concept of sustainable development combined with a ‘new’ universal, 
transformative UN agenda seems counterintuitive to the legalistic, top-down tendency within 
the European Commission in which legal competences often mark the boundaries instead of 
the possibilities. The most influential explanation of coordination seems to be (absence of) 
political will to implement the UN Agenda, currently halted by internal discussions on the 
EU’s future and ignorance of EU leaders.   
                                                     
549 Interview EU official, 13-6-2017. 
550 Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. 
551 Cf Kamphof, R. and Melissen, J. (2018)‘SDGs, Foreign Ministries and the Art of Partnering with the Private Sector’, Global 
Policy (online, early view)https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12563. On the difficulties for governments, specifically ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, being in partnerships with the private sector for the SDGs.  
552 Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. 






Chapter 7: Synthesis: Comparing the Cases 
7.1 Introduction 
“For too long, the expectation - at least in the Brussels bubble - was that the EU 
institutions would always try to do more than the treaties allowed them, while the 
expectation within Member States was that they would push back to make them do 
less. This immature behaviour has to be overcome” (Speech José Manuel Barroso, 8 
May 2014)554 
 
This chapter synthesises the findings of the influence of mixed legal competences on EU and 
Member State coordination in three specific sustainable development contexts: policy 
formulation on alternative fuels for private vehicles, negotiation of ‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC 
negotiations and implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 in the EU and Member States. The 
cases are compared systematically to build the theory on the effect of legal competences on 
sustainable development policies in the EU and the Member States, as well as their 
interaction with other issues stemming from political theoretical literature and beyond. 
Thereby it turns to anotherquestion, namely: How do legal competences affect EU and 
Member State coordination in negotiation, implementation and formulation of sustainable 
development policies? The Conclusion/Discussion (chapter 8) reflects on the answers in 
detail.  
 
This chapter provides a descriptive and analytical overview of the findings in all three cases. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes the coordination processes 
(dependent variables) in the three case studies. Section 7.3 then highlights the results with 
regards to the effects of legal competences: the division of competences in the Treaty, the 
Court’s case law, regulations and directives (internally) as well as EU’s powers in a 
multilateral context (externally). This section contains ‘general reflections’ on legal 
competences (7.3.1), as well as identification of similarities and differences across the cases, 
which are visualised in a matrix (7.3.2).  Section 7.4 analyses the political factors that were 
tested in the case studies as intervening variables, namely supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
and preference heterogeneity. In addition, other more specific explanations raised in the 
case studies are reviewed. Subsequently, section 7.5 analyses, assesses and visualises the 
interactions between these legal and political variables and refers back to the methodological 
challenges that were partly raised in chapter 3. This section also highlights some of the 
difficulties of deduction from these specific case studies, while nevertheless showing their 
value for future research and theory building.  
7.2 EU and Member State coordination  
Coordination has been defined in this dissertation as the process of contacts between 
diplomats and officials from EU institutions (especially the European Commission) and 
Member States with the purpose of discussing an issue of common interest and working 
towards a common position. These coordination processes can be internal (within the EU) or 
external (international) and include the discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination. In 
                                                     
554 European Commission (2014) ‘On Europe Considerations on the present and the future of the European Union’: A speech by 
José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission Humboldt University of Berlin, 8 May 2014,  
 
134 
all case studies the coordination processes have been described, without marking the 
‘quality’ of the coordination. The primary objective of this dissertation is to see whether the 
independent variable of legal competences has an effect on these coordination processes on 
sustainable development policies. What is important to note, however, is that the three 
coordination case studies differ with regards to their ‘place’ in the policy cycle as well as the 
internal/external dimension.  
 
In relation to the ‘discussing’, ‘working towards a common position’ and ‘adjusting different 
positions’ parts of the coordination definition, the climate change case study has been the 
one where the most ‘coordination’ aspects could be described. This is naturally the case if 
one takes into account the need to work towards a common position in the external context 
of the UNFCCC. With less ‘external pressure’, such as in the case of alternative fuels, there 
is also less coordination to be analysed and described. It is also worth noting that many 
interviewees for the climate change case study refer to the ‘positive’ encounters with 
coordination when compared to the other case studies.555 
 
Coordination between EU and Member State actors includes the discussion of the 
‘management’ of the coordination.556 It is interesting to note that these ‘managing actors’ 
differ across the case studies. In the alternative fuel case study, it appears that the ministries 
and societal stakeholders within the Member States are the managing force in the 
coordination process. In the climate change case study, one sees a specific coordination role 
for the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which is mostly but not only ceremonial, and a 
more substantive one for the European Commission (DG CLIMA). In the SDG 
implementation case study, the coordination lies at the EU level, and more specifically with 
the Secretariat-General of the European Commission. Within the Member States, the 
coordination ‘management’ differed between e.g. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, General 
Affairs, Development Cooperation and Environment ministries.  
 
With regards to coordination and socialisation, one of the expectations from the literature 
was that preferences of Member State and EU actors, instead of being fixed, can converge 
over time through social interaction processes such as socialisation.557 Member States’ 
representatives involved in deciding on or negotiating an EU position would thus adopt a 
European orientation due to the ‘socialisation’ in EU practices. 558 It is no coincidence that 
socialisation often pops up in empirical research on climate change negotiations. Similarly, 
this case study shows an enormous coordination effort both before and during the UNFCCC 
negotiations and a rather coherent ‘Team EU’ socialisation. This socialisation process could 
enable the Commission to take on a leading role in coordination due to its experience in DG 
CLIMA. A similar though less demanding socialisation process seems to have taken place in 
the run-up to the Agenda 2030, especially by environment and development cooperation 
officials in the EU institutions and the ministries in the capitals of the Member States. 
However, with the SDG implementation, after the adoption of the Agenda 2030 in 2015, there 
                                                     
555 Interview MS official, 24-1-2014, Interview EU official, 9-4-2014, Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-
2017, Interview MS official (1) and (2), 14-6-2017 Interview former MS official, 10-5-2017.  
556 Cf  Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked 
governance (Oxford University Press). 
557 Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, p. 
975. 
558 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 75. 
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was a shift in coordinating actors  both in the European Commission (Secretariat-General 
and first Vice-President) and in some of the Member States, where implementation 
coordination was transferred to interdepartmental councils or Prime Minister’s offices. As a 
result, one can now speak of a ‘transitional phase’, as socialisation processes had to start 
once again with different actors; other stakeholders.559  
7.3 The effect of legal competences  
Each case study involved an operationalisation of ‘legal competences’ as independent 
variables in the same broad manner.  Within the EU, these legal competences were divided 
into Treaty competences, legal principles and the Court’s case law, as well as regulations 
and directives. Moreover, legal competences at the external (multilateral) stage also have an 
independent effect on EU and Member State coordination of sustainable development 
policies. This section summarises the findings in the three case studies in general reflections 
and analyses similarities and differences across such cases. 
7.3.1 General reflections 
Competences 
 
The topics of interest in the case studies cover many policy areas from climate, energy and 
transport to security, trade and taxation. As a result, sustainable development policies are 
mostly topics of ‘mixed competences’.560 Nevertheless, the ‘centre of gravity’ in these case 
studies were the policy areas of environment/climate change (EU in UNFCCC), development 
cooperation (SDGs), transport, and energy (alternative fuels). These policy areas can all be 
subsumed under the category of ‘shared competences’.561 While the ‘category’ of shared 
competence sounds cohesive, all three case studies revealed that there is a wide divergence 
of policy areas and coordination arrangements within the category.  When compared to e.g. 
environment, the policy area of energy is one of the fields in which the EU has fewer powers. 
With regards to the energy and electricity mix, much is kept within the discretionary 
autonomy of the Member States.562  Such an autonomy is equally important in financial, and 
taxation issues. In addition, land-use, export promotion and efforts in ‘non-ETS’ sectors, such 
as agriculture and transport, were typical ‘Member State competences’ and it seemed not 
possible for the Commission to expand its powers. The interviews’ findings in the case 
studies seem to suggest that Member States do everything to keep these competences safe 
within their own hands.563 
                                                     
559 European Commission (2017) ‘Commission Decision on setting up the multi-stakeholder platform on the implementation of 
the Sustainable Development Goals in the EU’, C(2017) 2941 final, Brussels, 22.5.2017. See also Kamphof, R. and Melissen, J. 
(2018) ‘SDGs, Foreign Ministries and the Art of Partnering with the Private Sector’, Global Policy (online, early view) 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12563. for the difficulties for governments, specifically ministries of Foreign Affairs, being in 
partnerships with the private sector for the SDGs.  
560 On mixed competences cf Rhinard, M. and Kaeding, M. (2006) ‘The international bargaining power of the European Union in 
‘mixed’ competence negotiations: The case of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 1030-1033. 
561 See art 4 TFEU, while acknowledging that ‘development cooperation’ is a specific type of shared competence, see art 4(3) 
TFEU and Art 208 TFEU.  
562 Cf Kamphof, R., Bonenkamp, T., Selleslaghs, J.M.H.M.R. and Hosli, M.O. (2017) ‘External competences in energy and 
climate change’ in Leal-Arcas, R. and Wouters, J. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 
Publishing), pp. 30-47. 
563 Interview Other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 28-7-2016 (alternative fuels case study), interview EU official, 13-6-2017, Interview MS official, 13-6-2017, 
Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview EU official, 30-5-2017 (climate change case study) Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. 
Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. 




Furthermore, one of the expectations was that the discussions around the issue of 
competences would have a large role in the different case studies and that the European 
Commission would make use of these competences. However, the interviews portray an 
environment in which these competences are not a primary issue, and not promoted as such 
by EU actors.564 This latest finding is interesting, as in all three cases the European 
Commission could make the legal case that the Treaty provides them with more 
competences on the issue than it currently uses in practice. Examples include the peculiar 
negotiation mandate (unanimity) for UNFCCC negotiations, the lack of EU coordination on 
SDG implementation and the absence of steering policies on alternative fuels. Contrastingly, 
when financial/taxation, energy mix issues or land-use policies are at stake the Member 
States are more than willing to play the ‘competence’ autonomy card.  
 
Court’s case law and legal principles 
 
The legal principle of the conferral of powers (Art 5 TEU) entails that the Union can only act 
once a competence has been created. In parallel, one should bear in mind the principle of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity proved particularly important as 
a guideline in EU policy formulation and implementation, within these specific case studies.  
This principle is often used to argue that the discretionary autonomy should stay within the 
hands of the Member States. 
 
The ‘referee’ on the use of competences and the effect of legal principles in the EU is the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. However, the Court is only in position to reflect on 
the legal situation in practice when it is asked to do so by the EU institutions or its Member 
States. These legal opinions, infringement proceedings or annulment actions have however 
not (often) been started for these cases, despite the fact that the Treaty does not always 
provide clear answers and practice is at times seemingly contradictory of the Treaty.  
 
Nevertheless, the Court’s case law has an important effect. ERTA case-law565 appears to 
have effect for both climate change negotiations as well as the UN Agenda 2030 as the EU 
has committed to implement the SDGs both in its internal and external policies. Moreover, 
quite recently the Court ruled that within a Free Trade Agreement the ‘objective of 
sustainable development forms an integral part of the (exclusive) common commercial 
policy’.566 This ‘Singapore opinion’ may prompt a more active role for the Court in the 
evaluation of the conduct of sustainable development.567 As social and environmental 
dimensions are increasingly integrated with economic policies, the Court might be asked to 
reflect more on the use of competences in mixed agreements. Furthermore, the ‘principle of 
sincere co-operation’, originating from the Court’s case law and now part of the Treaty568, 
obliges  Member States and the EU to cooperate more loyally than they sometimes seem to 
do in practice as shown in the case studies. Nevertheless, although not referring directly to 
the Treaties and the Court’s case-law, it is seen as disrespectful to Member State and EU 
                                                     
564 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview MS official, 14-6-2017. 
565 Cf section 2.3. 
566 Para 147, opinion 2/15 
567 Interview EU official, 13-6-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 12-6-2017, Interview MS official, 12-6-
2017 (SDG implementation case study). 
568 Art 4(3) TEU.  
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actors to ‘colour outside the lines’ of the Team EU approach during climate change 
negotiations. 
 
Regulations, Directives and Strategies 
 
The EU is to considered by certain commentators such as Damro (2012: 682) ‘fundamentally 
a large single market with significant institutional features’.569 These single market features, 
especially when agreed in regulations and directives, could be analysed as legally defining 
powers with internal (and external570) effects. These regulations and directives affect the 
distribution of competences, which make them a dynamic rather than a fixed (Treaty-based) 
process.571 As an example, one would expect the Union to have more (coordinating) powers 
when there is a single market for road fuel agreed in a directive. Nevertheless, when looking 
at the different case studies in more detail it is clear that there are many ‘opt-outs’ for the 
Member States which hinder coordination (and implementation) ‘management’ by the 
European Commission. Continuing with the example of alternative fuels, they are not part of 
the legally  binding Emission Trading System (ETS). Moreover, there are ‘substantial 
barriers’ to the single market resulting from national taxation schemes, not only on fuels, but 
also on energy. 572 Overall, the case studies show that there is significant internal legislation, 
but that the EU seems not so strict on compliance and weak in implementation. Furthermore, 
all case studies demonstrated a general reluctance among Member States to accuse other 
Member States when they do not cooperate according to the prescribed rules of 
coordination. 
 
External (multilateral) legal context 
 
Besides the significant internally defined powers, there are externally defined legal powers. 
However, as the case studies have demonstrated, the international context does not often 
prescribe legally binding rules. The Sustainable Development Goals, for example, have a 
non-legal binding character and the monitoring and review mechanisms in the UN High-Level 
Political Forum are likewise ‘soft’. The UN is ‘encouraging regional frameworks such as the 
EU’ (para 21) to facilitate implementation, but national governments ‘have the primary 
responsibility’ (para 47).573 The Paris Agreement is more binding, but composed of a ‘binding’ 
section as well as voluntary, non-binding commitments. The ‘multilateral context’ on 
alternative fuels is almost non-existent. 
 
Despite these ‘soft’ externally assigned powers, there are nevertheless some internal effects 
of these UN documents and Statutes. As the EU as well as its Member States are a Party to 
the UNFCCC they need to cooperate to reach the objectives of the Paris Agreement, with an 
upcoming stocktake of climate pledges in which, most likely, the EU and its Member States 
will need to increase their work on mitigation, adaptation and finance. Moreover and vice 
                                                     
569 Damro, C. (2012) ‘Market power Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 682-699. 
570 For external effects see ERTA case-law.  
571 Original text: “de bevoegdheidsverdeling op het terrein van de externe betrekkingen is niet statisch, maar dynamisch”. See 
http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer/dossiers/externe-betrekkingen/exclusieve-en-gedeelde-externe-bevoegdheden-van-de-eu.html on 
21-12-2014.  
572 Steenberghen, T. and Lopez, E. (2008) ‘Overcoming barriers to the implementation of alternative fuels for road transport in 
Europe’. Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 16, No. 5, p. 584. 
573 United Nations General Assembly (2015) ‘Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, UN 
Resolution A/RES/70/1, adopted on 25 September 2015, available online at 
<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld>, Accessed 12 January 2017.  
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versa, the Treaty and ERTA case law upgrade the external profile of the EU at e.g. the 
United Nations whenever EU Member States and third states are willing to accept its internal 
competences at an external stage.  The Court’s case law and, the Lisbon Treaty, combined 
with the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement provides ample room of manoeuvre to 
‘parallelise’ these internal and external dimensions. When, as in the case of alternative fuels, 
a multilateral context is missing, this seems to weaken the internally defined legal powers. 
7.3.2 Similarities and differences: legal competences across the cases 
The below Table (7.1) gives an overview of the relevance of legal competences for EU and 
Member State coordination across the cases. A ‘weak’ relevance indicates that the source of 
legal competences is not (or seldom) as such used or indicated, according to the documents 
and interview findings. A ‘moderate’ relevance indicates that there is some use of this source 
of legal competences; a ‘strong’ relevance means that this source often comes back in 
interview findings and/or policy and legal documents.  In the alternative fuels case the 
‘regulations and directives’ are marked as having ‘strong’ impact on coordination between 
EU and Member State actors. The ‘U-turns’ on biofuels in directives proved to be having an 
especially large effect. In contrast, with the absence of a multilateral context, the importance 
of UN documents and Statutes is scored as ‘weak’. In the case study on ‘Team EU’ in 
UNFCCC negotiations, the UN context is ‘strong’ but, as indicated in many interviews, there 
has been almost no attention paid to ‘competences’ since 2010-2011. Therefore, this source 
of legal competences is scored as ‘weak’. The case study on ‘SDG implementation’ has 
‘moderate’ scores on all four sources of legal competences. With the absence of a real 
implementation strategy until (most likely) the next College of Commissioners from 2019, it is 
















Moderate Weak Strong Weak 
Case UNFCCC Team 
EU 
Weak Moderate Moderate Strong 
Case SDG 
implementation 
Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Table 7. 1 The relevance of sources of legal competences across the cases     
Similarities 
 
The case studies point to some similarities. Firstly, the actual claiming of Treaty-based or 
case law-based competences by the European Commission appears to rarely occur in daily 
practice. Likewise, the Court of Justice is absent from the discussions as they are not asked 
to reflect on the division of powers in practice. This is remarkable as the daily practice 
sometimes contravenes the logic of the Treaty. The Commission for instance, does not 
question the peculiar procedure of Team EU in climate change negotiations while this would 
definitely be a relevant legal question for the Court of Justice. The recent Singapore opinion 
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was however noted in interviews across the cases, which indicate a potential revitalisation of 
legal questions on the conduct of powers in sustainable development policies (and trade).574 
Secondly, and conversely, the Member States seem in all three cases to be selective on their 
‘financial’ and ‘energy mix autonomy’ national competences such as climate finance 
commitments, funding for SDG implementation, taxation of fuels as well as discretionary 
autonomy on land-use issues and export promotion.575 Thirdly and notably, while all case 
studies were selected as ‘mixed-competence’ procedures one could see in all cases that 
there are strong differences between policy areas even when they are based on the same 
(shared) ‘competence category’. As a result, apart from clear categories such as ‘exclusive’ 
EU competences or national competences, there is a sweeping range of policy areas where 
decisions are increasingly made on an ad-hoc basis. The category of ‘shared’ competences 
especially appears to be composed of different balances of power between EU and Member 
State actors, ranging from 50-50 to 90-10. This could be the result of the equal importance of 




There are of course also differences across the cases and the potential effect of legal 
competences, often largely related to the place in the chain of decision-making. While this is 
a small-N study and especially the climate change case seems very peculiar, one could see 
clear differences in the powers of the Commission in negotiation (quite strong) as compared 
to implementation of international agreements and powers in policy formulation (quite weak). 
Part of this difference could be related with the difference between external and internal 
competences. While the internal division of competences are delineated in the Treaty, the 
external competences are not clearly established. As a consequence, the identification of 
external competences is to a large extent based on decades of pre-Lisbon case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union which ‘provides a fertile field for ingenious legal 
argument’ over the interpretation of the Treaties.576  
 
Besides the difference between internal and external dimensions, there is a difference in the 
actual notion of the topics within the Treaties. Climate change is not often distinguished in 
the Treaty, which leaves some creative room to manoeuvre for EU and Member State actors. 
One could even argue that there is a lack of legal competences on climate change in the 
Treaty. The less a topic is mentioned in the Treaty, the more legal creativity in the field of 
coordination seems necessary and other legal sources (such as case law, regulations, 
directives and UN Statutes) are used. However, this should be crosschecked with more 
research on this topic. Interestingly, some of the ‘general’ interviews on the history of 
competences point to an era (1980s and 1990s) in which the Treaty was more a ‘framework’, 
while in recent years it has become a ‘tighter jacket’ in which legal competences were more 
                                                     
574 Interview EU official, 13-6-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 12-6-2017, Interview MS official, 12-6-
2017 (SDG implementation case study). 
575 Interview Other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 28-7-2016 (alternative fuels case study), interview EU official, 13-6-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview 
EU official, 30-5-2017 (climate change case study). Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-
2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
576 Wouters, J., Odermatt, J. and Ramopoulos, T. (2013) ‘The EU in the World of International Organizations: Diplomatic 
Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political Realities. Legal Hurdles and Political Realities.’ Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies Working Paper, No. 121, p. 4. 
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restrictive.577 The mere fact that ‘climate change’ receives less attention in the Treaty can 
therefore be a positive sign for more creative use of legal competences. 
7.4 Intervening variables (political-theoretical issues) 
The previous section pointed to some generalities across the cases. The potential of legal 
competences is often not fully used, especially by the European Commission. There can be 
many political explanations for this phenomenon. Why would the European Commission for 
example dare to bring a competence discussion on mercury to the Court of Justice while it 
keeps the status quo climate change? 578 This section points to the political issues identified 
from the literature that have been part of the questioning and investigation in the case 
studies as intervening variables. These issues are the supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s positioning in the international constellation and 
preference heterogeneity. As demonstrated later, some of these ‘political’ issues do have a 
legal component that should not be neglected. Moreover, other explanations raised in the 
case studies will be briefly summarised.  
 
Table 7.2 gives an overview of the relevance of the ‘intervening variables’ across the cases. 
A ‘weak’ relevance indicates that the political-theoretical issue is not (or seldom) as such 
used or indicated, according to the documents and interview findings. A ‘moderate’ relevance 
indicates that there are some references to this intervening variable; a ‘strong’ relevance 
means that this political explanation often comes back in interview findings and/or policy and 
legal documents. In the alternative fuels case study ‘preference heterogeneity’ is scored as 
‘strong’ due to the differences in fuel choice between Member States. In contrast, ‘Team EU’ 
in UNFCCC negotiations has a ‘weak’ heterogeneity’: climate change is generally considered 
a policy area in which Member States’ views are aligned. For ‘SDG implementation’, the EU’s 
position in the international constellation of power is considered as ‘strong’ as the goals can 
















Moderate Weak Strong 
Case UNFCCC 
Team EU 




Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Table 7. 2 The relevance of intervening variables across the cases 
 
                                                     
577 Interview ‘Former MS official (general)’ 19-4-2017 and Interview Former EU and MS official, 31-3-2017.  
578 On this case, cf De Baere, G. (2012) ‘Mercury Rising: The European Union and the International Negotiations for a Globally 
Binding Instrument on Mercury’. European Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 640-655. 
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Below is an overview of the intervening variables and their potential effect on coordination of 
EU and Member State actors in sustainable development policies. 
 
Supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
 
The main debate in the literature on European integration has for a long time been the 
supranational-intergovernmental ‘dichotomy’ which dictates that integration is either driven by 
supranational institutions or national governments.579 As Nugent (2017: 436) suggests 
intergovernmentalism refers to arrangements, ‘whereby nation states, in situations and 
conditions they can control, cooperate with one another on matters of common interest’.580 
The Member States are free to cooperate or not and are able to set the limits of this 
cooperation, e.g. through a veto.  At the other end of the spectrum, supranationalism refers 
to governance arrangements where states decide to delegate responsibility for decision-
making to a body that stands above (supra) the nation state.  In this way, states lose some 
control, but they still have to agree to do this.  
 
If that dichotomy also dictates EU and Member State cooperation on sustainable 
development issues, or lack thereof, one would expect institutional turf battles on the 
treacherous issues of climate change, development cooperation and fuels for private 
vehicles. However, this ‘traditional pattern’ of Member States versus European Commission, 
where the Member States (via the Council) ask for less EU powers fearing a ‘competence 
creep’, is only to some extent visible in the case study on alternative fuels. Interestingly, in 
the case of SDG implementation the Council is asking for more coordination and powers of 
the Commission urging for an ‘implementation strategy’ with ‘concrete measures’ in ‘all 
relevant EU internal and external policies’. 581 The climate change negotiations are more 
peculiar. On the one hand, the Member States and the European Commission seem to work 
together coherently in ‘Team EU’ during the negotiations leaving these turf battles aside. On 
the other hand, the Member States keep their control over the process with a large role for 
the Presidency and the Council Working Group WPIEI both before and during the 
negotiations. The European Parliament, often not a part of the intergovernmental-
supranational dichotomy literature, still seems to be a less influential player than the Council 
and the Commission in these three case studies. However, they sometimes demand 
ambitious policies especially in committees such as ENVI (environment) and DEVE 
(development cooperation).  Nevertheless, the ‘inter-committee coordination’ in the European 
Parliament on sustainability issues is notably absent.582 
 
EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
 
The position of the EU in the international constellation of power is also an explaining factor 
for EU and Member State cooperation as often found in the literature, especially in 
                                                     
579 Branch, A. P., and Ohrgaard, J. C. (1999) ‘Trapped in the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy: a response to Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 123-143. 
580 Nugent, N. (2017) The government and politics of the European Union (Springer), p. 436. 
581 Council of the European Union (2017), A sustainable European future: The EU response to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development - Council conclusions, 10370/17, 20 June 2017, para 19. 
582 Yesilkagit, K. (2008) ‘Review - The coordination of the European Union. Exploring the capacities of networked governance – 
by Andrew Jordan and Adriaan Schout’. Public Administration, Vol. 86, No. 2., p. 615. Yesilkagit holds that “There are almost no 
bureaucratic procedures that systematically support inter-committee coordination of EPI (Environmental Policy Integration). EPI, 
moreover, depends on informal relations and the personality of the MEPs involved as well as of the rapporteurs of the 
Environment and other committees.” 
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multilateral negotiations.583 The case studies do not all have a clear external component and 
as such, they are difficult to compare on this specific explaining factor. Moreover, both SDG 
implementation and the introduction of alternative fuels are still in their early stages, not only 
in the EU but also in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the finding that the international 
context indeed played a large role in ‘Team EU’ cooperation at UNFCCC negotiations was 
confirmed in many interviews. As the third largest CO2 emitter, the EU can be considered as 
important, but not as the most important player to reach global CO2 emission goals. This has 
a strong effect on their internal need for coordination.584  In a less clear-cut international 
negotiation, such as the Open Working Group leading to the Agenda 2030 and the SDGs, 
one could find Member States and the EU coordinating their positions effectively. However, 
when it comes to SDG implementation or in the absence of a multilateral negotiating context 
(e.g. for alternative fuels) or the absence of a strong monitoring mechanism (e.g. the HLPF 
for SDGs), it proved difficult for the EU and Member States to cooperate. In that sense the 
international context appears to facilitate EU and Member State cooperation and use of the 
Treaty accordingly. Indeed, even when there is large import dependence and the EU’s 
position of the international constellation of power on fuels is decreasing in practice, it seems 
as if Member States can try to work on their own ‘raw material/resource strategies’ despite 
some coordination and a soft EU raw material strategy on critical raw materials.585 This could 
be related to the absence of international cooperation and the absence of a need to work 
together for (the EU and) Member States.586  This would indeed explain why energy 
cooperation is still in its infancy despite equal ‘shared competences’ like climate change, 




‘Preference heterogeneity’ – meaning (the absence of) aligning interests – is  a primary 
explaining factor of EU and Member State cooperation behaviour according to the literature. 
The case studies sketch a mixed picture in the different policy areas. In the case of climate 
change there is a general preference homogeneity, especially on the necessity to tackle 
climate change internationally. On sub-issues, there are often one or two outliers, e.g. 
Poland588. In the multilateral negotiations there seems to be a ‘Team EU’ preference 
homogeneity on climate change mitigation and adaption and more heterogeneity on the 
(financial) ‘means of implementation’, within the EU as well as externally. The homogeneity 
on mitigation and adaptation can be explained by the image that the EU itself has the most 
ambitious climate policies as tradeing bloc. That makes it in the interest of all EU Member 
States to aim for a global ambitious climate deal. For alternative fuels there seems to be 
preference heterogeneity across the EU depending on the historical fuel context 
                                                     
583 Cf Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
584 Cf Bäckstrand, K., and Elgström, O. (2013) ‘The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’. Journal 
of European Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 10, p. 1380 who consider the EU ‘a bridge builder between the major emitters’.  
585 European Commission (2013) on the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. COM(2013) 442 final. Brussels, 
Belgium, 24.6.2013. Cf Lee, B., Preston, F., Kooroshy, J., Bailey, R. and Lahn, G. (2012) ‘Resources futures: A Chatham House 
report’. London, UK: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, accessed via 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/187947 for a critical overview of international cooperation on natural 
resources.  
586 See e.g. (in Dutch) Kamphof, R. (2013) ‘Grondstoffen’ (natural resources, raw materials) Nationale Commissie voor 
Duurzame Ontwikkeling NCDO, Amsterdam, www.kaleidosresearch.nl/download/2015/08/2013-Grondstoffen.pdf, p. 43-45.    
587 Cf Kamphof, R., Bonenkamp, T., Selleslaghs, J.M.H.M.R. and Hosli, M.O. (2017) ‘External competences in energy and 
climate change’ in Leal-Arcas, R. and Wouters, J. (eds) Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (Edward Elgar 
Publishing), pp. 41-43 for differences in global climate and energy frameworks and the role of the EU. 
588 Rettman, A. (2015) ‘Poland vetoes CO2 targets on the eve of Paris visit’ EU Observer, 28 October 2015. Available at   
<<https://euobserver.com/environment/130867>> Accessed 10 December 2015.  
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(diesel/gasoline), size of the automotive industry, strong domestic stakeholder lobbies and 
different blending and taxation policies.  
 
For the SDGs, it is difficult to analyse the substantive divergence because of the broad scope 
of this agenda and the extended practical use of sustainable development. As indicated in 
the interviews this concept was previously especially known for the environmental dimension 
and to some extent poverty eradication.589 The Agenda 2030 ‘on sustainable development’ 
not only encompasses the recent ‘three dimensions’ (environmental, social and economic) 
but likewise security and human rights dimensions. The ‘extended’ use of the concept is 
increasing preference heterogeneity on e.g. human rights issues in Poland and Hungary. 
Additionally, the idea that economic growth should stay ‘within planetary boundaries’ is 
sometimes debated beyond the classical environmentally focused DGs and ministries. This 
latest finding resonates in all three case studies: there seems to be more preference 
heterogeneity between Directorates-General and between ministries within the EU and within 
Member States than between the European Commission and the Member States. For 
example, finance ministries proved to be difficult partners in the new sustainable 




Apart from the relevance of legal competences and intervening variables all three case 
studies pointed to case-specific alternative explanations for EU and Member State 
coordination in formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable development 
policies. The alternative fuels for private vehicles case study demonstrated the importance of 
the tone of the scientific and/or emotional debate for joint decision-making. In that sense, the 
UNFCCC negotiations were easier due to the 97 percent consensus in peer-reviewed 
climate science literature that humans are causing global warming.591  
 
In all the case studies, the opinions of ‘other societal stakeholders’ such as the private sector 
and CSOs were taken into consideration. In the study on alternative fuels their views were 
hugely significant, in the case study of SDG implementation much is expected from the other 
societal stakeholders and in the UNFCCC negotiations, besides the parallel merchandising 
process of the Open Tent Zone, the other societal stakeholders appeared to have only a 
small role in the ‘real’ intergovernmental negotiations.  
 
When considering drivers for coordination of EU and Member States on sustainable 
development policies, some refer to a European public that values environmental protection 
and development cooperation highly, as has been signposted by several recent 
Eurobarometer surveys.592 On the one hand, this could be an ‘alternative explanation’ of EU 
                                                     
589 Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 12-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
590 Interview EU official, 7-9-2016, Interview MS official, 7-9-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-9-2016, Interview EU 
official, 31-3-2017 (alternative fuels case study), Interview EU official, 14-10-2015, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview EU 
official, 13-6-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. 
Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
591 Cook, J., Nuccitelli, D., Green, S. A., Richardson, M., Winkler, B., Painting, R., ... & Skuce, A. (2013) ‘Quantifying the 
consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature’. Environmental Research Letters, Vol. 8, No. 2, 024024. 
592 European Commission Special Eurobarometer (2014) ‘Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment’, Special 
Eurobarometer 416, September 2014 and European Commission Special Barometer (2017) ‘EU Citizen’s views on 
development, cooperation and aid’, Special Eurobarometer 455, April 2017. Cf  Falkner, R. (2007) ‘The political economy of 
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and Member State coordination of sustainable development policies. On the other hand, 
consumers seem to be rather hesitant in choosing flexi-fuel vehicles and more 
environmentally friendly products and do not protest massively when Member States engage 
in practices such as reducing their aid budget.  
 
The strong commitment to sustainable development policies seems confined to specific 
ministries/DGs/policy units in the EU institutions and Member States.593 In that way, the 
distinction between EU and Member States might be a bit too abstract and in practice, it is 
more influenced by the preferences of individual ministries, or, in the case of the European 
Commission, specific DGs. These differences between specific DGs and ministries might 
provide powerful explanation, but this finding needs however further testing to become more 
robust.  
7.5 Interactions  
This section deals with the interactions between the legal competences and the other 
intervening variables. It shows that there is more interaction between these approaches in 
the empirical practice of the case studies than the literature suggests. Moreover, certain 
developments could enable a larger role of legal competences in the near future. The 
remainder of this section is focused on some methodological limitations of the approach 
taken in this study.594  
 
The effects of the procedural arrangements and legal competences are in all three case 
studies assessed against intervening variables suggested from the theoretical literature. The 
case studies however point to the situation that it is mostly not an ‘either/or’, but rather an 
interactive context. There is much interaction between these intervening variables and legal 
competences in practice as described and visualised below.  
 
Firstly, it should be noted that the supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
variable proved to be relatively unimportant in the case studies. Upon consideration of the 
‘mixed’ and often ‘shared’ competences underpinning these policies which more on the 
nature of cooperation than moving competences from Member States to EU or vice versa, 
this does not come as a surprise. In that sense the picture of an almost ‘teleological drive 
towards further European integration’ as suggested in many academic contributions, is not 
necessarily the case in these mixed competence policy fields.595 After all, most EU external 
relations are not characterised by ‘exclusivity’ and the number of areas in which the EU can 
act without the Member States are in fact limited.596 As a result, international agreements are 
concluded often as ‘mixed’ agreements even when there is a dominant exclusive 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘normative power’ Europe: EU environmental leadership in international biotechnology regulation’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 510. 
593 Schout, A., & Jordan, A. (2005). ‘Coordinated European Governance: SelfOrganizing or Centrally Steered?’. Public 
Administration, Vol. 83. No. 1, p. 215 hold in the (related) context of ‘Environmental Policy Integration’ that “sectoral DGs 
continue to focus on their own sectoral objectives to the detriment of the environment. Most DGs are usually willing to consider 
environmental objectives, but not to the extent needed to deliver sustainability”. 
594 For a more extensive methodological overview see chapter 3: research design.  
595 da Conceição-Heldt, E. and Meunier, S. (2014) ‘Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external 
effectiveness of the EU in global governance’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 976. 
596 Van Vooren, B. and Wessel, R. A. (2014) EU external relations law: text, cases and materials (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 99. 
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competence behind the agreement. 597 Considering these legally defined shared 
competences, it is less odd that the Council is sometimes asking for more coordination by 
the Commission, in e.g. SDG implementation strategies in the EU. 
   
Nevertheless, there are still some policy measures such as taxation and the energy mix 
where Member States seem less willing to coordinate, especially in cases of preference 
heterogeneity or supranational versus intergovernmental dominance. It is no coincidence that  
these policy measures in particular are often brought up in interviews, as these are based on 
the logic of the Treaty and specific Articles. For example, in the Treaty provisions on 
environment and climate change (cf Art 192 TFEU) it is already indicated that fiscal 
measures, land use and ‘measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between 
different energy sources’ need unanimous support from Member States by way of derogation 
from the normal procedure.  In that way, one could see interaction between the variable 
‘supranational versus intergovernmental dominance’ and internal EU legal competences. As 
such, it may be better to speak of ‘balance’ between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism in these mixed-competence arrangements than ‘dominance’. 
 
 
Figure 7. 1 Interactions variable supranational versus intergovernmental dominance 
 
Secondly, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power interacts with UN 
Statutes and documents (external legal competences) as well as internal EU legal 
competences when there is a strong multilateral context such as the UNFCCC (see Figure 
7.2). However, the case studies show that there is sometimes an absence of a multilateral 
context, either caused by the absence of a multilateral forum (alternative fuels) or because 
the implementation is an EU internal issue (SDG implementation). Both the UN Statutes and 
documents (EU external legal competences) and the EU’s position in the international 
                                                     
597 European Commission - Press release ‘European Commission proposes signature and conclusion of EU-Canada trade deal’, 
Strasbourg, 5 July 2016; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2371_en.htm. 
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constellation of power function as ‘intervening’ variables in that specific context. Figure 7.3 
visualises this intervening effect. 
Figure 7. 2 Interactions variable EU’s position in the international constellation of power in 
case of a strong multilateral context 
 
 
Figure 7. 3 Interactions variable EU’s position in the international constellation of power in 
case of a weak/absent multilateral context 
 
Thirdly, the preference heterogeneity has a clear connection with both the legal competences 
as well as the supranational versus intergovernmental dominance. The interaction with the 
legal competences has little to do with the substantive content of the preferences but more 
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more lenient towards environment and trade, notable EU policy areas, there seems to be 
much more substantive convergence than when the arguments are more lenient towards 
energy autonomy or financial issues and taxation, which are strong national competences. 
Even within policy areas like climate action there is much more convergence on 
environmental substance than financial substance issues such as the EU contribution to the 
Green Climate Fund. Interestingly, the objective of a policy could also be analysed taking into 
account legal competences. As such, CO2 reduction can be considered an objective where 
there are already many regulations, directives and a multilateral context that drives 
coordination between EU and Member State actors. In contrast, an objective like ‘energy 
security’ comes much closer to national competences such as the energy mix, which will 
hinder coordination between EU and Member State actors.  
 
There is clear interaction and overlap between the variables of supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, preference heterogeneity and legal competences. They all 
refer to the politico-legal balance of power between EU and Member Studies (see Figure 
7.1). This dissertation points however, to a specific sub-category of ‘preference 
heterogeneity’ that appears to be distinguished from the supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance. This category could be named ‘preference heterogeneity 
between DGs/ministries’. Across the case studies there is alignment between specific  DGs 
and ministries, e.g. DG CLIMA and environment ministries. These ‘coalitions’ could however 
conflict with other coalitions, such as the economic coalitions of DG ECFIN and national 
ministries of economic affairs. These coalitions try to make use of legal competences. 
Therefore, one could say that this ‘new’ category of preference heterogeneity interacts with 
legal competences but can be an independent variable in itself. The interaction of this 
variable is visualised in Figure 7.4. 
 
 
Figure 7. 4 Interactions variable preference heterogeneity 
 
Taking these interactions and the importance of the variables into account, the mere 
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dependent variable ‘coordination of EU and Member State actors in sustainable development 
policies’ proved to be difficult to hold in practice. Instead, there are many politico-legal 
interactions between preference heterogeneity, supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance and the catalogue of competences and Treaty provisions. In that sense, the 
Treaty provisions themselves are the result of a political trade-off in the Treaty negotiations in 
the 2000s, thus making it implausible to mark the legal competences as ‘independent’ from 
political processes. Notwithstanding this fact, it is interesting to note that the logic of the 
Treaty is often used without political debate. Moreover, when the Treaty is deliberately not 
used there are frequently political reasons why this practice is not referred to the Court of 
Justice. Taking into account all these politico-legal interactions, it makes sense to combine 
these disciplines in analyses of EU and Member State action on sustainable development.    
 
7.6 Methodological limitations: criticising the three case studies  
As highlighted in the research design (ch 3), these selected case studies can be considered 
tests that can lead to valid ‘analytical generalisations’ or ‘emergent patterns’.598 The design 
with only three cases has the effect that there are more rival explanations to assess than 
cases to observe, ‘many variables, small N’.599 As a result, one should be careful in inferring 
general reflections from these three specific case studies.  
As previously identified, the climate change case has a unique institutional arrangement of 
lead negotiators and issue leaders, a large role for the Presidency and a ‘negotiation 
mandate’ based on unanimous Council conclusions. EU action on climate change is a 
‘saviour issue’ for the project of European integration itself.600 Moreover, the multilateral 
context with massive Conferences of the Parties of the UNFCCC gives climate change a 
distinct profile. Hence, besides being cautious in inferring conclusions about the legal 
competences this study additionally makes it clear that a sole focus on climate change 
negotiations does not make for valid analytical generalisations.  
Aside from the uniqueness of (Team EU in) the climate change negotiations, the other cases 
are further  unsettled. For the climate change case on the one hand, one could at least limit 
the timeframe from Copenhagen (2009) until Paris (2015) and after Paris (from 2015) until 
the new global stocktake (2018-2019) which mark distinct periods. On the other hand, SDG 
implementation is still an ongoing process that only started less than two years ago, when 
this case study was conducted. Moreover, within these two years601 the Commission has 
waited for fourteen months since the adoption of the Agenda 2030 ‘implementation strategy’ 
in November 2016. The process of formulating policies on alternative fuels is already taking 
longer. However, there have been such great ‘U-turns’ in this area that it is difficult to speak 
of coherent policies on alternative fuels from 2009. Notwithstanding these limitations, it the 
                                                     
598 Specifically, Groen L. (2016) The Importance of Fitting Activities to Context: The EU in Multilateral Climate and Biodiversity 
Negotiations. PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Toshkov, D. D. (2009) Between politics and administration: Compliance 
with EU law in Central and Eastern Europe. PhD Thesis Department of Public Administration, Faculty of Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, Leiden University. 
599 Lijphart, A. (1971) ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’. American Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3, p. 
686 and Collier, D. (1993) ‘Political Science: the state of discipline II’ in Finifter, A.W. (ed) American Political Science 
Association, 1993. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540884. Mahoney (2007: 128) holds in this respect that there 
are ‘criticisms pertaining to case-selection in small N-research’. Cf Mahoney, J. (2007) ‘Qualitative methodology and 
comparative politics’. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 122-144. 
600 Van Schaik, L. and Schunz, S. (2012) ‘Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Normor 
InterestDriven Actor?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 169. 
601 This case study focuses on the implementation of the Agenda 2030 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals from the 
adoption of the Agenda (September 2015) until July 2017. 
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case studies analyse ‘coordination’ more than the coherence of the policies. In that sense, it 
is not too methodologically problematic that the policies themselves are disconcerted. 
However, especially for SDG implementation, it is the case that there are sometimes 
completely new actors on the stage when compared to the previous (negotiation) phase 
which makes it difficult to compare periods. Therefore, more structured and focused process 
tracing would add value and improve the causal analysis.602 The results of this study analyse 
the ‘interaction’ of the legal competences with intervening variables more than the direct 
causal effect of these legal competences.    
In addition, while also an asset, this methodological approach lacks a specific internal or 
external dimension and is focused on EU and Member State action in a multilateral context 
(EU in UNFCCC negotiations), decision-making in an EU context (alternative fuels) and 
implementation in an internal and external context (SDG implementation). Therefore, the 
results cannot be valued as specifically applicable to (one of) these domains. However, 
previously demonstrated, the internal and external dimensions are increasingly linked (cf 
SDGs). A sole focus on internal or external dimensions would be superficial. As Delreux 
stated the “key to understand the negotiation behaviour of the EU on the international 
(environmental) scene is the domestic (EU) decision-making process’.603   
 
It could have been a better option to keep either the policy field constant or to keep the stage 
in the policy-making process constant. Such a choice would have negated that the 
differences between the cases can were a result of the to characteristics of the policy field or 
to the stage of the policy-making process. While this dissertation is comprehensive in the 
analysis of the coordination process, it could still be criticized as being too distinct in the 
comparison of case studies. 
 
Due to the limitations and small-N comparison the results in these case studies, synthesised 
or not, cannot be more than plausibility probes, comparable to pilot studies in experimental or 
survey research.604 As such, this study ‘explores the suitability’ of these cases as vehicle for 
testing a theory before starting a larger research effort.605 They need further testing in other 
cases to become more robust. Researchers could additionally conduct more semi-structured 
interviews or use other forms such as surveys or participant observation. While this is 
acknowledged, the pioneering theory-building exercise of the effect of legal competences on 
the coordination of sustainable development policies and negotiations within the EU needs 
closer scrutiny with a limited number of cases to start with. In that way, the three cases are 
relevant, as they are based on the same kind of sources and the methodology includes both 
legal and political theory approaches. Moreover, interactions with many of the ‘already 
existing’ issues are tested like the supranational versus  intergovernmental dominance and 
preference heterogeneity. It is shown that these explanations are in some way inaccurate 
without taking into account the legal competences in greater detail. 
 
                                                     
602 Cf Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2013) Process-tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (University of Michigan 
Press) for possibilities of more systematic process-tracing. The process tracing approach in this dissertation has been largely 
based on earlier seminal work on process tracing by e.g. George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory 
development in the social sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). 
603 Delreux, T. (2006) ‘The European Union in international environmental negotiations: a legal perspective on the internal 
decision-making process’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 232. 
604 Levy, J. S. (2008) ‘Case studies: Types, designs, and logics of inference’. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, 




SUMMARY CHAPTER 7 
The chapter synthesised the findings of three case studies on the influence of mixed legal 
competences on EU and Member State coordination of sustainable development policies. 
The cross-case comparison of ‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC negotiations, implementation of the 
UN Agenda 2030 in the EU and Member States and formulation of alternative fuel policies 
reveals that the actual claiming of competences and involvement of the Court of rarely 
occurs daily practice, at least for the European Commission. Moreover, the category of 
shared competences proves to be especially broad and many issues are arranged on an ad-
hoc basis. Nevertheless, the legal competences prove to have many interactions with issues 
from the literature: supranational versus intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in 
the international constellation of power and preference heterogeneity. These findings can be 
valued as minimal plausibility probes, due to  the small N and peculiarities of the cases. 
Regardless, this study contributes to a new methodological approach of analysing the EU’s 
and Member State’s coordination on sustainable development issues, both within the EU as 




Chapter 8: Conclusion and Discussion 
“The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe (…) and contribute to 
the sustainable development of the Earth” (Art 3(3) TEU and Art 3(5) TEU) 
This final chapter builds upon the synthesised empirical findings presented in the previous 
chapter. The concluding chapter is split into four sections. The first section (8.1) summarises 
and revisits the main empirical findings of this dissertation and answers the central research 
question: How do legal competences, affect EU and Member State coordination in 
formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable development policies? By 
reflecting on the three case studies this section answers the following additional sub-
question: How do the legal competences, interact with other explanations of EU and Member 
State coordination on sustainable development policies? This dissertation has analysed 
more specifically the interaction with the following issues: supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of power 
and preference heterogeneity. 
Section 8.2 provides reflections on the theoretical, methodological and conceptual aspects 
by focusing on advantages and limitations of the research design and methods. This section 
moreover reflects on the use of operationalised concepts, theories and variables as well as 
generalisability of the findings. Following the main findings and reflections, some avenues for 
future research are suggested in section 8.3, focusing on both the analysis of EU 
sustainability policies as well as further inquiry into the politico-legal effects of the division of 
competences and Treaty logic. The chapter concludes with section 8.4 in which the policy 
relevance of the findings (8.4.1) is addressed, followed by concluding remarks (8.4.2).   
8.1 Main findings 
The EU contribution to worldwide sustainable development has been extensively studied and 
increased interest is expected following the implementation of two landmark agreements: the 
Paris Climate Agreement and the UN Agenda 2030 with its 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals. In the day-to-day institutional and political discussions, the division of competences is 
one of the most divisive issues. These two issues converge in the coordination of EU and 
Member State actors of sustainable development policies. Little is known, however, about 
the political effect of legal competences on this coordination process. This is especially 
problematic for the analysis of sustainable development policies, as this is a ‘shared 
responsibility’ of EU and Member State actors.606 Moreover, formulation, negotiation and 
implementation of sustainable development policies encompass many policy areas and 
internal and external dimensions of EU policies. In a combined approach, many (implicit or 
explicit) assumptions in both approaches can be tested more extensively and possible myths 
can be checked. By combining legal and political insights, the conduct of coordinative action 
can be evaluated from input and process to outcome and impact, thereby contributing to the 
evaluation of EU diplomacy as well as of the effects of treaty modifications or new case law 
on EU and Member State relations.607  In that way, one would become more aware of the 
                                                     
606 European Commission (2016) ‘Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability’, COM (2016) 
739 final, Strasbourg, 22.11.2016, p. 16. 
607 Cf Kleistra, Y. and van Willigen, N. (2014). ‘Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges.’ In Koops, J.A. 
and Macaj, G. (eds) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 52-69. 
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‘actor characteristics’ of the EU and Member State actors.608 This dissertation has been a first 
attempt to assess the political influence of ‘legal competences’ on EU and Member State 
coordination of sustainable development policies. 
By means of a step-by-step politico-legal process tracing approach, three case studies have 
been conducted. The question driving this research was how legal competences affect EU 
and Member State coordination in formulation, negotiation and implementation of sustainable 
development policies. In addition, with a view to the objective of building bridges between the 
fields of law and political science, the interaction with other explanations from the theoretical 
and empirical literature has been incorporated into the analysis. Three of these ‘political-
theoretical’ issues have been included in the analysis as ‘intervening variables’.  
The expectation beforehand was that legal competences, especially those derived from EU 
Treaties, would have a considerable effect on coordination of EU and Member State actors in 
all stages of decision-making (policy formulation, negotiation and implementation). 
Furthermore, it was expected that there would be significant interaction with the explanations 
stemming from political theories, but that legal competences would be more dominant. 
Regarding the EU and Member State actors themselves, it was considered likely that the 
legal competences would empower the European Commission more, while restraining 
Member States actors. These latest findings would be in line with the most recent complaints 
from practice in which Member States seem to increasingly feel that their competences are 
being somewhat overtaken by the European Union.  
The table below (8.1) gives an overview of the relevance of legal competences (independent 
variables) and the political-theoretical intervening variables for EU and Member State 
coordination across the cases. A ‘weak’ relevance indicates that the source of legal 
competences or intervening variables is not (or seldom) applicable, according to the 
documents and interview findings. A ‘moderate’ relevance indicates that there is some use of 
this source of legal competences or that the political explanation is partly applicable; a 
‘strong’ relevance means that this source of legal competences or the political explanation 










Legal competences    
Competences and Treaty 
provisions 
Moderate Weak Moderate 
CJEU case law and principles Weak Moderate Moderate 
Regulations, directives and 
strategies 
Strong Moderate Moderate 
                                                     
608 See also. Vogler, J. (1999) ‘The European Union as an actor in international environmental politics’. Environmental Politics, 




documents and Statutes 
Weak Strong Moderate 
Intervening variables    
Supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance 
Moderate Weak Moderate 
EU’s positioning in the 
international constellation of 
power 
Weak Strong Moderate 
Preference heterogeneity Strong Weak (strong 
homogeneity) 
Moderate 
Table 8. 1 The relevance of legal competences and intervening variables for EU and Member 
State coordination of sustainable development policies across the cases 
The findings presented in chapter 7 nuance some of the theories and concepts in which the 
role of EU Treaties is often neglected. It also shows, however, that these legal competences 
are sometimes habitually not used, which has some important consequences. In that way, 
the interaction with intervening variables provides additional understanding. Contrary to 
expectations, the legal competences were often not per se enhancing the powers of the 
European Commission in the coordination process with Member States,. Instead, the 
Member State actors themselves often made use of their own legal competences on e.g. tax 
issues, energy mix or land-use.609 The European Commission seemed, in at least two out of 
the three case studies, unwilling to start legal procedures against coordination procedures 
where they seemed considerably weaker than prescribed by the Treaty. Moreover, in SDG 
implementation, the Commission could have used political and legal instruments to take a 
stronger coordination role.    
The remainder of this section will focus on the main findings of the coordination process 
(8.1.1) in relation to sources of legal competences (8.1.2) and (interactions with) intervening 
variables (8.1.3). It connects the answers to the research question(s) with the existing 
literature by addressing each variable in turn. Apart from the legal competences and 
intervening variables, the forty-seven semi-structured interviews in particular have pointed to 
‘other explanations’ that proved to be dominant in the specific case studies. These 
explanations often appear to be less influenced by legal competences, but need further 
testing. Section 8.1.2 concludes with a new visualisation of independent, interacting, 
intervening and dependent ‘variables’ based on the insights of this dissertation.  
8.1.1 Coordination 
Coordination has been defined as the process of contacts between diplomats and officials 
from EU institutions (especially the European Commission) and Member States with the 
                                                     
609 Interview other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 28-7-2016 (alternative fuels case study), Interview EU official, 13-6-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview 
EU official, 30-5-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-
2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
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purpose of discussing an issue of common interest and working towards a common 
position.These coordination processes can be internal (within the EU) or external 
(international) and include the discussion of the ‘management’ of the coordination. This 
process has been visible in all three case studies, although most evident in the climate 
change case study. With lower external pressure from outside the EU, as in the case of 
implementation of international agreements (SDGs case study) or in that of continent-
focused policy making (alternative fuels), the coordination has been less visible.  
 
The ‘managing actors’ of the coordination process have been different. In climate change 
negotiations, there is a clear substantive leadership from DG CLIMA (European 
Commission), which is most often matched by environment ministries and ministries of 
Foreign Affairs in Member States who have the powers to coordinate. The Presidency of the 
Council of the EU also has a strong coordination role within the process, although mostly, but 
not only, ceremonial.610 For SDG implementation, the situation is different, with the 
Secretariat-General of the European Commission in the coordinating seat, while in many 
Member States the synchronization of action on the 17 SDGs is not centrally organised.611 
Regarding r alternative fuels, there is a combination of DG Energy, DG Transport and 
sometimes DG CLIMA often (mis)matched by national ministries of Economic Affairs  in 
Member States. 
 
The findings across the case studies also show  that socialisation is a possible result of 
coordination, rather than an independent/intervening variable affecting it. Socialisation 
dynamics are very ambiguous and this explanation stops being helpful in case of an actual 
overhaul of actors involved, as in the case of alternative fuel policies and SDG 
implementation. This qualifies and criticises some of the literature that considers socialisation 
as a factor that can (strongly) affect EU and Member State coordination, such as literature on 
the EU in UNFCCC negotiations612. This dissertation takes a different stance and is of the 
opinion that socialisation (and coordination) is influenced by political and legal variables, and 
not the other way around.  
 
Socialisation could be even less influential for ‘Team EU’ in UNFCCC negotiations if the 
institutional set-up would adapt to the logic of the Treaty. This might be a reason why this 
‘repair’ was not considered in the run-up to the all-important Paris Agreement, but it could still 
be on the table when the implementation of the Paris Agreement is up and running and the 
competence-critical United Kingdom will leave the EU in 2019. The Commission might use 
‘political’ reasons not to ruin this strong socialisation process. As the SDG implementation 
and alternative fuel ‘socialisation processes’ demonstrated, this process is much more 
difficult when there are new actors and an absence of a multilateral context.    
                                                     
610 Interview EU official, 30-5-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview MS official, 13-6-2017, Interview EU official, 13-6-
2017. 
611 Cf  Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked 
governance (Oxford University Press) who hold that the secretariat-general is the ‘central player in coordination process. This 
book is also indicating the importance of individual DGs on the coordination process. 
612 E.g. Groenleer, M. L. and Van Schaik, L. G. (2007) ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 5, 
pp. 969-998, although this study was conducted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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8.1.2 Legal competences 
The case studies on formulating policies on alternative fuels, Team EU in UNFCCC 
negotiations and implementation of the UN Agenda 2030, and Sustainable Development 
Goals in EU and Member States, reveal that legal competences have some clear, but often 
moderate, influence on coordination processes. Stakeholders (EU officials, Member State 
officials and other societal stakeholders) experience this influence. In most of the case 
studies, the sources of legal competences have a ‘moderate’ effect (see Table 8.1). There 
are, however, some exceptions. The catalogue of competences and Treaty provisions are 
often not part of the coordination discussions in Team EU during UNFCCC negotiations, at 
least since 2010/2011. The CJEU case law and principles seem to have a weak effect in the 
case study on alternative fuels, but the regulations, directives and strategies have a strong 
effect. Furthermore, the external legal context is notably absent in the alternative fuels case 
study and prevalent in the UNFCCC Team EU case study.  
While the literature often focuses on the ‘creeping’ competences of the Commission, the 
case studies demonstrate that the Member State actors are protective of their fixed legal 
competences on e.g. taxation, the energy-mix or land-use policies.613 Despite this 
observation, the mixed and often ‘shared’ competences indeed ask for ‘loyal cooperation’ of 
EU and Member State actors614, which is mostly followed in practice. Consequentially, very 
few Member State actors try to ‘colour outside the (team EU) lines’ in international 
negotiations.615 There is a general feeling that implementation of international sustainable 
development agreements is a shared responsibility. As such, the powers legally defined by 
the Treaties and UN documents often mark the policy areas in which coordination is 
supposed to be more difficult and sketch the common path of coordination in negotiation and 
(to a lesser extent) policy formulation and implementation for these specific case studies. 
However, the empirical research likewise points to some important qualifications for the 
effect of legal competences. First, while the Lisbon Treaty was hailed because of the 
catalogue of competences in which powers are demarcated, it should be noted that in 
practice the category of ‘shared’ competences is wide-ranging and in need of specific 
examination per policy area. This is making coordination of multi-faceted mixed competence 
arrangements, analysed in this dissertation, increasingly difficult and often based on ad-hoc 
decisions. As an example, while in the same competence category, there are major 
differences between coordination of environmental (climate) policies when compared to 
energy or transport policies.  As such, the operationalisation of Da Conceicao-Heldt and 
Meunier (2014), presuming a direct correlation between competences and internal 
cohesiveness616, is too far-fetched from a more nuanced reality, especially in the category of 
shared competences. As held by the Court there are ‘implied powers’, which means that the 
adoption of internal regulations, directives and strategies has an effect on the Commission’s 
external powers. As a result, the category of shared competences can in practice lead to 
either 5, 50 or 95 percent ‘Commission-coordination’ powers or somewhere in between 
                                                     
613 Interview other societal stakeholder 1, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal stakeholder 2, 27-3-2017, Interview other societal 
stakeholder, 28-7-2016 (alternative fuels case study), Interview EU official, 13-6-2017, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview 
EU official, 30-5-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-
2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
614 Art 4(3) TEU. 
615 Interview Member State official, 03-04-2015. 
616 da Conceição-Heldt, E. and Meunier, S. (2014) ‘Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external 
effectiveness of the EU in global governance’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p.  969. 
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depending on the legal context. However, this is often unclear and asks for extensive legal 
background study and arguments.  
Even when the background legal information is considered, the practice in these case 
studies illustrates that the Commission, due to political consideration, sometimes deliberately 
chooses not to start legal procedures. This points to a second essential finding related to 
legal competences in sustainable development policies, namely the overall absence of the 
Court of Justice. While every case study provides for some clear examples of ‘contrary to the 
Treaty-logic’ or ‘contrary to sustainable development objective’, the Court is often not asked 
for a legal opinion. The Court could be asked to reflect on the very peculiar ‘Team EU’ 
arrangement in UNFCCC negotiations that is contrary to the logic of the Treaty in some 
respects. The Court could also be used to start infringement proceedings against Member 
State actors and their fuel policies. Likewise, the Court could be asked (by the Council) for a 
legal opinion whether or not the Commission should  do more in coordination of the Agenda 
2030 in EU and Member States. Nevertheless, the Commission seems to be hesitant in 
starting these procedures, thereby failing to push its legal competences to the limit.  
A third finding relates to the external legal context, which to a certain extent defines the 
internal coordination. Of the three case study examples, it is clear that the UNFCCC context 
is the most stringent, although not always legally binding. In a more binding multilateral 
context EU and Member State actors often have less difficulty coordinating their policies and 
positions. Contrastingly, in the absence of a multilateral forum, like the one that exists for 
alternative fuels, there seems to be less manifestation of coordination. When there is a 
multilateral context, but only very soft monitoring and reporting such as with the UN Agenda 
2030, this appears to hamper coordination according to the logic of the EU Treaties. 
Therefore, while the legal theories seem to be focused on ‘implied’ powers, rationale of 
external powers having an internal effect seems equally influential in the conduct of 
coordination of sustainable development policies.  
8.1.3 Interactions with intervening and other variables 
Apart from answering the main research question, it is essential to answer the sub-questions 
for this dissertation, in particular  how legal competences interact with other explanations of 
EU and Member State coordination on sustainable development policies. The following 
‘intervening variables’, derived from the literature, have been operationalised: supranational 
versus intergovernmental dominance, the EU’s position in the international constellation of 
power and preference heterogeneity. After conducting the different case studies, a more 
nuanced picture of the interaction between political and legal variables becomes clear.  
 
As chapter 7 and Table 8.1 have already revealed there are weak, moderate and strong 
effects of these intervening variables, and these can regularly be attributed to legal 
competences. It is no coincidence that the supranational versus intergovernmental 
dominance variable has no strong effect in the three case studies, as the mixed, and often 
shared, competence agreements prescribe coordination instead of conflict and autonomy. 
The ‘EU’s position in the international constellation of power’ affects coordination and the 
‘importance’ of this variable mirrors the relevance of UN Statutes and documents (external 
legal competences) affecting coordination. To be more precise, a strong effect on 
coordination does not mean that the EU itself has a strong position in the international 
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constellation of power. For example, as the third largest emitter the EU is often positioned as 
having moderate power at the global stage.617  
 
Preference heterogeneity is a more independent (and interacting) variable from the legal 
competences in these case studies. In the case of alternative fuels, historical fuel choices 
and domestic stakeholders often influence preference heterogeneity across the Member 
States. However, in that case, Member States can use their autonomous competences on 
tax, energy mix and land use to hinder coordination. The absence of preference 
heterogeneity, or instead substantive convergence, in Team EU during UNFCCC 
negotiations is probably related to the EU’s position in the international context. The 
preference heterogeneity in SDG implementation is mixed per policy area and appears partly 
dependent on the division of competences.  
 
For every case study, there are other, case-specific, explanations that turn out to be 
dominant according to  the interviews. These include the involvement of other societal 
stakeholders, the emotional state of the debate (alternative fuels) and political will (positively 
in UNFCCC negotiations and negatively in SDG implementation). These explanations seem 
less influenced by legal competences, but need further testing. It should be noted that the 
interlinkage between ‘political will/political support’ and ‘coordination’ had previously been 
identified by e.g. Jordan and Schout (2006: 271).618  More generally, the ‘other explanation’ 
of differences between specific DGs/ministries affecting coordination between EU and 
Member State actors was shown prominently in every case study.619 This explanation could 
even be considered more important than the differences between (EU and) Member State 
actors. It seems that this ‘preference heterogeneity across DGs and Ministries’ has an 
independent and interacting relationship with legal competences. This new variable appears 
to be specifically important for ‘sustainable development’ policies. The normative debate on 
sustainability and economic growth ‘within planetary boundaries’ is, for example, differently 
evaluated in climate and environment ministries than in finance ministries.  
 
Figure 8.1 visualises how the findings in these case studies would change the expected 
nature of the relationship between independent and intervening variables affecting the 
dependent variable ‘coordination of EU and Member State actors in sustainable development 
policies’. When compared to the ‘variables and expectations of relations’ (see Figure 1.1), 
there are some differences. First, there is no longer a category of ‘intervening variables’ but 
rather independent, though interacting, political and legal variables that affect coordination. 
Secondly, the legal multilateral context and the EU’s positioning in the international 
constellation of power are considered ‘preceding’ steps in the process. Thirdly, the category 
‘preference heterogeneity between DGs/ministries’ is added and fourthly, ‘preference 
heterogeneity (between EU and Member States)’ and ‘supranational versus 
intergovernmental dominance’ are merged. These adaptations reflect the interaction between 
                                                     
617 Bäckstrand, K., and Elgström, O. (2013) ‘The EU's role in climate change negotiations: from leader to ‘leadiator’. Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 10, p. 1380. 
618 “coordination capacities at network and actor level need political pressure”. Jordan, A. and Schout, A. (2006) The 
coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance (Oxford University Press), p. 271. 
619 Interview EU official, 7-9-2016, Interview MS official, 7-9-2016, Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-9-2016, Interview EU 
official, 31-3-2017 (alternative fuels case study), Interview EU official, 14-10-2015, Interview MS official, 8-6-2017, Interview EU 
official, 13-6-2017 (climate change case study), Interview EU official, 2-5-2017. Interview other societal stakeholder, 29-5-2017. 
Interview other societal stakeholder, 7-6-2017. Interview EU official, 7-6-2017. Interview MS official, 13-6-2017 (SDG 
implementation case study). 
 
158 
legal powers and political issues to a larger extent, but need to be further tested in 
systematic sustainable development policy case studies. 
 
 
Figure 8. 1 Variables affecting coordination EU and Member State actors in sustainable 
development policies  
8.2 Theoretical, conceptual and methodological reflections 
The objective of this dissertation was to contribute to the academic literature and the 
integrative academic debate, by exploring interactions between political and legal 
descriptions of EU and Member State coordination of sustainable development policies. 
Legal sources such as Treaties and case law have been combined with empirical sources 
including forty-seven semi-structured interviews. While this innovative design and 
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methodology has some clear-cut advantages, there are also limitations to this approach 
(8.2.1). This section reflects on the potential of this integrative approach, the shortcomings, 
conceptual and theoretical considerations (8.2.2) as well as generalisability of the findings 
(8.2.3).620  
8.2.1 Research design and methods 
This framework tries to contribute to an upcoming call in the literature to combine political 
and legal variables and indicators to come to a comprehensive assessment framework of EU 
sustainable development decision-making, negotiation and implementation.621  The 
innovative design of this dissertation could be seen as a kind of ‘politico-legal analysis’.622 
Formal issues derived from Treaty provisions and official (legal) documents are combined 
with interview findings, thereby using the ‘toolbox’ of legal scholars and political scientists.623 
The combination of qualitative process tracing and legal documents in EU research is not 
often used, except for some gender-related studies.624  By combining legal and empirical 
sources, this explorative study does not distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ or primary or 
secondary sources.625 That is one of the limitations of this integrative approach: a 
prioritisation in sources is lacking. One could argue that this dissertation places the Treaty 
provisions in the foreground. However, empirical information highlights some very specific 
political ‘tipping points’ where the legal provisions become less important. These tipping 
points might be overlooked when there is a legal prioritisation in a future research design.  
The objective of this dissertation was to explore the potential of legal competences as the 
explaining factor for EU and Member State coordination in sustainable development policies. 
With this explorative objective in mind, the approach has been to operationalise the ‘legal 
competences’ in a broad manner, including Treaty articles, the Court’s case law, the external 
legal multilateral context as well as regulations and directives. This approach proved useful 
as it differed per case study which ‘legal competence’ was the most relevant. With the broad 
operationalisation of legal competences, these different sources were distinguished but not 
prioritised. While one could argue that it all starts with the Treaties and their delineation of 
competences,626 this is not per se how it is experienced in practice. Nevertheless, this 
approach already goes significantly further than the current empirical operationalisation of 
the division of competences in which the categories of competences are often used as ‘ideal 
                                                     
620 For a reflection on the limitations of the (design of the) comparative case studies see also sub-section 7.2.4. 
621 Oberthür, S. and Groen, L. (2015) ‘The Effectiveness Dimension of the EU's Performance in International Institutions: 
Toward a More Comprehensive Assessment Framework’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1319-
1335. See also Kleistra, Y. and van Willigen, N. (2014). ‘Evaluating the Impact of EU Diplomacy: Pitfalls and Challenges.’ In 
Koops, J.A. and Macaj, G. (eds) The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 52 for the 
suggestion of a necessary change in evaluating EU diplomacy from (formal) input and process to (formal/informal) outcome and 
(informal) impact. 
622 Kamphof, R., and Wessel, R.A. (2018) ‘Analysing shared competences in EU external action: the case for a politico-legal 
framework’. Europe and the World: A law review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 38-64. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2018.02.  
623 Panke, D. (2014) ‘The European Union in the United Nations: an effective external actor?’. Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 21, No. 7, p. 1054. 
624 Cf Cichowski, R. A. (2004) ‘Women's rights, the European Court, and supranational constitutionalism’. Law & Society 
Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 489-512. 
625 Wasserfallen, F. (2010) ‘The judiciary as legislator? How the European Court of Justice shapes policy-making in the 
European Union?’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 17, No. 8, p. 1136 says to follow Moravcsik, A. (1998) The choice for 
Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 80-82 and his 
‘advice to rely on ‘hard primary sources’, namely, Treaty Articles, Directives, European Parliament documents, European Court 
of Justice judgements and reports on the negotiations in the Council’ although this is not so sharply put in Moravcsik’s work.    
626 Jørgensen, K. E. and Wessel, R. A. (2011) ‘The position of the European Union in (other) international organizations: 
confronting legal and political approaches’. In Koutrakos, P. (ed) European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), p. 264. 
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types’. Indeed, as Van Schaik (2012:23) held, the mixed competence cases do often ‘not fall 
within these ideal types’ and ‘often combine topics where the competence division varies’.627  
This dissertation in parallel makes use of semi-structured interviews. These interviews are 
planned after a stakeholder analysis, reviewing organigrams of EU institutions and 
governments of EU Member States, and snowball sampling. Each interviewed official is 
anonymised (see Annex 1), the interviews take 45-60 minutes, the interviewees receive the 
topic list at the latest one day before the interview (see annex 2), and each expert is asked 
whether he/she could refer to other experts. There are a couple of limitations of the use of 
semi-structured interviews in this dissertation, which have been indicated before (see 3.2.1). 
While a critical reflection on this method is invaluable, inclusion of findings from semi-
structured interviews seems complementary to a review of official (legal) documents and 
especially legal provisions from the Treaties. It is advisable to continue using this 
methodological approach in conjunction with the use of other sources.   
The concept of coordination has been defined broadly in this dissertation. This proved to be 
useful in the description of processes in the different case studies. However, it also 
complicates structured comparison. Overall, this dissertation has not invested too much in 
dedicated questions in the research design (and semi-structured interviews) on the 
manifestation of this dependent variable. Instead, the bulk of the analysis was focused on 
independent and intervening variables. As such, future research would profit from more 
dedicated questions and comparative analysis on the dependent variable coordination, now 
that the effects of the independent, interacting politico-legal variables have proved to be 
promising.  
The dissertation could also have benefited from clear-cut hypotheses, specifying which effect 
was expected from variables on coordination. It would have fit well with the positivist 
approach of independent, intervening and dependent variables. Moreover, this would have 
made the research design more robust with better justified intervening variables and their 
effect on the dependent variable. It has nevertheless been a deliberate choice not to work 
with hypotheses, so as to stay open to other arguments and to work explicitly on a combined 
innovative politico-legal academic formula, rather than opting for the traditional empirical way 
of using hypotheses. This research design has been one of ‘hypothesis- seeking’. It is 
expected that the results pave the way for more clear-cut hypotheses to test whether the 
theoretical expectations raised in this dissertation could indeed be confirmed.  
8.2.2 Conceptual and theoretical reflections 
In this dissertation, a set of general questions has been used for each case study, to guide 
both the legal analysis and the semi-structured interviews. This process tracing approach 
was chosen for the qualitative data analysis. It is common to use process tracing to identify 
causal effects.628 The concept of causality needs critical reflection after this research project. 
As it has been held by Furlong and Marsh (2010: 184-185), one’s epistemological position is 
fundamental to how one understands causality and explanation.629 While ‘playing the game’ 
                                                     
627 Van Schaik, L.G. (2013) EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations: More Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 23. 
628 King, G., Keohane, R. O. and Verba, S. (1994) Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research (Princeton 
University Press). Cf Collier, D. (2011) ‘Understanding process tracing’. PS: Political Science & Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp 823-
830. 
629 Furlong, P. and Marsh, D. (2010) ‘A skin not a sweater: ontology and epistemology in political science’ in: Marsh, D. and 
Stoker, G. (eds) Theory and Methods in Political Science, 3rd edition (Palgrave MacMillan), pp. 184-185. 
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of causality and variables, this dissertation is ultimately critical about pure causality. It sees 
the interaction of political and legal variables having a causal effect on the coordination of EU 
and Member State actors as most crucial when evaluating the conduct of EU sustainable 
development policies. As some other critics already argue, causal mechanisms are 
‘unobservable’630 and ‘social constructs’ without ‘real-world existence’631. That is one of the 
reasons why the main question is whether legal competences affect EU and Member State 
coordination instead of asking a more teleological question. Indeed, the legal competences 
affect EU and Member State coordination alongside other variables. 
The concept of sustainable development also proved to be difficult to operationalise in this 
dissertation, which affects the generalisability of the findings.632 The concept was previously 
particularly known for its environmental aspects and (to some extent) poverty eradication. 
However, the Agenda 2030 ‘on sustainable development’ not only encompasses the recent 
‘three dimensions’ (environmental, social and economic), but also the  security and human 
rights dimensions. Apart from the SDG implementation case study, the CFSP dimension of 
sustainable development is almost totally excluded from this dissertation. While there are 
good reasons not to include CFSP633 in this analysis, such an inclusion could be relevant, 
especially with upcoming themes such as ‘sustainable peace’ and ‘planetary security’.634  
 
Observing the ‘extended’ use of the concept of sustainable development, one could argue 
that almost all policies qualify as ‘sustainable development’ policies in the framework of the 
UN Agenda 2030. This appears to have negative effects on the analysis of sustainable 
development policies in the EU. There are many aspects on which the case studies differ, 
which might also offer possible explanations for the differences in outcomes between 
them.635 Reflections on the use of this concept in future academic contributions are 
recommended, to see whether it is still useful to speak of ‘sustainable development’ policies. 
Nevertheless, the UN Agenda 2030 and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, 169 targets 
and 230 indicators already ‘operationalise’ this concept in both qualitative and quantitative 
ways, which could be used in future research.  
 
Another reflection in relation to the current literature is that the internal and external 
‘dimensions’ of EU policies are increasingly connected. There is significant difficulty in 
distinguishing between these dimensions. As the UN Agenda 2030 and e.g. SDG12 on 
responsible consumption and production already indicated, there are many external effects 
of internal policies. The mirroring and parallelisation of internal and external EU dimensions 
                                                     
630 Ibid, p. 137.  
631 Cf Vukovic, S. (2012) Analysis of multiparty mediation processes. Doctoral dissertation, Universiteit Leiden. 
632 The academic history is full of difficult concepts to analyze coordination of EU and Member State actors. Cf Jordan, A. and 
Schout, A. (2006) The coordination of the European Union: exploring the capacities of networked governance (Oxford University 
Press).who analyze the coordination for ‘Environmental Policy Integration’ (EPI). 
633 See section 1.2.5. Reasons include a.o. the different institutional framework when compared with other (external) policies 
and the fact that the Court of Justice has no legal competence on CFSP policies according to the Treaty. 
634 Cf ‘Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining 
Peace’, Statement by H.E. Mr Peter Thomson, President of the 71st Session of the UN General Assembly, 1 April 2017, 
accessed http://www.un.org/pga/71/2017/04/01/building-sustainable-peace-for-all-synergies-between-the-2030-agenda-for-
sustainable-development-and-sustaining-peace/, 17 October 2017. On ‘planetary security’ cf the Planetary Security Initiative, 
https://www.planetarysecurityinitiative.org/, accessed 17 October 2017. 
635 Groen L. (2016) The Importance of Fitting Activities to Context: The EU in Multilateral Climate and Biodiversity Negotiations. 
PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, p. 80. Cf George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in 
the social sciences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press) and Della Porta, D. (2008). Comparative analysis: case-oriented 
versus variable-oriented research. In Della Porta, D. and Keating, M. (2008) Approaches and methodologies in the social 
sciences: A pluralist perspective (Cambridge University Press), pp. 198-217. 
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could result in better-aligned policies and policy coherence for sustainable development.636 
While legal scholars point to the difficult EU external relations terminology and absence of 
legal provisions on external competences in the Treaty, the UN Agenda 2030 as well as the 
Court’s case law give ample reasons to align the internal and external dimensions of EU 
sustainable development policies. 
Apart from the conceptual reflections, this dissertation points to some theoretical and 
empirical reflections.  When compared to current research, this dissertation has 
operationalised the concept of mixed competences in a broader and more nuanced way than 
previous contributions. As such, the operationalisation of Da Conceicao-Heldt and Meunier 
(2014), with a direct correlation between competences and internal cohesiveness, proves to 
be unsatisfactory, at least for EU sustainable development policies. There are at least three 
reasons why this framework set out by Da Conceicao-Heldt and Meunier is less useful for 
sustainable development policies. First, as these case studies have shown, many policy 
trajectories include multiple policy areas and mixed competence arrangements. Secondly, 
the broad legal competences encompass much more than just the catalogue of competences 
and include for instance the Court’s case law, regulations, directives, and the UN legal 
context. Thirdly, as this dissertation makes clear, there is much more interaction between 
legal and political variables that affect internal cohesiveness than just the exclusive, shared 
or supportive notion of competences.  
Furthermore, this dissertation has chosen to operationalise the grand theories of neo-
functionalism, intergovernmentalism, social constructivism and institutionalism, and concepts 
such as actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness into functional and basic ‘variables’ in the 
case studies. Of course, these ‘variables’ can be criticised for not representing the whole 
theory. Despite this, by using this ‘bits and pieces’ approach, one could already see the 
interactions with the legal competences and it proves that there is at least appetite for 
including more general legal notions in these theories and empirical applications. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, this dissertation does indeed suggest combining political and 
legal variables in the assessment of coordination of sustainable development policies by EU 
and Member State actors. 
8.2.3 Generalisability of findings 
As it has been argued before, this analysis has concentrated on three specific sustainable 
development cases, thus restricting over-generalisation of these specific patterns identified in 
the case studies. Overall, the study should be understood as a plea to combine existing and 
new legal and political insights to better understand the effects of legal choices on political 
practice and vice versa.637 Moreover, the study intended to qualify and nuance some of the 
literature in which legal competences are scarcely taken into account. The results from this 
study can only be valued as ‘plausibility probes’, providing interesting avenues for future 
research, yet it is acknowledged that they need further testing in other cases to become 
more robust.638  
                                                     
636 Cf Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017) ‘Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development 2017’ 
with contributions from the author, available via http://www.oecd.org/publications/policy-coherence-for-sustainable-development-
2017-9789264272576-en.htm. 
637 Cf Kamphof, R., and Wessel, R.A. (2018) ‘Analysing shared competences in EU external action: the case for a politico-legal 
framework’. Europe and the World: A law review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 38-64. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444.ewlj.2018.02  
638 George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press). See also chapter 3 and 7.2.4.  
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Moreover, the research makes it clear that one should be very cautious in inducing any 
general pattern from the peculiar case of climate change negotiations. This UNFCCC 
arrangement is unique in many aspects: the multilateral context, the mass event of the COP, 
and officials working on UNFCCC issues rather isolated from other issues for at least five to 
ten years. Additionally, the ‘Team EU’ approach with a large role for the Presidency of the 
Council, ‘lead negotiators’ and ‘issue leaders’, and the negotiation mandate based on 
unanimous Council conclusions are all  unique aspects, when compared to other policy 
areas and negotiation structures. While the issue itself can be viewed as a ‘saviour’ issue639, 
and the socialising approach within Team EU is hailed as bringing a ‘trend towards the 
emergence of a European identity among EU negotiators’,640 there are many weaknesses. 
These shortcomings include inter alia wieldy procedures, dependence on personal relations 
and result in legal uncertainty.  
8.3 Further research 
This exploration of the potential of a politico-legal analysis where ‘legal competences’ interact 
with intervening variables to analyse the EU and Member State coordination on sustainable 
development policies has brought some important insights which could lead to theory 
development and a broader assessment framework. The three case studies (chapter 4,5 and 
6) have already set the scene with avenues for future research on the specific issues: ‘Team 
EU’ in UNFCCC negotiations, EU alternative fuel policies and SDG implementation across 
the EU and Member States. This section promotes more abstract and general ideas for 
further research.  
 
In the first place, this dissertation seems to show that the legal competences often do provide 
guidance on EU and Member State coordination in sustainable development policies. As the 
operationalisation of these powers has been rather broad, one could analyse whether some 
legal aspects have more authority than others e.g. the role of the Court of Justice or the 
development and evolution of Treaty provisions in practice. In addition, and interestingly, this 
study sheds light on particular political events in which legal aspects do not play a role and 
legal competences are deliberately not pushed to the limit by (especially) the European 
Commission. Van Schaik (2010) found that EU competences are sometimes considered a 
‘legal straightjacket’ by Member States that ‘forces them to coordinate’.641 Despite this 
understanding in the literature, this investigation lends support to the idea that competences 
are pushed more by Member States, especially to keep discretionary autonomy on e.g. 
financial (taxation) issues, the energy mix or land-use issues. These political battles on the 
division of competences, and more specifically the reasons why legal competences are 
habitually not used, could be the focus of further research. The finding that there are 
conditions in which the legal competences are used more stringently can be tested as a 
hypothesis for new cases.  
 
For the research to become more robust, findings of larger comparative case studies beyond 
sustainability policies appear to be needed, especially to reflect on mixed and shared 
                                                     
639 Van Schaik, L. and Schunz, S. (2012) ‘Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Normor 
InterestDriven Actor?’. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 169. 
640 Oberthür, S. (2011) ‘The European Union’s performance in the international climate change regime’. Journal of European 
Integration, Vol. 33, No. 6, p. 672. 
641 Van Schaik, L.G. (2010). ‘Is the Sum More than its Parts? A Comparative Case Study on the Relationship between EU Unity 
and its Effectiveness in Multilateral Negotiations’, PhD thesis, Catholic University Leuven, 2010. 
 
164 
competences. One could think of development aid (shared non-pre-emptive competence), 
social policies (shared competences in case of minimum Union standards), or military issues 
(shared competences in the field of foreign and security policy, no competence for the Court 
of Justice).642 Furthermore, it would be relevant to assess the effects of the separate legal 
status of the EU, in particular international organisations on the influence of the EU in that 
particular policy area.  
 
As the case study on implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 revealed, this implementation 
of international sustainable development agreements is often under-researched. Specifically 
in the implementation phase, political and legal arguments take centre stage again. As such, 
the original academic contribution of analysing the legal provisions and EU competences that 
(could) define the implementation of the SDGs (see 6.2) adds value. However, seeing that 
there have been many sustainable development agreements adopted in the last decade, it 
makes sense to focus more theoretically and empirically on the use of legal competences 
and political arguments in implementation of sustainable development policies.  
 
With regards to the empirical methods used, this specific politico-legal approach of process 
tracing could be adjusted by including, for instance, survey interviews (for prioritisation, 
impact and saliency of legal competences) or participant observation (for more practical 
knowledge of the ‘course of affairs in an (international) negotiation arena’643). Efforts can be 
devoted to including a more external third country/international organisation perspective on 
EU-Member State relations. Furthermore, regarding the interview sources one could try to 
speak to more judges to reflect on their political role. A methodical quantitative and/or 
qualitative content analysis of EU statements and documents could be considered, both 
within the EU or at United Nations organ level. These kinds of analyses could lead to firmer 
findings on how the EU and Member States coordinate their sustainable development 
policies.  
 
Another avenue for future research on sustainable development policies is the inclusion of 
other societal stakeholders and their effect on the coordination of EU and Member State 
actors. One could think of larger multinational corporations, but also civil society 
organisations, interest groups, cities, and regions. As held in chapter 6, a promising area 
further concerns the Sustainable Development Goals as a framework to work more 
coherently towards sustainable development, both internally as well as in EU and Member 
State external relations. Furthermore, the ‘high politics’ events including Trump’s announced 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, UN system transformation, Brexit, and President 
Juncker’s Scenarios on the Future of Europe644 might have considerable impact, but it is 
most likely too early to investigate their effects seeing the upcoming procedural (legal) issues 
and (political) negotiations in the coming years. 
8.4 Policy relevance and concluding remarks 
While the original focus of this study was to explore the academic potential of legal 
competences in interaction with intervening (political theoretical) variables, there were some 
                                                     
642 These categories of shared (external) competences originate from Van Vooren, B. and Wessel, R. A. (2014) EU external 
relations law: text, cases and materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 100-132.  
643 Groen L. (2016) The Importance of Fitting Activities to Context: The EU in Multilateral Climate and Biodiversity Negotiations. 
PhD Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, p. 387. 
644 European Commission, ‘White Paper on the Future of Europe: reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025’ [2017].  
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findings that could affect the policy dimension of sustainable development policies. 
Therefore, this dissertation concludes with some findings relevant for policy-makers focusing 
on the question whether/which institutional and Treaty reform is needed to enable 
coordination on sustainable development policies. Furthermore, the relevance of the legal 
uncertainty combined with the effect of some more political variables as found in some case 
studies is addressed, with specific attention on citizens and companies. Thereafter, some 
concluding remarks are shared.   
8.4.1 Policy relevance 
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty has been the result of a long, heavy inward-looking 
negotiation process in the EU and many are afraid to lift the lid on the political ‘Pandora’s 
box’ of Treaty negotiations again soon. This strong appeal is understandable from a policy 
negotiator’s perspective, but it should not relieve academic researchers of the obligation to 
consider the effects of Treaty provisions and evolved legal competences in practice. Seeing 
the transitions needed for sustainable development within the planetary boundaries of the 
Earth according to recent international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the UN 
Agenda 2030, it is increasingly crucial that these Treaty provisions are checked for their 
flexibility. This dissertation has outlined the practicalities of these Treaty provisions in three 
specific complex mixed competence arrangements: alternative fuel policies, Team EU in 
UNFCCC climate negotiations and implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
Legal competences are influential in the three case studies, mostly in connection with the 
intervening variables. The empirical and legal material reveals that the Treaty and the 
principle of loyal cooperation is often used in practice. The near inevitability that Member 
State actors will ultimately not ‘colour outside the lines’ of the shared mandate, especially in 
multilateral negotiations, could be a soothing idea. However, the other side of the coin is that 
the EU and Member State actors tend to limit and control each other while forgetting to think 
outside of the box. This lack of innovation and ambition is harmful specifically for current 
sustainable development policies, as these are in dire need of transformation. 
There are examples where the Treaty provisions and the Court’s case law are not used and 
there is an apparent hesitation to ask the Court for clarity. The objectives behind this legal 
‘misbehaviour’ are often not cutting red tape or better regulation for the ‘sustainable 
development of the Earth’645, but are instead the result of purely political considerations. 
Examples include keeping the wieldy ‘Team EU’ approach in climate negotiations, not 
starting infringement proceedings against Member States on slanted fuel policies and 
keeping the situation of SDG implementation and Commission coordination as indulgent as it 
is now.  
It is expected that this situation will soon change and legal arguments will become (more) 
manifest in explaining the coordination between EU and Member State actors in sustainable 
development policies. First, with the Paris Agreement and the SDGs there is increasingly a 
multilateral context in which the EU could flourish as an actor, and EU and Member State 
coordination is needed against ‘the rest of the world’. Former allies including the United 
States are going their own way, as the Trump administration’s announced withdrawal from 
                                                     
645 Art 3(5) TEU. 
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the Paris Agreement makes clear. This could soften or strengthen EU and Member State 
coordination depending on the binding nature of the ‘global stocktake’ of ambitions. 
Secondly, the Court of Justice, until now notably absent from sustainable development 
discussions, recently started to meddle in the debate with its opinion on the Singapore 
Agreement in which it stated that the objective of sustainable development could be seen as 
an ‘integral part’ of the common commercial policy, an exclusive competence. 646 This 
opinion, as well as a number of questions that are raised in this dissertation, might lead to a 
stronger involvement of the Court of Justice and more political effects of legal competences 
on sustainable development policies. 
Moreover, with the upcoming British exit from the EU the Union loses one of its most legal 
competences-critical members of the club.647 This could mean that legal competences are 
reinstated after Brexit, ‘repairing’ previously Treaty-loose procedures like the Team EU in 
UNFCCC negotiations on the one hand. On the other hand, as the SDG implementation 
process ‘second working stream’ already makes clear, the Commission will be internally 
focused in the coming years and might make some stronger decisions on legal competences 
only when the next College of Commissioners (2019-2024) will take office. It is expected that 
the Commission especially could upgrade its profile when legal issues come back to the 
forefront, however as always in strong interaction with the other variables. In that way, the 
intention of this study is to contribute to a politico-legal analysis of EU sustainability action by 
EU and Member State actors. 
The good news is that it is not necessary to start a process of Treaty reform. The catalogue 
of competences has clarified which policy areas are in the exclusive coordination hands of 
the Commission and which policy areas are to remain within the discretionary autonomy of 
Member States. This division is often used in practice. However, while other authors already 
refer to the lack of clarity on EU external competences this dissertation pinpoints the 
potpourri of shared competences. One almost needs a legal and historical background to 
understand the differences between policy areas that seem to belong to the same category 
while working so different in practice, such as environment (climate), energy and transport 
policies. This uncertainty needs to be clarified, as it now has the effect of a disconnect of 
policies, legal and political uncertainty, and the near-necessity for new EU and Member State 
actors to orientate for many months before understanding the legal and political complexities 
of each policy area in conjunction. Moreover, the drive of Member State actors to keep all 
competences on financial (taxation) issues and energy mix as close to national autonomy as 
possible is hampering coordination of sustainable development policies as demonstrated by 
all the case studies. Seeing the transboundary character of sustainability challenges, one 
could think of more EU competences in this area, although this is likely to open up the ‘black 
box’ of Treaty reforms.    
This oft-legal guidance and (sometimes) politico-legal uncertainty affects citizens and 
companies. For companies, legal uncertainty is difficult, especially on sustainable 
development policies, as they are mostly waiting for the legal framework to be set by 
                                                     
646 Court of Justice of the European Union (2017) ‘The free trade agreement with Singapore cannot, in its current form, be 
concluded by the EU alone’, press release no 52/17, Luxembourg, 16 May 2017, accessed via 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170052en.pdf. 
647 Cf Government of the United Kingdom (2015) Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 




governments.648 One could argue that the examples presented by this dissertation might 
open up ‘Urgenda-like’ cases649  at EU level in which the EU and Member State coordination 
can be challenged by citizens and CSOs as insufficient and ‘unlawful’ in its quest for 
sustainable development. However, it is not possible for citizens to directly complain to the 
Court of Justice is about this situation as it does not directly infringe their rights and the 
Court’s mandate is to settle legal disputes between national governments and EU 
institutions.650 EU and Member State actors deliberately avoid these legal disputes. Citizens 
thus need other means to strengthen the sustainable development policies. 651 In light of the 
increased awareness and support for more stringent sustainability policies at EU 
coordination level, it can be expected that these issues will be addressed at another 
(political/media) level with reference to the legal situation.  
8.4.2 Concluding remarks 
Overall, this dissertation has explored the potential for including the legal competences from 
Treaty provisions in the empirical analysis of EU and Member State coordination on 
sustainable development policies. While the findings themselves could be seen as 
‘plausibility probes’ there are many new avenues for further research, theory development 
and an integrative politico-legal assessment framework sketched. With the global 
sustainability challenges lying ahead of the EU and Member States in relation to the wider 
world, it is hoped that all possibilities are explored to work towards the ‘overarching objective’ 
of sustainable development for the Earth, as promised in the Treaty.  
 
This dissertation has tried to build bridges between legal and empirical studies and (in the 
case of alternative fuel policies) between technical and political studies. By including more 
cases in new analyses, future research can make use of this exploration to optimise potential 
for both disciplines to reach sustainable development objectives. In that way the official motto 
of the EU, in varietate concordia (united in diversity), could be an inspiration for a concerted 
academic effort to address the various pressing global challenges that the EU and its citizens 
are currently facing. 
  
                                                     
648 Cf Steurer, R. (2010) ‘The role of governments in corporate social responsibility: Characterising public policies on CSR in 
Europe’. Policy Sciences, Vol. 43, No. 1, p. 51 stating that “The base level of responsible behavior for any organization is legal 
compliance and the Government has a role to play in setting standards in areas such as environmental protection, health & 
safety and employment rights. The Government can also provide a policy and institutional framework that stimulates companies 
to raise their performance [voluntarily] beyond minimum legal standards.” 
649 Urgenda v The Netherlands, The Hague District Court (24 June 2015) ECLI:NL: RBDHA:2015:7196 (original language: 
ECLI:NL: RBDHA:2015:7145). For a legal analysis cf de Graaf, K. J. and Jans, J. H. (2015) ‘The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands 
Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change’. Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp 517-527. 
650 Art 263 TFEU. 
651 European Commission Special Eurobarometer (2014) ‘Climate change’ Special Eurobarometer 409 / Wave EB80.2, March 
2014.  European Commission Special Eurobarometer (2014) ‘Attitudes of European citizens towards the environment’, Special 
Eurobarometer 416, September 2014. Cf Falkner, R. (2007) ‘The political economy of ‘normative power’ Europe: EU 
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Annex 1: List of Interviews  
Anonymised version without ‘name’ and ‘function and organisation’ categories. Please 
contact the author whenever you might need more information about the interviews 
(ries.kamphof@gmail.com). 
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Yes SDGs Own initiative Brussels 
08-06-2017 MS official Yes Climate 
change 
Referral Brussels 

















































07-06-2017 EU official Yes Climate 
change 



















Own initiative The Hague 
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Own initiative The Hague 
13-06-2017 EU official Yes SDGs Referral Brussels 
24-01-2014 MS official No Climate 
change 



























22-07-2016 MS official No Alternat
ive 
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Yes SDGs Own initiative Brussels 























14-10-2015 EU official Yes Climate 
change 








Yes SDGs Own initiative Brussels 
31-03-2017 EU official No Alternat
ive 
fuels 


















Own initiative The Hague-
Bonn, Skype, 
also attended 





















Referral The Hague 
14-06-2017 MS official Yes Climate 
change 
Referral The Hague, 
Riga (by 
phone) 
03-04-2015 MS official Yes Climate 
change 





Yes SDGs Referral  Brussels 
12-06-2017 MS official Yes SDGs Own initiative Brussels 
07-09-2016 EU Official No Alternat
ive 
fuels 
























10-08-2016 MS official No Alternat
ive 
fuels 




02-05-2017 EU official Yes SDGs Own initiative Brussels 
26-08-2015 
&  
MS official No Climate 
change 










13-06-2017 MS official Yes Climate 
change 
Own initiative Brussels,  
Unintentionally 




the day before 





13-06-2017 EU official Yes SDGs Referral Brussels 



















DISCLAIMER : the views expressed by the interviewees do not (per se) represent the views 
and opinions of the organisations/countries they work for or represent. 
 
Non-response rate 
Despite multiple attempts by e-mail and phone the following organisations/institutions could 
not be interviewed for the specific case studies 
- European Automobile Manufacturers' Association: ACEA (alternative fuels, other 
societal stakeholder) 
- Former EU official (general) 
- CSR Europe (SDGs, other societal stakeholder) 
- European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC) (climate change, SDGs, other societal 
stakeholder) 
- Netherlands Permanent Representation to EU (climate change & SDGs, MS official) 
- Members of European Parliament (SDGs, climate change, other societal stakeholder) 






Annex 2: List of Semi-structured Interview Questions and Interview 
Requests  
 
Case Study Team EU in UNFCCC Negotiations 
Semi-structured interview questions PhD Thesis Ries Kamphof 
‘Shared EU (External) Action on Sustainable Development Issues: a Politico-Legal 
Analysis of Shared Competences’, Case study EU negotiations at UNFCCC 
*Interviews will be anonymised. The list of interviewed people will only be available upon 
request. 
General questions/background: 
- In what way have you been active in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement? 
- What experience of negotiation do you have before or in the follow-up of the Paris 
Agreement? 
- How do you/(..) relate to the implementation of the Paris Agreement after the 
Presidency? 
- Do you have a legal background/education? If yes, (how) do you use this background 
in UNFCC negotiations? If no, do you ever miss this background in negotiations? 
 
European Union and the UNFCCC negotiations 
- According to your experience which institutions and/or Member States take the lead 
in the negotiations? 
- What role do legal rules (e.g. Treaty, case law) play in the cooperation and conflict 
between EU and Member States? 
- What role do political issues play in the cooperation and conflict between EU and 
Member States? 
- How did (..) position itself in the discussion about the division of responsibilities during 
international negotiations? 
- How important are other societal actors in climate negotiations? 
 
EU and climate, environmental and development policies 
- Do you consider the EU Member States to agree substantively on these topics? How 
does that affect a common stance in international negotiations? 
- According to you, is the EU and effective negotiator with third countries on these 
topics, e.g. at the United Nations? 




- Are there important issues we have not discussed yet?  





Case study SDG implementation 
Semi-structured interview questions PhD Thesis Ries Kamphof 
‘Shared EU (External) Action on Sustainable Development Issues: a Politico-Legal 
Analysis of Shared Competences’, Case study EU implementation SDGs/UN Agenda 
2030 




- In what way have you been active in the negotiation phase of the UN Agenda 2030? 
- How do you/your institution relate to the implementation of the UN Agenda 2030 and 
the Sustainable Development Goals? 
- Do you have a legal background/education? If yes, (how) do you use this background 
in SDG implementation? If no, do you ever miss this background in negotiations? 
 
European Union and the Sustainable Development Goals 
- According to your experience which institutions and/or Member States take the lead 
in SDG implementation? 
- What role do legal rules (e.g. Treaty, case law) play in the cooperation and conflict 
between EU and Member States in SDG implementation? 
- What role do political issues play in the cooperation and conflict between EU and 
Member States in SDG implementation 
- How does (…) position itself in the discussion about the division of responsibilities 
during SDG implementation? 
- How important are other societal actors in SDG implementation? 
 
EU and climate, environment and development policies 
- Do you consider the EU Member States to agree substantively on these topics? How 
does that affect SDG implementation? 
- According to you, is the EU and effective negotiator with third countries on these 
topics, e.g. at the United Nations? 




- Are there important issues we have not discussed yet?  







Case study alternative fuels (many interviews together with Thijs Bonenkamp) 
Interview questions research project alternative fuels 
-  How are you related to the European transport policy in general and the automotive 
production and fuels in particular? 
 
Scenario’s Ethanol/methanol vs hydrogen vs electrification 
- What is your opinion on the feasibility of the following scenarios in the EU for the 
future of transport, private vehicles: 
1. ‘All electric’ scenario: renewable electricity via battery to electrical motor with new 
distribution infrastructure and charging stations. 
2. Hydrogen-based scenario: hydrogen from renewable electricity via electrolysis, 
/fuel cell in every car for electricity from hydrogen from a tank and towards electrical 
motor, distribution infrastructure on the basis of hydrogen, could make use of the 
current autogas infrastructure 
3. ‘All liquid’ scenario: gasoline → bioethanol → methanol from renewables based on 
hydrogen/electrolysis/fuel cell catalytic reaction. No ‘disruptive’ change 
infrastructure/legislation. 
Could you please take into account the preferences from Member States and state 
whether you see any difference for short- and long-distances? 
- How important is oil import dependence for the future of automotives in the EU and 
how would this ‘priority’ relate to issues such as decreasing emissions, air pollution 
and decarbonisation of transport? 
- Did you ever consider methanol as a fuel option and why/why not? 
 
EU decision-making 
- Is there a common internal EU market on transportation fuels? 
- Transport policy is a ‘shared competence’ between EU and Member States. How 
would that affect this situation? 
- Which Member States would feel more inclined to introduce mass-scale introduction 
of E85 and flexi-fuel automotives and which ones would normally oppose such a 
move? 
- Which parties would you consider the main stakeholders in the debate on biofuels, 
decarbonisation of transport and bio-ethanol? EU vs rest of the world 
- Large scale introduction of ethanol production is much more common in other parts of 
the world (e.g. Brazil, United States). Why? 
 
Biofuel production/innovation 
- How has the transformation process from first generation biofuels production to 
second and third generation biofuels been proceeding? 
- Are there any European funds that promote innovation in biofuel production 
methods? 
- What measures can be taken to consolidate/enhance the success of biofuels in the 
(near) future? 





- Would you feel that certain issues need specific attention that are not covered in this 
interview? 
- Who do you advice to speak to for this research project? 




Hopefully everything is all right in (…) at the (..) 
With much interest I learned about the activities of (..) and (…). I wondered whether it is 
possible to speak to you for my PhD Thesis on shared competences and the EU sustainable 
development policies. I am particularly interested in the EU implementation of the UN 
Agenda 2030 and the SDGs and hope (one of) you could provide me with some answers. 
  
Hopefully it is possible to have the meeting with you in Brussels. I am planning to be in 
Brussels for some days/weeks in May, June and July. Would this 45-minute short and 
confidential interview be possible for example at (..), (..) or (..)? I could send the interview 
questions in advance. I would be most grateful if you can let me know whether you or one of 











Hopefully everything is all right at the (..). (Point of contact) referred to you as a very relevant 
expert overseeing the activities of the EU and its Member States, the conduct of UNFCCC 
negotiations and implementing sustainable development policies.  With much interest I 
learned about your activities (…). I wondered whether it is possible to speak to you for my 
PhD Thesis on shared competences and the EU sustainable development policies. I am 
particularly interested in the EU and its Member States at climate change negotiations, but 
also in general how the (shared) competences have an effect on (external) EU sustainable 
development policies and hope you could provide me with some answers. 
 
I am planning to be in Brussels for some days/weeks in (..). Would this 45-minute short and 
confidential interview be possible for example (..), (..) or (..)? I could send the interview 
questions in advance. I would be most grateful if you can let me know whether you or one of 
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